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FROM THE EDITORS
At a time when China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy and its national leader-
ship appear to have committed themselves firmly to a program of aircraft carrier
development over the coming decades, doubts are being voiced increasingly in
the West, and not least the United States itself, over the affordability and opera-
tional effectiveness of carriers in the current fiscal and strategic environment.
Aircraft carriers have served for some seven decades as in effect the capital ship
of the U.S. Navy. Will they continue in this role in the future? In addressing this
question, Robert C. Rubel, a retired naval aviator, offers a careful review of the
evolving “doctrinal” roles aircraft carriers have played for the Navy in the course
of their history and of the emerging strategic and operational challenges they
face. He concludes that while some of these roles appear to be obsolescing, the
carrier will likely be with us for the foreseeable future, though possibly in lesser
numbers and with a reduced emphasis on traditional strike missions. Professor
Rubel is dean of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies at the Naval War College.
Among military concepts that never quite seem to come into focus, “sea bas-
ing” surely ranks high. Sam J. Tangredi revisits the doctrinal and bureaucratic
state of play on this issue. Sea basing continues to be viewed and evaluated in
very different ways by the different services; the relative eclipse of the concept
over the last several years is a somewhat depressing testimony to the continuing
shortcomings of “jointness” in the U.S. military. Tangredi offers a cautious de-
fense of the continuing relevance of sea basing, with reference less to the most
frequently cited rationale—the potential political vulnerability of bases located
in allied territory—than to the growing physical vulnerability of fixed land bases
to long-range ballistic missile attack. Captain Tangredi, USN (Ret.), is a former
head of the Strategy and Concepts Branch of the Office of the Chief of Naval Op-
erations. This article will also appear in a forthcoming Newport Paper on U.S.
forward presence in Asia, the Pacific, and the Indian Ocean.
In “Three Disputes and Three Objectives: China and the South China Sea,”
Peter Dutton next provides a careful review of the regional tensions in Southeast
Asia generated over the last several years by China’s increasingly aggressive as-
sertion of its claims to the South China Sea at the expense of other littoral states,
as well as by its challenge to freedom of navigation and foreign military presence
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there, in contravention of a key and long-standing principle of American global
maritime policy. Dutton emphasizes the extent to which China’s sometimes in-
explicable behavior in this arena has heightened its neighbors’ suspicions of
Chinese motives and intentions and led them to invite the United States to en-
gage more actively on these issues. He argues that it is very much in China’s own
interest to refrain from unilateralist maritime claims, which can be invoked just
as well against it by other states, and suggests that all parties should focus on a
mutually advantageous diplomatic solution to the multiple disputes in ques-
tion. Peter Dutton is a retired U.S. Navy commander and the current director of
the China Maritime Studies Institute at the Naval War College.
In “Progressing Maritime Security Cooperation in the Indian Ocean,” Lee
Cordner highlights the maritime security challenges facing the littoral states of
the Indian Ocean and, citing in particular the lack of agreed maritime bound-
aries in many parts of the region, argues the need for new regional institutional
structures that can address and help devise solutions to these challenges.
Cordner notes the progress achieved in the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium,
which had its second meeting in Abu Dhabi in May 2010, but believes that en-
gagement at a more political level would be required to advance the process sig-
nificantly. He also stresses the importance of involving extraregional maritime
powers in such a process. All of this can be seen as an invitation to U.S. naval
planners and diplomats to explore ways to implement the agenda of the Navy’s
“Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower” in a maritime theater of grow-
ing global importance. Lee Cordner is a commodore in the active reserve of the
Royal Australian Navy.
As the United States begins shrinking its military footprint in Afghanistan, it
becomes a matter of some urgency to understand what progress it and its coali-
tion partners have actually made toward preparing the conditions desired for
the eventual withdrawal of foreign combat forces from that country and the as-
sumption of responsibility for its security by the Afghan government itself. Yet
formal efforts to gauge such progress have been late in coming, and the method-
ologies they utilize have been widely criticized. Two authors with recent
hands-on experience in Afghanistan and elsewhere analyze what has come to be
known within the U.S. military as “operational assessment” and the reasons why
it continues to fall short as a tool of the commander in contemporary counterin-
surgency warfare. Jonathan Schroden is a research analyst at the Center for Na-
val Analyses; Stephen Downes-Martin is a professor in the Warfare Analysis and
Research Department of the Naval War College.
Finally, in “Dewey at Manila Bay: Lessons in Operational Art and Opera-
tional Leadership from America’s First Fleet Admiral,” Commander Derek
Granger, USN, revisits a signal but neglected moment in American naval
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history—Commodore George Dewey’s decisive defeat of a squadron of the
Spanish navy in Manila Bay on 1 May 1898. He argues that this action should not
be seen merely as a tactical triumph but rather as a model of naval operational
art that continues to have relevance for naval officers today. Commander
Granger is a June 2011 graduate of the Naval War College.
IF YOU VISIT US
Our editorial offices are in Sims Hall, in the Naval War College Coasters Har-
bor Island complex, on the third floor, west wing (rooms W334, 334, 309). For
building-security reasons, it would be necessary to meet you at the main en-
trance and escort you to our suite—give us a call ahead of time (841-2236) or
use the phone at the main Sims Hall entrance (1-2236).
F R O M T H E E D I T O R S 5
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Rear Admiral Christenson became the fifty-third Presi-
dent of the U.S. Naval War College on 30 March 2011.
The fourth of six sons of a Navy Skyraider pilot and a
Navy nurse, he graduated from the U.S. Naval Acad-
emy in 1981.
At sea, he commanded USS McClusky (FFG 41), De-
stroyer Squadron 21 in USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74),
Carrier Strike Group 12, and the USS Enterprise (CVN
65) Strike Group. He most recently served as President,
Board of Inspection and Survey. He also served as the
antisubmarine warfare officer and main propulsion as-
sistant aboard USS Cook (FF 1083); as aide to Com-
mander, Cruiser Destroyer Group 1 in USS Long Beach
(CGN 9); as weapons officer aboard USS Downes (FF
1070); as Destroyer Squadron 21 combat systems officer,
in USS Nimitz (CVN 68); and as executive officer of
USS Harry W. Hill (DD 986). He deployed eight times
on seven ships, twice in command of McClusky.
Ashore, he commanded the Surface Warfare Officers
School in Newport, and as a new flag officer he served as
Commander, Naval Mine and Anti-submarine War-
fare Command, Corpus Christi, Texas. He also served at
the U.S. Naval Academy as a company officer, celestial
navigation instructor, assistant varsity soccer coach, and
member of the admissions board; at Headquarters, U.S.
Marine Corps, in the Strategic Initiatives Group; and on
the Joint Staff, in J5 (Strategic Plans and Policy) and as
executive assistant to the assistant chairman.
He graduated with distinction and first in his class from
the Naval War College, earning his master’s degree in
national security and strategic studies. He was also a
Navy Federal Executive Fellow at the Fletcher School of
Law and Diplomacy.
Rear Admiral Christenson has been awarded the De-
fense Superior Service Medal, the Legion of Merit (five
awards), the Meritorious Service Medal (two awards),
the Navy Commendation Medal (five awards), and the
Navy Achievement Medal.
Naval War College Review, Autumn 2011, Vol. 64, No. 4
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IN MARCH 2011, I WAS TOLD that I would be the fifty-third President
of the Naval War College. After smiling and making a few phone
calls to family to share the humbling news, I began to think about the great re-
sponsibilities that come along with the privilege of joining a line of leaders that
includes Alfred Thayer Mahan, Raymond Spruance, James B. Stockdale, and
Stansfield Turner. Filling their shoes would not be possible, but the potential to
do our nation and navy great good was nearly unlimited. And as I am the fourth
of six sons of a naval aviator and a Navy nurse who met and married in Newport,
this city has a special place in my heart.
Newport has hosted great Sailors since well before America’s independence
and before the formation of the U.S. Navy. The “rebel” captain John Paul Jones
sailed the Continental Navy sloop Providence in the waters off Newport in the
days leading up to the Revolution. Two and a third centuries later, Newport re-
mains a “Navy town,” and the phrase “going to Newport” evokes a sense of antic-
ipation and excitement unique to all the seaports of the world.
Although Newport is now more likely to be the port of call for cruise ships
than for warships, it is still an internationally recognized venue for maritime
study, research, and thought. Newport and the Naval War College mean differ-
ent things to different people, and when we ask “Why Newport?” we need to
consider the answer from a number of different perspectives.
Why Newport? The Global Perspective. Great nations have great navies, and
great navies have world-class institutions of learning. The U.S. Navy is blessed to
have three—at Annapolis, Maryland; Monterey, California; and here in New-
port. For the past 127 years the Naval War College has served as America’s home
for the study of sea power and as a catalyst for international maritime security
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cooperation. Officers from allied navies have been attending classes in Newport
with their American counterparts since 1894, when Royal Swedish Navy officers
contributed their insights into the revolution in maritime affairs that gripped
the world at the end of the nineteenth century. Ever since, seamen speaking
many languages have met as equals in the classrooms and on the game floors of
the College and have selflessly shared the lessons of centuries of maritime heri-
tage and experience. The decades have shown that wise judgment and sound
tactics have no particular nationality and that the power of a persuasive argu-
ment is universal. This tradition continues in the twenty-first century, with over
sixty-five nations participating annually in the College’s international pro-
grams. Today, as in the past, free and open seas remain key to the preservation of
peace and the expansion of international commerce. This fact energizes the stu-
dents and faculty every day; it inspires them to study the lessons of history and to
deepen the international friendships that build and maintain order on the ocean
commons. The breadth of the global maritime partnerships that have been facil-
itated by Newport alumni will be evident this fall when the College hosts the
Twentieth International Seapower Symposium, which will bring together the
leaders of over a hundred of the world’s navies for consultation, discussion, and
thinking about our shared interests at sea.
Why Newport? The National Perspective. By tradition and by design, the intel-
lectual endeavors in Newport have a decidedly saltwater flavor. The fact that the
school is surrounded by the beautiful waters of a broad bay, however, does not
obscure the reality that preservation of our nation’s security demands not only
mastery of seapower but also the learned application of the skills of the soldier,
the airman, and the diplomat. Our student body consists (aside from about 150
international students) of a diverse group of leaders from all the military ser-
vices, as well as from the federal government agencies and departments that
must work effectively and seamlessly to “provide for the common defense,” as
called for in the Constitution. The academic and research programs in Newport
address such issues as the size and composition of military forces necessary to
meet the nation’s worldwide commitments; the impact of the defense budget on
the national economy and the industrial base; and the role of the military estab-
lishment in a free society. The composition of seminars and study groups en-
sures that the insights of the Foreign Service officer, the intelligence specialist,
and the international student carry equal weight with those of the career U.S.
military professionals during the spirited and sometimes heated debates that oc-
cur daily. The network of alumni created by each class provides interservice, in-
teragency, and international connections that continue to make the world a
better place for decades after graduation.
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Why Newport? The Navy’s Perspective. The unequaled size and technological
complexity of the U.S. Navy requires that its junior officers be singularly focused
during the early parts of their careers. Qualification and then proficiency as a
naval aviator, a nuclear submariner, or a surface warfare officer (who is also of-
ten nuclear trained) provides the foundation upon which a full career is based.
But as these officers mature and are promoted to higher levels of responsibility,
their vision must expand beyond their tactical mastery. The Naval War College
offers the professional development opportunity that enables students to refo-
cus their attention on the operational and strategic aspects of their profession.
The proven warfare specialists and associated restricted line and staff corps ex-
perts are required to consider the issues that arise from employing the Navy’s
core capabilities of forward presence, deterrence, sea control, maritime security,
and humanitarian assistance and disaster response in an ever-changing world.
They then consider how these expanded core capabilities are used in conjunc-
tion with the land, air, space, and cyberspace capabilities of all the services to
support the national security strategy. The officers who depart from Newport
—with joint-service, interagency, and international mind-sets—are truly quali-
fied to lead forces into harm’s way in any environment or contingency.
Why Newport? The Officer’s Perspective. Military officers spend their careers
more concerned about the welfare of others than about their own. They accept a
call to service that frequently demands that they leave the safety and security of
their homes and families to travel to distant and often dangerous foreign waters
and lands.
As I told our students at my change of command ceremony, “This year in
Newport is truly a gift from your country to you. The books, the faculty, the time
at this point in your life will probably never happen again. You all know people
who are struggling in this economy, you all know people who are in harm’s
way—you are neither. Your orders are to read, study, think, and write. Do that,
and I promise, you too will be changed forever. And your country, in giving you
this year, will most certainly receive the benefit when you leave here forever
changed for the better.”
Why Newport? The Family’s Perspective. Most of our students are fortunate
enough to be able to bring their families to Newport to share in the Newport ex-
perience. They find warm and welcoming communities outside the gates, beau-
tiful waters everywhere, and history and adventures beyond compare. The
military member is not on duty (in the same way), not deployed, and not at sea
or in the field. Students here are busy, since the demands of the academic pro-
grams are significant, but the nature of the work in Newport is different, and the
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rewards of a year here last a lifetime. It is amazing how many graduates seek me
out to express their sincere gratitude for the exceptional education our faculty
delivered to them—and to say that is was also the best year of their families’ lives.
The folklore here is that getting all the reading done “is only hard if you do
it”—to which I love to reply, “Well, I read every word, and it changed me for-
ever.” And the reading continues. The pages that follow represent the ongoing
contribution that Newport still makes to the things that matter to our maritime
nation and our world.
The year I spent in Newport did change me forever, and I hope the previous
paragraphs have answered the question, “Why Newport?”
JOHN N. CHRISTENSON
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College
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Professor Rubel is Dean of Naval Warfare Studies at the
Naval War College. Before retiring from the U.S. Navy
in the grade of captain, he was an aviator, participating
in operations connected with the 1973 Yom Kippur
War, the 1980 Iranian hostage crisis, the TWA Flight
847 crisis, and DESERT SHIELD. He commanded Strike
Fighter Squadron 131 and served as the inspector gen-
eral of U.S. Southern Command. He attended the
Spanish Naval War College and the U.S. Naval War
College, where he served on the faculty and as chairman
of the War Gaming Department, in the Center for Na-
val Warfare Studies, before his present appointment. He
has a BS degree from the University of Illinois, an MS in
management from Salve Regina University in Newport,
Rhode Island, and an MA in national security and stra-
tegic studies from the Naval War College (1986).
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THE FUTURE OF AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
Robert C. Rubel
The aircraft carrier has been around in various forms since the First WorldWar. Its emergence as the key denominator of naval power is legendary, and
its continuing prestige in this role is even yet spawning building programs
among established and growing navies. The aircraft carrier is the largest and
most complex of all warships and in most cases the most expensive. In addition
to the cost of the ship itself, that of the embarked air wing must be considered,
not to mention the extensive logistics and training infrastructure needed to keep
carriers operating and useful. A recent Naval Postgraduate School study has
shown that approximately 46 percent of the Navy’s personnel—officer, enlisted,
and civilian—are assigned to positions either on or supporting its carriers.1 For
these and other reasons, there has been almost constant debate over the past
ninety years within navies, between navies and air forces, and within govern-
ments over the advisability of investing in carriers. As the prospects for major
cutbacks in defense spending loom, the debate will again heat up. Both propo-
nents and opponents of carriers have refined their arguments over the past nine
decades, but these are now starting to wear thin as the geopolitical environment
and the technology of war have changed. Also, the arguments both for and
against have tended toward the theological, with many tacit or unacknowledged
assumptions underpinning the argumentative maneuvers. In an attempt to im-
prove the quality of the coming debates, this article will examine the prospects
for future utility of the ship type, including that of the embarked air wing, from
a different angle. Instead of making a holistic judgment on the future utility of
aircraft carriers, it will focus on the ways they have been, are, or could be used.
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Within the bounds of security classification, it will also attempt to sort out the
risk factors that attend their use. Others may then proceed to decide whether a
continued investment in them is justified.
In order even to begin to analyze the future of aircraft carriers, a definition of
the type is warranted. It is easy to accept that the imposing, nuclear-powered
Nimitz-class carriers (CVNs) of the U.S. Navy are truly aircraft carriers, operat-
ing as they do robust mini–air forces of sixty to eighty tactical jets and support
aircraft. Similarly, the French Charles de Gaulle and the Brazilian São Paulo are
clearly aircraft carriers, if significantly smaller. The former Russian Varyag, now
being refurbished by the Chinese, is also clearly an aircraft carrier, meant as it is
to handle fixed-wing jets as well as helicopters. There are a number of similar
ships around the world that are meant to support operations of short-takeoff/
vertical-landing (STOVL) jets. However, the definition becomes less clear in the
case of ships that are capable of supporting STOVL jets but whose stated pur-
pose is either amphibious assault (the U.S. Wasp and Tarawa classes, for exam-
ple) or antisubmarine warfare (the Japanese Hyuga-class “destroyers,” which
have ship-long flight decks).2 Principally, though these latter ships are designed
to operate helicopters, they could have—and they have in fact—operated
STOVLs. However, despite their ability to operate STOVL jets, these ships can-
not be considered true aircraft carriers, since, as will be seen, they cannot ade-
quately perform the doctrinal roles that aircraft carriers have historically
fulfilled.
A SHORT DOCTRINAL HISTORY OF AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
Most histories of aircraft carriers focus on the progressive development of their
physical characteristics and their performance in battle. However, in order to
understand the issues that will influence their future, it is necessary to under-
stand how the doctrinal roles of aircraft carriers have evolved. Since navies in
general and the U.S. Navy in particular do not publish doctrine along these lines,
it is necessary to infer it from the way the carriers have been used.
The normal way to discuss doctrinal roles of aircraft carriers is in terms of
“sea control” and “power projection”—this terminology being congruent with
the way the U.S. Navy describes its strategic missions. However, these terms are
too broad and indiscriminate to allow clear analysis of the strengths and weak-
nesses of aircraft carriers. Power projection could mean either one-time strikes
or sustained, “level of effort” operations to prosecute air campaigns against en-
emy infrastructure or in support of ground forces with interdiction and close air
support. However, it makes a critical difference whether operations against land
require a carrier to constrain its movements or not. Thus terms like “power
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projection” and “strike,” and even “sea control,” are too broad to be useful in this
discussion. For the purpose of this article, they are subsumed, as appropriate,
within the roles described below.
The six doctrinal roles aircraft carriers have performed are presented below
in roughly the order they were adopted.
Eyes of the Fleet. In their earliest instantiation in the U.S. Navy, aircraft carriers
were conceived of as platforms whose aircraft would be used to locate the enemy
fleet before it broke the horizon so that one’s own battle line could maneuver to
engage at best advantage. Once the battle lines were engaged within visual range,
aircraft would spot the fall of shot, adjusting the fire of major-caliber guns more
quickly and accurately and at longer ranges than could observers high in the bat-
tleships’ masts. In this role, the carrier would operate with its own fleet’s battle
line interposed between it and the enemy; without substantial defense of its
own, the carrier could not be subjected to risk. Its air wing would consist almost
solely of scout planes, which was appropriate in view of the limited performance
of the aircraft of the day. However, it did not take long to realize that the advan-
tages of aircraft scouting and shot spotting were so great that an opposing fleet
would obtain its own carriers and embark on them fighters to shoot down
scouts. Thus carriers quickly became homes to fighter aircraft that could fight
for and win air superiority over the enemy fleet so that the scouts could do their
mission.
Cavalry. In some of the fleet battle experiments in the 1930s and throughout
most of World War II, the carriers took on the mission of conducting hit-and-
run raids, the most famous of which was the Doolittle raid on Tokyo in early
1942.3 Operating in a manner not unlike the cavalry of Confederate general Na-
than Bedford Forrest in the Civil War, the fast carriers depended on speed and
stealth to sneak into waters in which the Japanese fleet held sway in order to at-
tack bases and otherwise disrupt enemy logistical operations. In this role, the
carriers could not risk getting into a decisive engagement, any more than a Civil
War cavalry brigade could risk becoming snared in a dismounted fight with
infantry.
Capital Ship. A “capital ship,” rightly understood, is a ship type that can defeat
any other ship type. In the days of sail and dreadnoughts, it was the type of ship
having the most and biggest guns. It is the ship type around which fleet doctrine
and fleet architecture are established. The question is what kind of killing
weapon the capital ship supports. In the early 1920s, as naval aviation was gestat-
ing, it became clear from war games at the U.S. Naval War College that if aircraft
performance kept increasing, a coordinated attack by carrier aircraft with
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armor-piercing bombs could sink a battleship before it ever got in range of one’s
own fleet. This notion was validated by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and
by the sinking of two British dreadnoughts by Japanese land-based aircraft. Sub-
sequently, the great carrier battles of the Pacific determined the outcome of the
war as much as great sailing-ship battles had those of earlier conflicts. Used as
capital ships, the acceptable risk profile for aircraft carriers changes substantially
—they become consumables, just like any other capital ship. However, in subject-
ing themselves to risk they must be
able to inflict such harm on the
main enemy force that it is not ca-
pable of further contesting “com-
mand of the sea” at an acceptable
level of risk to itself. Since the battle of Leyte Gulf, carriers have not been used in
this role.
When nations commit their capital ships to a battle, it is generally for com-
mand of the sea, having achieved which, by virtue of defeating and seriously
weakening the opponent’s main fleet, a force may use the seas for its own strate-
gic purposes. Fighting for sea control in specific instances may still be necessary.
The carrier battles of World War II were generally aimed at securing command
of the sea; however, the carriers still had to function as local sea-control plat-
forms, a role in which they were very effective. However, it should be noted that
as the American fleet approached the Japanese home islands, threats from land-
based defenses required ever greater concentrations of carriers to secure suffi-
cient control of the sea to allow amphibious operations to take place.
Nuclear-Strike Platform. The advent of nuclear weapons caused significant tur-
moil within the U.S. military establishment. The newly independent Air Force
argued that its intercontinental nuclear bombers made aircraft carriers obsolete.
The Navy, for its part, sought to defend the carrier force by making it a part of the
nation’s nuclear war plans and deterrent posture. As a nuclear delivery platform,
the carrier would operate a bit as it did in the cavalry role, depending on speed
and stealth to reach a point at which it could launch its nuclear bombers. After
that launch, it would attempt to survive as best it could, either to get back to the
United States or to be ready for additional tasking. The point is that in this role,
just as in the cavalry and capital-ship roles, its mode of operation was to deliver a
pulse of power and then scoot—standing and fighting was a recipe for destruc-
tion. Keeping risk acceptable was a function of the ability to stay unlocated and
untargeted. The ballistic-missile nuclear submarine replaced the aircraft carrier
in this role because the risk of it being found before it could fire its missiles was
all but eliminated.
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USS Ford, the United States will have nuclear
carriers around for at least the next fifty years.
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Airfield at Sea. Three traditional rules govern how a fleet should be employed:
1. Keep the fleet concentrated.
2. Do not tie a mobile fleet to a piece of ground.
3. Do not become decisively engaged with land forces unless decisively
superior.
These rules can be violated, but the conditions have to be right—namely, there
can be no significant opposition at sea. In order to support a ground fight ashore
or conduct a continuous air campaign (power projection in the “level of effort”
mode), aircraft carriers have to break at least rules 2 and 3, and in order to main-
tain a carrier on station for months or years, as was done in Vietnam, they must
break rule 1. The requirement to feed aircraft continuously into a land fight es-
sentially robs the aircraft carrier of its maneuverability, due to the relatively
short range of carrier-borne tactical jets. During the wars in Korea and Vietnam
and all operations since the fall of the Soviet Union, in the almost complete ab-
sence of at-sea opposition, U.S. aircraft carriers have operated exclusively in this
role. The one exception was the U.S.-Soviet face-down in the eastern Mediterra-
nean in conjunction with the 1973 Yom Kippur War between Israel and an as-
sortment of Arab powers. In that crisis, three American carrier groups were
positioned to be ready to assist the Israelis with land strikes. Meanwhile, the nu-
merically superior Soviet Fifth Eskadra positioned itself to sink or disable the
carriers.4 This represented a fundamental paradox in doctrinal roles for the car-
riers, and they faced tactical defeat had hostilities broken out, having insuffi-
cient sea room to maneuver so as to adopt a capital-ship posture. The key to
using carriers in the “airfield at sea” role is to take explicit account of their in-
ability to tolerate much risk at all.
Geopolitical Chess Piece. It has been the habit of American presidents and their
advisers in the gamut of crises since World War II to move aircraft carriers
around to demonstrate American concern, resolve, or outright anger. The par-
ticular benefits of using carriers in this way are that they operate on the high
seas, where permission to move is not needed from other countries, and that be-
cause they carry their own fuel, weapons, and maintenance, they are ready on
arrival at the scene of a crisis to deliver power. Moreover, since modern U.S. car-
riers are large and imposing, and have been unchallenged on the seas, they
“show the flag” to great effect—they provide excellent “visuals.” Here too, how-
ever, precisely because they need to be visible in this role, and because they nor-
mally must be ready to function also as an airfield at sea, carriers cannot tolerate
any significant risk. This was the difficulty in the Yom Kippur War crisis men-
tioned previously. The Navy and the nation are so used to operating carriers
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with impunity as airfields at sea that as new sea-denial threats emerge (as did the
Soviet navy) the potential for a role/risk disconnect is magnified.
Another definition of “capital ship,” though not unrelated to its operational
definition, is that of a ship type whose power, expense, and prestige are so great
that it becomes the yardstick for measuring a nation’s naval power. This defini-
tion is essentially a different slant on the “geopolitical chess piece” role. This view
arose especially during the age of dreadnoughts, when the Washington Treaty at-
tempted to rein in naval arms races by formally limiting the tonnage of battle-
ships.5 Aircraft carriers became the objects of this type of thinking, and this is one
of the reasons that a number of emerging navies, as well as established navies
under pressure from shrinking budgets, are electing to devote higher propor-
tions of their resources to building them.
However, for the United States, this thinking could become a geopolitical
trap. The Nimitz- and Ford-class carriers are built at only one yard, in Newport
News, Virginia. Currently, they are being built at the rate of one every five years,
in order to maintain the Navy’s inventory of them at eleven. One of these carri-
ers, including its air wing, costs about as much as ten nuclear submarines or al-
most twenty guided-missile destroyers. When debates arise about how many
carriers this nation really needs, one of the arguments employed to oppose re-
ductions is that if it does not keep building these ships, it will lose the workforce
needed to construct them. Not having the capability to construct a large nuclear-
powered carrier would, some argue, put the nation at strategic risk. However,
this line of reasoning seems to be based more on the general notion that carriers
represent national strength than on any specific strategic or operational neces-
sity. Even if it does not build another carrier after USS Ford, the United States
will have nuclear carriers around for at least the next fifty years. It does not seem
reasonable to presume that the strategic future of the United States hinges on a
few thousand shipyard workers in Virginia.
OTHER ROLES FOR AVIATION SHIPS
In World War II, the majority of the aircraft carriers the United States built were
termed “escort carriers.” These small ships could carry only a few aircraft and
were used mostly for antisubmarine (ASW) work or for air support of amphibi-
ous operations. Because of their limited capacity and slow speed, they could not
be adequately used in any of the six doctrinal roles outlined above. In the 1950s,
a number of World War II fast carriers of the Essex class were converted to anti-
submarine carriers. These ships carried mostly sub-hunting aircraft, with a few
jets for self-defense. Other Essexes were turned into helicopter carriers, for helo-
borne assaults over the beach. Once these ships had passed their useful service
lives, vessels designed from the keel up as helicopter carriers were put into
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service; progressively newer designs have entered the fleet ever since. Some new
versions of the through-deck aviation ship now complicate the matter of desig-
nation. The recently commissioned Spanish “strategic projection ship” Juan
Carlos would seem to blur doctrinal boundaries, because it features a “ski jump”
for operating STOVL jets. Nevertheless, the ship’s design focuses on amphibious
operations more than any of the doctrinal roles mentioned above.
Aside from ship designs or conversions with specific mission focuses of ASW
or amphibious assault, regular aircraft carriers, by virtue of their inherent flexi-
bility, have been pressed into service in a number of collateral missions in recent
years, most prominently disaster relief and humanitarian assistance. In this
mode they mostly operate helicopters, although other aspects of their capability
come into play, such as communications, freshwater distillation, and medical ca-
pacity. It is worthwhile noting at this point that the impetus behind the forth-
coming new Chinese aircraft carrier may have been more frustration at inability
to participate in the 2004 tsunami relief effort in Indonesia (where the Nimitz-
class carrier USS Abraham Lincoln played a key part) than a desire to face down
American carriers.
In considering the future of aircraft carriers, we should understand that aviation-
capable ships engaging in specialized or collateral missions will always be needed
to some extent. Whether ships used for these purposes look like aircraft carriers or
not, the calculus for the advisability of building them will be different from that
which governs true aircraft carriers.
THE IMPACT OF FUTURE TECHNOLOGY
Armed with an understanding of their doctrinal roles, we can proceed to assess
how current and future weapons and systems technologies might affect the util-
ity of aircraft carriers. It is a matter not simply of whether the carrier can be de-
fended or not but of whether it can fulfill the doctrinal role the nation requires
of it.
Antiship Ballistic Missiles. Professional journals have been full of articles analyz-
ing the potential impact of the recently developed Chinese DF-21F intermediate-
range ballistic missile, fitted with a maneuvering reentry head that has an anti-
ship seeker built into it. The purpose of this missile is thought to be not so much
to sink the carrier as to achieve a “mission kill,” causing fires and damage to the
air wing and topside structures. If the missile system is perceived to be effective
at this, then its existence and the presence of its mobile transporter/erector/
launchers would constitute a deterrent to U.S. interference in an invasion of Tai-
wan or in other Chinese initiatives within about a thousand miles of China’s
coast. Assuming that a terminal, hit-to-kill defense is not feasible against it, this
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missile would seem to threaten seriously the future utility of the aircraft carrier
anywhere within its range. On the other hand, having a seeker, it could be vul-
nerable to decoying. If this is the case, the probabilities for missile success are re-
duced. This leads us to think in terms of what role the carrier might be playing as
it sails into DF-21 threat range. If the carrier is functioning as cavalry, a capital
ship, or a nuclear-strike platform—that is, delivering a pulse of power and then
escaping—the risk tolerance inherent in those roles might be compatible with the
reduced but still significant threat posed by the DF-21. If, however, the carrier is
being used as either an airfield at sea or a geopolitical chess piece, its mobility sac-
rificed and the risk incurred likely would be incommensurate with the role.
Submarines, Antiship Cruise Missiles, and Other Access-Denial Systems. The ef-
fect of these systems is similar to that of the DF-21. Current and anticipated de-
fensive systems for the carrier are likely to be able to handle small numbers of
these weapons. However, when larger numbers are employed against the carrier
—and this will probably only happen in littoral waters—the likelihood of “leak-
ers” increases. Once again, depending on the role the carrier is playing, the risk
may be tolerable, especially if the carrier is free to maneuver. If a combination of
geography and doctrinal role constrains its mobility and maneuverability, the
risk climbs quickly.
Some have advocated, on these grounds, that smaller carriers ought to be
built in larger numbers to achieve “tactical stability,” the condition in which the
defensive capabilities of the ship and its contributions to the overall offensive
power of the force are in balance. Games at the Naval War College have cast some
doubt on this logic, quite apart from considerations of the relative efficiency of
large and small flight decks. It appears that doctrinal role is a governing factor. In
general, it seems that if mobility is compromised by doctrinal role, the net risk to
the force is the same, whether the force is composed of one or two large, or four
to six small, carriers. Nothing changes, except in the inefficiencies and added
cost of multiple small carriers.
Improved Air-Defense Systems. In one important sense, the viability of tactical
airpower is the essence of the future utility of aircraft carriers. New types of surface-
to-air missile systems have made operation of nonstealthy aircraft within their
range excessively risky. Also, new generations of fighters, notably the Su-27, its de-
rivatives, and even newer designs from Russia and China, have eroded the techni-
cal advantages traditionally enjoyed by American aircraft. New types of air-to-air
missiles, fighter radars, and sophisticated crew/system interfaces have similarly
lessened the advantage our superior training has conferred. All of this calls into
question the utility of aircraft carriers as strike (cavalry) platforms or airfields at
sea against a well armed opponent. The same trend holds in the arena of war at
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sea, at least with respect to surface-to-air missiles, and may compromise the via-
bility of the aircraft carrier in the capital-ship role. To fight modern, high-tech air
defenses, sea or land based, missiles may be the only viable answer, although very
stealthy unmanned aircraft operating from aircraft carriers may also be viable, es-
pecially if equipped with short-range attack missiles.
Short-Takeoff/Vertical-Landing Jets. The advent of the F-35B STOVL Joint Strike
Fighter (JSF) promises to enhance significantly the overall capabilities of a ski
jump–equipped carrier. The question is whether this increase in capability
would both allow such smaller aviation-capable ships to function as regular air-
craft carriers and change the calculus of the various doctrinal roles. It appears
that the F-35B will offer increases in range and load-carrying capability over the
AV-8 Harrier, the British-developed “jump jet” that has served a number of na-
vies and the U.S. Marines for decades. However, these increases do not come
close to bringing the F-35B into the same class as conventional-takeoff-and-
landing carrier aircraft, and the range and endurance of even these are short
enough to require the carrier to get in rather close to the fight. The principal ad-
vantages of the F-35B will be its increased connectivity, sensing, and stealth—all
good things, but not sufficient to change the logic inherent in the doctrinal roles.
Moreover, the small number of aircraft that can be carried on the ski-jump car-
riers limits their ability to perform some of the doctrinal roles. They will likely
remain useful support ships for amphibious and antisubmarine operations, es-
pecially operating helicopters, and will constitute prestige platforms for small
navies to show the flag.
Unmanned Aircraft (UAVs). What could potentially change the calculus of doc-
trinal roles is the unmanned aircraft. For a given “deck spot” (the square footage
an aircraft takes up parked on a carrier’s flight or hangar deck), unmanned air-
craft offer double or triple the range and endurance of manned aircraft. More-
over, without the need to accommodate a human, their form can be considerably
more stealthy, and their operations do not need to take into account crew-rest
factors, at least to the extent that they do in manned aircraft. What this may offer
in terms of doctrinal roles is a return of the carrier as the eyes of the fleet, operat-
ing a wing of long-range UAVs for reconnaissance and perhaps line-of-sight
communications relay. A carrier could then remain outside most threat “enve-
lopes,” with much more scope for maneuvering to keep from being targeted. The
longer range of UAVs (including unmanned combat aerial vehicles, or UCAVs)
would also allow the carrier to function as an airfield at sea with less risk. In
terms of command and control, however, UAVs that require a constant “man in
the loop” would not offer as much flexibility to the carrier as those with higher
degrees of autonomy.
R U B E L 2 1
NWC_2011AutumnReview_Rubel.ps
\\data1\john.lanzieri.ctr$\msdata\Desktop\NavalWarCollege\NWC_2011AutumnReview\NWC_2011AutumnReview.vp
Friday, July 29, 2011 8:26:04 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
27
Naval War College: Full Autumn 2011 Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2011
FUTURE DOCTRINAL ROLES
The traditional rationale for aircraft carriers is that they provide tactical air-
power independent of land bases and that—no small thing—they are ready to
do so on arrival. While all of this is true and constitutes concrete benefits of hav-
ing aircraft carriers, the real arguments for and against them reside in their doc-
trinal roles. Which of the traditional roles are obsolete? Do the remaining ones
justify continuing investment in aircraft carriers? Are there emerging or poten-
tial roles for carriers that would justify building more?
As has been mentioned, the development of unmanned aircraft may revitalize
the primordial role of aircraft carriers as eyes of the fleet. Operating a wing of vari-
ous kinds of UAVs, the carriers could conduct what is known as C4ISR (com-
mand, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and recon-
naissance) or establish a grid of airborne relay nodes that would support a fleet
battle network if satellites were destroyed or intense jamming occurred. Because
of the vulnerability of land bases to ballistic missiles, and at increasing distances
from potential war zones, the arguments that the Navy has used in the realm of
tactical airpower to justify carriers also serve for carrier-based C4ISR. As with tac-
tical airpower, regardless of how long aircraft range is and how much in-flight re-
fueling is available, if land bases are distant from the area of operations, it takes far
more aircraft to generate a continuous presence in the battle space and operations
are far less responsive and flexible than they would be if based from a nearby car-
rier. A local source of UAVs, if land bases are far away, is invaluable operationally
and strategically.
The cavalry role for carriers, practiced as late as the 1986 EL DORADO CANYON
strikes on Libya, has become a victim of the missile age. In the most recent round
of strikes on Libya, Tomahawk cruise missiles were used. Now possessing
guided-missile submarines that can carry over a hundred Tomahawks, the Navy
does not have to accept risks of running a carrier surreptitiously into hostile wa-
ters to carry out a strike or subjecting manned tactical aircraft to robust air de-
fenses. In a similar manner, the introduction of the ballistic-missile submarine
made the carrier nuclear-strike role obsolete. Whatever the trade-offs between
tactical aircraft, manned or unmanned, and missiles, the lethality of modern air
defenses and the difficulty of moving naval forces undetected militate strongly
against using carriers in this role. It does not appear that a carrier operating
UCAVs would offer any significant advantage in the cavalry role over a subma-
rine carrying cruise missiles.
As for the capital-ship role, in the missile age the whole concept may be
obsolete. There has been a constant ebb and flow of technical and tactical superi-
ority of the offense and defense at sea, but mostly the offense now dominates—
modern antiship missiles are very fast and hard to shoot down. Certainly, they
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are dependent on the successful functioning of their seeker heads; these can be
decoyed or blinded, and the prospect of close-in directed-energy defenses may
tilt the balance in favor of the defense.6 However, a successful defense of the car-
rier does no good if the carrier cannot in turn succeed in attacking enemy naval
forces. Improvements in air-defense technology by Russia and China and the
prospects for their proliferation will make the tactical offense progressively
more difficult and risky. It should be recalled that in the great carrier battles of
World War II, the aircraft losses were brutal, on the order of 70 percent for the
Japanese and 28 percent for the
Americans.7 In the late 1970s, as
naval aviation developed aircraft-
centric antiship tactics in the after-
math of the wake-up call of the
1973 episode, it became clear that a single strike on a single formation of Soviet
ships might cost a quarter of an air wing.8 Whereas we were able to replace such
losses in 1942–45, no such thing would be possible today, given the complexity
and expense of modern jets.
The upshot is that the seas, at least certain areas of them, are becoming a
no-man’s-land for surface ships. Whether or not submarines ought to be consid-
ered capital ships is beside the point; the carrier will likely not be one. On the
other hand, for scenarios short of high-end missile combat, there is no ship
more able to exercise general control of a large ocean area than an aircraft car-
rier, fanning out its air wing to scout and identify surface vessels. Carrier aircraft
probably are the best counter, for example, to the small-boat swarms that some
countries, like Iran, have adopted, assuming the carrier can operate out of range
of the densest littoral defenses.
Currently, the “airfield at sea” is almost the exclusive role for the large aircraft
carrier, essentially fused with that of the “geopolitical chess piece.” This (com-
bined) role will continue to be highly useful into the future, so long as the inten-
sity of defenses stays below a certain threshold. If either high-tech air or naval
defenses proliferate, the number of areas and scenarios in which carriers can
function in this role will decline. If this happens, the value of the carrier as a geo-
political chess piece will erode proportionately. This is a key uncertainty about
the future and a central difficulty in assessing the future value of aircraft carri-
ers. If a ground fight occurs close to the coast and a carrier could move in with
impunity to provide air support, perhaps through-deck amphibious ships flying
STOVL aircraft would suffice. But their capacity to generate sorties and the
number of targets they can strike are nowhere near what is possible for large car-
riers with catapults and arresting wires; moreover, if deep penetration is needed,
as has been the case in Afghanistan, nothing less than a large carrier operating
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conventional aircraft will do. Because of miniaturization, advanced electronics,
and advances in missile, mine, torpedo, and submarine design, it is becoming
easier to hide naval defenses. A particular case in point is the Club-K cruise mis-
sile marketed by the Russian company Novator. Four missiles could be housed in
an innocuous-looking shipping container, hidden in plain sight and ready to be
fired from trucks, railroad cars, or commercial ships.9 Similar advances in co-
vertness can be expected in other weapons types. The implication is that it will
be difficult or impossible to “sanitize” an area where a carrier can function as an
airfield at sea.
What new doctrinal roles might emerge for the aircraft carrier? One that comes
to mind is a variation on “eyes of the fleet.” If the struggle for sea control migrates
to below the surface, an aircraft carrier might be highly useful as a submarine-
support vessel. The carrier would not only provide C4ISR services for subma-
rines but disrupt air and surface ASW efforts by the enemy, perhaps even con-
duct ASW itself. Especially if operating long-range UAVs, the carrier might be
able to maneuver more widely and thereby perform this role at an acceptable de-
gree of risk—or better put, at a level of risk commensurate with the doctrinal
role.
Another potential supporting role for the carrier is as a mother ship for the
littoral combat ship (LCS). The LCS has limited sea-keeping capability and must
have a source of logistical support relatively close by, especially if it is to operate
at high speed and high combat tempo. If a squadron of LCSs must enter a high-
threat area where there are no bases and where regular logistical ships would be
at excessive risk, a nuclear carrier might be the answer. Having considerable fuel
and ammunition-storage capacity, high sustained speeds, and self-defense abil-
ity (with its escorts), a carrier could range around undetected or untargeted un-
til a covert rendezvous with one or more LCSs could be arranged. While a
logistical support system that employs submarines might be the ideal, this ar-
rangement may be the most feasible in the short term. In conjunction with this
role, the carrier, operating both manned and unmanned aircraft, could provide
tactical scouting for littoral combat vessels as well as a secure and robust local
battle network.
A NEW CALCULUS
This assessment of doctrinal roles is revealing. Certain roles for the carrier are
already obsolete, and others are eroding. A few new roles are emerging, but these
place the carrier in a new position in relation to the rest of the fleet. Whereas the
carrier has been the central pivot of the fleet since World War II, the arbiter and
yardstick of naval supremacy and the keystone of fleet architecture, it will gradu-
ally become a more narrowly useful role player. There will be, for the foreseeable
2 4 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
NWC_2011AutumnReview_Rubel.ps
\\data1\john.lanzieri.ctr$\msdata\Desktop\NavalWarCollege\NWC_2011AutumnReview\NWC_2011AutumnReview.vp
Friday, July 29, 2011 8:26:04 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
30
Naval War College Review, Vol. 64 [2011], No. 4, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol64/iss4/1
future, situations that demand an aircraft carrier, so it can be said with confidence
that the ship type will be needed. However, the constriction in its roles and in the
locations and circumstances in which it could be appropriately used (i.e., where
doctrinal role and risk intersect) indicates that a new calculus is needed to deter-
mine how many the U.S. Navy really needs.
This article has dealt only obliquely with the issue of small versus large carri-
ers. The author has served on both types and is convinced that nonnuclear ships
under about eighty thousand tons sacrifice too much total combat capability to
be worthwhile investments as aircraft carriers. On the other hand, aviation ships
that can support operationally significant numbers of helicopters and STOVL
jets will be useful in amphibious and antisubmarine operations as well as a host
of others, including disaster relief, noncombatant evacuation, and various types
of humanitarian assistance.
An embedded implication in all this for amphibious operations should be
noted. If things are too hot to allow a carrier to operate as an airfield at sea, they
are too hot for an amphibious assault. If the number of times and places a carrier
can operate as an airfield at sea decrease, they decrease as well for amphibious
operations. Any assumptions about the ability to “roll back” enemy defenses
must be severely tempered by the likelihood that new technologies will produce
weapons that can be hidden from preemptive strikes—like the improvised ex-
plosive devices and car bombs that have been such intractable problems in Af-
ghanistan and Iraq. There is no question that some capacity for amphibious
operations from the sea will be needed in the future, but a rigorous and objective
analysis of the number of times and places in which they would be possible is war-
ranted, and as with carriers, a new calculus for sizing that capability is needed.
Another key consideration that would govern carrier force structure is deploy-
ment posture. Since World War II, the United States has maintained a forward-
deployed posture for the Navy, at times severely stressing its capacity. The Navy
has found that for each carrier it wants to keep forward, it needs two additional
ones to account for crew deployment tempo, training, and maintenance require-
ments. In theory, then, any carrier force level ought to be divisible by three.
However, an additional carrier is needed to compensate for the extended yard
periods required for nuclear refueling. That adds up to ten CVNs, but Congress
has legislated that the Navy maintain eleven, the “extra” carrier being available
for surge operations. There is currently a carrier homeported forward in Japan,
which provides additional scheduling flexibility. In practice, however, the de-
mand for carriers by the combatant commanders, coupled with the Navy’s Fleet
Response Plan deployment scheme (which seeks to maximize the number of
carriers available for surge operations), makes even eleven carriers seem insuffi-
cient. But the increasing expense of tactical jets and delays in their development,
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as exemplified by the JSF, means that there will not be enough aircraft to popu-
late eleven flight decks adequately, let alone a higher number.
In the future, as the doctrinal roles of the aircraft carrier change and become
more narrowly defined, the number of carriers needed forward at any time may
decline. Using the reverse of the standard Navy calculus, for every carrier not
needed to be stationed forward, the total inventory could, in theory, be reduced
by three. The savings would be
enormous, and, if this analysis of
doctrinal roles is correct, there
would be no reduction in the over-
all war-fighting effectiveness of
the Navy, assuming the money
saved could be reinvested, at least in part, in missiles, submarines, and surface
ships. On one hand, a reduction of one carrier on station would take the Navy to
a force of eight CVNs. On the other hand, if new doctrinal roles do materialize, a
higher number of carriers may be warranted. USS Enterprise, the first nuclear
carrier, commissioned fifty years ago, is on a forward deployment as this article
is written. There is no reason to think that the Nimitz-class carriers will have
shorter service lives, and the newer ones may last even longer. There is at least
reason to think that a number of these ships will outlive the utility of any given
type of embarked aircraft. This makes it difficult to assess the return on invest-
ment of additional new construction beyond Ford or its follow-on ship. If the
possible doctrinal roles for the aircraft carrier become too risky or are significantly
constrained in terms of where and when they might be feasible, the value of so ex-
pensive a platform will be called into question.
{LINE-SPACE}
The purpose of this article has been to explore the future of the aircraft carrier
using the framework of doctrinal roles. It appears that despite changing technol-
ogy there will be a continuing need for the ship type, although the obsolescence
of some doctrinal roles and the anticipated constriction of its use as an airfield at
sea may limit the numbers that are justified. New doctrinal roles may emerge,
depending on the flexibility of mind shown by the naval aviation community.
However, even if these new roles do pan out, they may not justify significantly
greater numbers of ships. Moreover, the carrier’s day as the supreme arbiter of
naval power and the determinant of fleet architecture may be coming to a close.
Its continuing utility will increasingly be in support roles. Once this shift occurs,
it may actually be easier to arrive at an objective determination of numbers re-
quired, as much of the emotional and political baggage surrounding them will
have been shed.
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If we mark the emergence of the aircraft carrier as sovereign of the seas at the
British carrier strike on the Italian fleet at Taranto in 1940, we see that the carrier
has enjoyed a period of dominance of over seventy years, substantially longer
than that of the dreadnought. To paraphrase Yogi Berra, the future of the aircraft
carrier isn’t what it used to be, but it is fairly clear the type will be around more
than long enough to celebrate a century and a half of service.
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SEA BASING
Concept, Issues, and Recommendations
Sam J. Tangredi
Sea basing is a strategic concept that has been defined in a variety of often con-tradictory ways. It is officially a joint concept, but it is widely perceived as a pa-
rochial tool to justify budget increases for the Department of the Navy. As an
activity, sea basing has been described as both traditional and transformational.1
Many proponents consider it a specific set of hardware—future platforms, such
as the mobile offshore base or additional ships for the Maritime Prepositioning
Force (MPF), like the proposed Mobile Landing Platform, which would allow
for selective off-load of prepositioned material while still at sea.2 A misperceived
exclusive association with amphibious warfare, not currently a priority in the
Pentagon, has largely driven sea basing out of policy discussions at the Office of
the Secretary of Defense (OSD) level. Ironically, sea basing came to prominence
in the past decade under a Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) determined to cut
capabilities from the amphibious fleet so as to fund future surface combatants.3
From 2002 to 2008, it appeared with great frequency
and was discussed with great passion in many profes-
sional defense journals and reports. But it is not once
mentioned in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)
2010 report.
As a grand concept, it appears becalmed, if still visi-
ble out on the horizon. However, as a practical reality,
U.S. forces engage in sea basing today—and every day.
The U.S. Marine Corps—along with a sometimes sup-
portive, sometimes reluctant U.S. Navy—is projected
to continue to make incremental improvements.
Sam J. Tangredi is a regional director of the planning-
consulting firm Strategic Insight Ltd. A retired U.S.
Navy captain, while on active duty he was, along with
operational billets, the head of the Strategy and Con-
cepts Branch of the Office of the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions and director of strategic planning and business
development for the Navy International Programs Of-
fice. He is the author of numerous articles on strategy
and defense policy and has published three books, the
latest of them Futures of War.
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WHAT IS SEA BASING ALL ABOUT?
There are both broad and narrow views of what sea basing is about. In its broad
vision, “sea basing” refers to the capability to use the sea in the same way that
U.S. forces use overseas regional bases, for deterrence, alliance support, coopera-
tive security, power projection, and other forward operations.4 This broad vision
stems from conceptual discussions that began within the Navy in the 1990s. It is
also reflected in the introductory sections of the more recent Marine Corps/
Navy/Army Concept for Employment for Current Seabasing Capabilities, released
on 19 May 2010.
From that perspective, sea basing is decidedly not a new concept. U.S. forces
have been sea basing since the Navy became a global force at the turn of the last
century—and arguably even before. “The World War II ‘fleet train’ [auxiliaries,
oilers, and supply ships that replenished the combatant ships at sea] that pro-
vided the U.S. battle fleet with such unprecedented range and freedom of action”
could be considered a sea base, since it allowed the fleet to resupply at sea or in
isolated anchorages.5 Likewise, it is easily observed that aircraft carriers are
floating air bases that can be positioned and repositioned on a global basis. Sur-
face ships are sea bases for strike systems (Tomahawk land-attack cruise mis-
siles), as well as for theater ballistic-missile defense sensors and weapons.
Submarines are also—depending on tactical employment—strike sea bases.
Amphibious warships constitute the components of a base for forces (primarily
Marine Corps) that can be rapidly inserted onto land by both surface and air.
Combining with the Navy “grey hulls” of the amphibious fleet are the Military
Sealift Command’s civilian-crewed MPF ships.6 The Army too operates preposi-
tioning ships.
However, a narrower view, focused on improvements to amphibious and
MPF ship capabilities—as exemplified in the report of the Defense Science
Board’s 2003 Task Force on sea basing—currently predominates in operational
discussions of joint capabilities. This narrower view is used by the Marine Corps
when justifying incremental improvements in naval expeditionary platforms.
As stated earlier, sea basing has never had one generally accepted definition.
We see the term rendered as “seabasing,” “sea basing,” “Sea Basing,” “Enhanced
Networked Sea Basing,” “seabased,” “sea base,” and other variants. Each con-
notes a specific nuance designed to distinguish it from the others. It does have an
official Department of Defense (DoD) definition, but one that many authorities
agree is not complete: “the deployment, assembly, command projection, recon-
stitution, and reemployment of joint power from the sea without reliance on
land bases within the operational area.” The entry adds, “See also amphibious
operations (JP 3-02).”7
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This definition is a great improvement over the previous DoD dictionary ver-
sion (which stated that sea basing was a technique of amphibious operations),
but the note betrays the lingering, near-exclusive association with amphibious
warfare. This is one reason why significant discussions of sea basing have not ap-
peared in the defense literature in the past two years. In his tenure as Secretary of
Defense, Robert M. Gates—kept in his position primarily to prevail in the “wars
we are in”—appeared to discount the likelihood of major amphibious operation
in the coming years. As noted, the Quadrennial Defense Review 2010 final re-
port and the report of the QDR Independent Review panel never mention sea
basing. The QDR 2010 report does include a Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) in
its listing of desired naval capabilities.8 But the MLP, of which the first is to be
funded in the fiscal year 2011 defense budget, is designed to facilitate the move-
ment of cargo by “connecting” existing maritime prepositioning ships and does
not in itself indicate a strong commitment to sea basing.
If, however, sea basing is defined as using the sea in the same way U.S. forces
use regional land bases, clearly there can be degrees of sea basing, in the same
way that there are different types of land bases—from austere to well developed
infrastructures. Within this range, sea bases currently exist and have existed; a
naval task force—depending on its configuration—can provide joint C4ISR,*
rapid strike capabilities using stealth or nonstealth assets, special operations
forces (SOF) insertion, ballistic missile defense (BMD), control of regional
airspace, search and rescue, emergency medical facilities, space for joint task
force command elements, and a means of positioning of infantry, light armor,
and artillery ashore beyond the beach.9 This capability is comparable to that of a
regional land base, relative to the size of personnel assigned. Of course, it can
move, thereby making enemy targeting more difficult. Its elements can also be
widely dispersed throughout a regional sea, an advantage that can be duplicated
ashore only by a network of land bases. Depending on operational require-
ments, sea-basing platforms may not have to operate in proximity of one an-
other to provide mutual support.
However, physical limits prevent a current sea base from landing heavy-lift
aircraft or storing “iron mountains” of supplies. Nor can it land significant
amounts of heavy armor ashore. Nor can it make an Army or Air Force general
feel fully in command of things—an unarticulated detriment to the perception
of jointness (though the U.S. Army officially supports sea basing). Yet it can be
most assuredly joint—and not simply by virtue of, say, operating Army helicop-
ters off aircraft carriers near Haiti.
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In a practical sense, its jointness is not new. Army forces participated in am-
phibious assaults along with the Marines in the Pacific and on their own in the
European theater. Although the largest landing force in World War II—that of
the D-Day invasion—operated across a narrow channel and therefore was well
supported by land-based aircraft, such was not true in North Africa or southern
Europe.
Since the essence of sea basing appears a traditional American capability, the
debate of the past decade primarily focused on the following questions:
• Is it an effective method of countering antiaccess defenses?
• How much more capable can sea basing be made by applying new technol-
ogies and greater resources?
• Considering that the Navy appears simultaneously to oversell the concept
and underfund its resources, will the other services continue to support the
concept in the joint arena?10
• Does the sea-basing concept justify improvements to Navy–Marine Corps
amphibious lift, and will it help the Marine Corps in its struggles with the
Navy over new ship programs and OSD over the future of MPF ships?
• Could sea basing become a replacement for, not just a supplement to,
regional land bases? Unlike overseas land bases, sea basing remains un-
der sovereign American control and does not require other nations’
permission.
SEA CONTROL, SOVEREIGNTY, AND ANTIACCESS
Sea basing is a capability that depends on command of the sea, or sea control. In
fact, it cannot exist without sea control. Since the collapse of the Soviet navy in
1991, U.S. sea control has been a given—unlike the situation in World War II,
when the Allies had to fight to achieve sea control. Clearly the People’s Libera-
tion Army intends to contest American sea control in the western Pacific. How-
ever, China’s maritime capabilities have not yet matched its aspirations and it is
unclear whether Chinese efforts at sea denial would be as effective as the more
alarmist reports would indicate.11 American global sea control is not yet broken,
presumably assuring the continued viability of sea basing. But the growing am-
bition among littoral states for regional denial capabilities—often referred to as
“antiaccess” or “area denial” strategies—is itself undeniable.
Because it is dependent on sea control, the U.S. Navy would naturally provide
the majority of resources for sea-basing platforms, out of its existing fleet and
ship-construction budget.12 Originally the Donald Rumsfeld–era Office of
Force Transformation defined “sea-base” as “a noun; the sea and not the things
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on it.”13 However, the sea base can be more properly thought of as the ships and
platforms on which—and by which—the forces are positioned. The ocean is the
fluid medium that provides both the terrain upon which heavy objects move
and the reduction in friction that allows them to do so—metaphorically, the
ocean allows castles to move. These iron castles constitute the sea base. Within
the castles are stored and transported the means of military power, including the
expeditionary strength of the Marine Corps and resupply for Army land forces.
These castles also provide the best available logistical platforms for humanitar-
ian assistance in littoral regions.
As mentioned earlier, a most attractive feature of sea basing is that it offers an
overseas base of operation located close to or in a crisis area but that is itself
completely under the sovereignty of the United States.14 The strike power that
can be projected from the continental United States is just a small portion of that
required to affect events on land in combat or crisis. Sea basing provides for a
forward presence and thereby produces deterrence effects that might not be
achievable through latent conventional capabilities in the continental United
States. Sea basing is also a means of providing sustained security cooperation
and humanitarian relief. All of this can be achieved without long-term violation
of anyone else’s sovereign territory under international law.
Proponents of sea basing like to quote British naval strategist Sir Julian S.
Corbett’s observation (1906) that Britain—then the world’s greatest sea
power—traditionally favored sovereign ports and bases that made it “indepen-
dent of uncertain neutrals and doubtful allies.”15 But to justify spending resources
on sea basing by the need for such independence is to oversell the concept. Amer-
ica’s current allies or partners are for the most part neither weak nor uncertain,
and in the current political environment it is doubtful that they would place dis-
abling restrictions on basing in the face of a mutual threat. Indeed, if anything,
current trends seem to be in the direction of an increasing willingness on the
part even of nontraditional allies (such as Singapore) to accommodate an Amer-
ican military presence on their territory. However, it is valid to argue that spend-
ing on sea basing should be increased on the grounds that antiaccess capabilities
of potential opponents (primarily China and Iran) have made fixed regional
land bases extremely vulnerable.
Sea basing itself faces an increasing threat but because of its mobility repre-
sents a much more difficult targeting problem for opponents. Can, however,
new sea-basing technologies ultimately outpace the antiaccess threat? The Navy
and Marine Corps are planning incremental improvements in expeditionary
off-load from sea to shore. The development of theater-ballistic-missile defenses
and the improved air defense represented by destroyers and cruisers having the
Aegis combat system gives additional protection to the sea base. But if future
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survivability proves increasingly problematic, will a significant investment in
improving overall sea basing have been warranted? If it appears that it would,
what technological improvements should be prioritized?
Right now, technological and engineering improvements are being applied to
expeditionary off-load. These are relatively low-cost improvements. But more
extensive acquisition—such as the Mobile Offshore Base, proposed in the 1990s
—has lost favor in light of other priorities and antiaccess issues. Proposed in-
creases to the naval amphibious fleet are also vulnerable to these concerns. This
debate—sea-basing versus antiaccess—has smoldered for some time and will
likely get hotter.
SEA BASING IN SEA POWER 21
Sea basing (or “Sea Basing,” as it appears in that document) was touted as one of
the pillars of the “Sea Power 21” plan, issued by Admiral Vern Clark as CNO, spe-
cifically as a means of “projecting joint operational independence.”16 It was also
described “as the foundation from which offensive and defensive fires [that is,
strikes from a distance, by artillery, air, missile, etc.] are projected—making Sea
Strike and Sea Shield [two other pillars] realities.”17 But the plan omitted any
discussion of amphibious ships and emphasized the strike capability of the
cruiser-destroyer force.18 To omit in this way the capability of the sea base to put
forces ashore would seem to ignore the most significant means by which the sea
base can affect events on land and limits sea basing to fleet strike and de-
fense—unless the omission in fact reflected a predecided budget priority.
Clearly Admiral Clark intended to emphasize the Navy’s role in supporting joint
forces already ashore; he expressed support for MPF shipping in resupply of
those forces. But this role would be a joint supporting capability rather than a
joint enabler.
Yet the emphasis on supporting joint forces via a new concept would not
seem to have engendered much enthusiasm from other services in the joint
arena except as a quid pro quo—I’ll support your program if you’ll support mine.
In fact, it would seem almost a deliberate provocation of the Marine Corps,
which would consider itself a full partner in any new naval concept. These fac-
tors resulted in the Navy’s overselling sea basing, in the sense that it relied on old
missions to justify a supposedly new construct. This was not an auspicious way
to advance the concept, but it did allow the Navy in 2002 to squeeze some money
from amphibious shipbuilding—a decision that, given the length of time re-
quired for shipbuilding, directly affects today’s fleet.19 The overall result is that
even today it is not clear—Admiral Clark’s successors having largely ignored Sea
Power 21—what the Navy Staff considers sea basing to be.
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THE FUTURE OF THE U.S. MARINE CORPS “EXPEDITIONARY
OBJECTIVE”
Since the Navy construct of sea basing did not include the Marine Corps, the Ma-
rines did what they do best—declared it an expeditionary objective and took it.
Sea basing was turned around from a concept that largely excluded amphibious-
assault capabilities to one focused on improving them. Such a focus would seem
natural, even within the broad vision. But it did not bank on Secretary of Defense
Gates’s apparent discounting of the need for strong amphibious capabilities—
capabilities that were not particularly needed in Iraq or Afghanistan. Recent OSD
efforts to kill the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle program—and the Marine
Corps’s efforts to keep it alive despite significant operational limitations and
cost increases—may have also colored the Secretary of Defense’s attitude toward
amphibious capabilities, MPF, and sea basing.
Consequently, the Marine Corps now views sea basing as a program of incre-
mental improvements in amphibious lift and is primarily interested in develop-
ing the ability to use MPF ships without having to off-load them in port.
Off-loading at sea, particularly in a combat environment, requires modern con-
nector ships, such as the MLP, which can transfer matériel from cargo carriers of
the Maritime Sealift Command to air-cushion landing craft (LCACs) in the se-
quence it is needed ashore. This approach would increase expeditionary landing
capacity without the higher costs of building more amphibious warships.
But although the Marines have experimented with incremental improvements
and have received partial QDR endorsement, the Defense Department’s “program
objective memorandum” for fiscal year 2012 has mandated a drastic cut in the
Navy’s prepositioning budget. This could put two-thirds of the current MPF into
reserve status or eliminate one of the three maritime prepositioning squadrons
—specifically MPS Squadron 1, located in the Mediterranean.20 The decision re-
flects OSD’s perception that the U.S. European Command and NATO will most
likely not need the equipment in the immediate future. Nonetheless, a two-thirds
cut, as opposed to an incremental reduction, does not bode well for the overall
concept of sea basing.
Even as Under Secretary of the Navy Robert O. Work, an expert on sea basing,
was outlining a future with more individually capable MPF ships in a 5 October
2010 speech at the National Defense Industrial Association’s Expeditionary
Warfare Conference, it was becoming apparent that his view might not be shared
on the OSD level. At the same conference, Brigadier General David Berger, di-
rector of the Operations Division at Headquarters, Marine Corps, described the
defense leadership as divided between those who view MPS squadron ships as
merely “floating warehouses”and those who see them as a forward crisis-response
capability in support of the regional combatant commanders. General James
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Conway, near the end of his tenure as Commandant of the Marine Corps, de-
fended Navy-Marine prepositioning by contrasting it with the Army’s view of
prepositioning, which he described as simply a fast means of resupplying forces
already engaged on the ground. As Conway put it, “The Army uses theirs to sup-
port a capability. In many ways, ours [Navy–Marine Corps MPF] is the [crisis re-
sponse] capability.”21
SUPPLEMENTING OR REPLACING LAND BASES?
Whether sea basing can replace land bases, or at least dependence on land bases,
raises bureaucratic issues within DoD that contribute to the reluctance to com-
mit to joint sea basing. For one thing, a greater commitment to sea basing—
along with a qualitative or quantitative reduction in overseas land bases—might
cause allies and partners to question American commitment to mutual defense.
To some extent, however, it is a question of foresight. If the future of American
war fighting consists of pacifying terror-supporting insurgent groups within
landlocked countries or continuing the use of quick-striking SOF forces sup-
ported by land-based tactical aviation (including unmanned aerial vehicles
flown from the continental United States), investment in sea basing would not
seem a priority.22 At times this seems to be Secretary Gates’s view, but not al-
ways.23 If future wars are going to be dominated by ever more precise global
strike from the continental United States—which would seem to be the U.S. Air
Force’s preferred future—sea basing would also seem a low priority.
However, if the future involves a range of regional crises in which the United
States wishes to retain direct influence, there is a lot to commend sea basing as a
primary instrument. As antiaccess capabilities of potential opponents expand,
the survival of regional land bases becomes problematic. The exact locations of
these bases are well known; they can be struck repeatedly by ballistic missiles re-
lying solely on preprogrammed coordinates. But prioritizing sea basing could
also mean a future defense posture in which overall DoD force structure is pre-
dominantly maritime. Relying primarily on naval assets as the foundation of
most joint force regional basing could be seen as a defeat for jointness—which is
still largely considered in DoD to mean proportional shares of the pie for all ser-
vices (and major defense agencies). This is a formula that the Gates Pentagon did
not break, and as defense cuts are imposed on major acquisition programs, it is
likely that they will affect the services roughly equally.
Although the developing planning related to the “Air/Sea Battle” operational
concept would seem to be bringing Air Force–Navy cooperation to a peak, the
potential for competition for resources between sea basing and global strike in a
flat defense budget is obvious. At the same time, the Air Force is not keen to ad-
mit the vulnerability of its long-term regional bases, which are presumed to be
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required if land-based tactical aviation is to be effectively applied to a regional
contingency. The Army has an interest in resupplying its forces—presumably al-
ready on the ground—by sea, but it has no interest in becoming a second marine
corps. Until May 2011, the Army’s focus—with program leadership by the De-
partment of the Navy—was the development of the Joint High Speed Vessel
(JHSV), a ferry-based logistics catamaran built by Austal USA. The JHSV, which
is not considered combat survivable, is designed for high-speed insertion of
troops in “‘soft power’ missions—responding to natural disasters, providing hu-
manitarian assistance, conducting port visits and training partner military
forces, among others.”24 In May, the Army transferred its share of the JHSV pro-
gram to the Navy.
Under these circumstances, sea-basing proponents might emphasize supple-
menting regional bases rather than replacing them. But in a flat or shrinking de-
fense budget, “supplementing” any capability would likely be seen as a luxury.
THE REALITY IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC
At the same time, there is a practical crosscurrent in the Asia-Pacific region that
might force the United States to look to sea basing as a land-basing replacement
—the agreed shift of Marine Corps personnel from Okinawa to Guam.
Thus far the question of sea basing versus land bases has been discussed in
terms of which posture is more defensible and could deliver more capabilities.
But in the Asia-Pacific, the most troubling contingencies remain possible con-
flicts in the Taiwan Strait and Korea. Okinawa is 110 nautical miles (two hun-
dred kilometers) from Taiwan and approximately 670 nautical miles (1,250
kilometers) from Seoul, Korea. Guam is over 1,470 nautical miles (2,700 kilome-
ters) from Taiwan and 5,900 nautical miles (eleven thousand kilometers) from
Seoul. The greater distances from Guam to either potential point of conflict
would appear to require a more extensive amphibious transport operation than
would be necessary from Okinawa. That means, first, a need for greater at-sea lo-
gistics, more fuel being but one consideration. Second, the force would be ex-
posed to potential standoff attacks for a longer period before it could reach its
effective operational area.
Another consequence of the shift is a possible reduction in practical deter-
rence. A swift Chinese campaign across the Taiwan Strait would likely be in-
tended as a fait accompli that would preclude American reaction. In calculating
the potential for success, whether an opposing force is 110 or 1,470 nautical
miles away makes a considerable difference. It is unreasonable to argue that air
transport can make up for this distance, since airlift cannot move significant
amounts of equipment. Though the JHSV could transit quicker than amphibi-
ous warships, it requires port facilities for off-loading and has a limited payload.
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The overall result is a lessening of a previously well established deterrent to pre-
cipitate action.
Options to overcome this tyranny of distance are to station more heavy
equipment closer to the area of potential conflict and rely on the airlifting or
“JHSV-ing” of troops into the theater, establish other land bases closer to the
area, rely on global strikes from the continental United States, or maintain or be
able to quickly assemble a robust sea base within striking distance of the area.
Stationing more heavy equipment in the region and relying on airlifted
troops to man it reduces the footprint required by a land base, but the question
of where the equipment sets can be located remains. A possibility is Okinawa, if
the Japanese government were to agree. Another possibility is on Taiwan itself,
but regional political considerations currently make that choice imprudent. Es-
tablishing extensive land bases would seem to pose the same problem: Where
would they be put? Again, both equipment locations and land bases have fixed
coordinates, well known to an attacker.
Strikes from the continental United States simply cannot be relied upon in
such a scenario; the nation is not now capable of effective conventional strikes
from that distance.
All this leads to the conclusion that the ability to assemble a robust sea base
—defined broadly—from forward-deployed joint and naval forces would be
the most effective tool and means of practical deterrence in such a conflict. Al-
though antiaccess systems can certainly threaten a sea base, targeting moving
ships at sea is still a much more difficult problem than is attacking fixed points
on land. For example, deception is a much more viable tactic for a sea base than
for an unmoving land base.
THE FUTURE OF SEA BASING: REALITY AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
Thinking about Seabasing: All Ahead, Slow is the title of Robert Work’s magiste-
rial study of this subject, and it reflects an approach he still espouses as Under
Secretary of the Navy. It is an apt recommendation for a defense-program envi-
ronment in which sea basing is not viewed as a priority. Under the constrained
budgets of the 1920s and early 1930s, the Marine Corps experimented with am-
phibious warfare, ultimately developing the concepts and equipment that would
enable the great advances in amphibious assault needed in World War II. Experi-
mentation, with modest programmatic investment, might do the same in ad-
vancing sea basing until its need is apparent for future contingencies.
However, if one takes the broader view of sea basing, the responsibility for
improving the capacity to sea base falls primarily on the Navy—which must also
make particular efforts to gain joint support for that broad vision. Dispersed
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platforms must be netted (securely) together, with the overall fleet functioning
as a multiple-domain, combined-arms base rather than as a group of indepen-
dent task forces. As CNO, Admiral Gary Roughead called for greater efforts in
developing “revolutionary concepts” for naval information and computing, and
his combining the naval intelligence (N2) and C4ISR (N6) branches of his staff
indicated his interest in the tighter netting of information. Tighter netting of
dispersed platforms is indeed a requirement for successful sea basing, but it is
obviously not sufficient in itself.25
The current Pentagon must deal with a quandary regarding sea basing. Expe-
riences in Iraq and Afghanistan will sour future administrations on extensive
commitments of ground forces in crisis-torn states. On the surface, this would
seem to refocus DoD on improving naval capabilities, but because sea basing re-
mains associated with putting ashore forces that are larger than SOF units (e.g.,
Marine expeditionary units), it is unlikely to attract more than incremental
investment.
One mission that might increase interest in a tightly netted sea base is naval
ballistic-missile defense, since reliable information from multiple sources (in-
cluding land-based) can increase the probability of accurate target solutions.
But it is easy to foresee BMD-capable ships as being treated as individual strate-
gic assets, operationally separate from conventional forces. This would be a mis-
take. The Aegis destroyer providing ballistic- or cruise-missile defense is as
much a part of the sea base as a Patriot battery defending an overseas land base is
part of that base’s combat infrastructure. At the same time, the ballistic-missile
defense provided to the land territory of allies by that same Aegis destroyer is as
integral an aspect of the overall sea-base mission as is the capability for landing
troops ashore. The logistical network that flows through the sea base—such as fuel
delivery by fleet oilers—is the means of keeping the Aegis destroyer on station.
Here are four recommendations for the Pentagon’s consideration:
• Examine and experiment with the broad vision of sea basing, particularly
in conjunction with developing a joint operational concept for antiaccess
warfare and elaborating the particulars of Air/Sea Battle.
• If a decision is made to reduce MPS squadrons, a significant portion of the
savings should be invested in the Marine Corps’s programs for increasing
the capabilities of the remaining MPF through new technologies and plat-
forms. This is in keeping with earlier statements by Secretary Gates that the
services could keep most of the savings from cuts made.
• Maintain naval BMD platforms as integral parts of deployed conventional
forces—part of the sea base as it exists today—rather than isolate them as
an element of strategic deterrence.
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• Assess the deterrent effect and responsiveness that sea basing can have in an
Asia-Pacific region in which land bases are not close to potential points of
conflict. This itself requires more extensive study of the comparative sur-
vivability of sea basing under antiaccess conditions.
Defense policy is all about making choices: who/what is the threat; what strat-
egy should we adopt; how should we position or deploy our forces. As noted, it is
also about managing resources, even for the United States, with its incompara-
ble military but current fiscal crisis. Since there is no certain answer, risk is al-
ways involved, and alternative strategies must always be considered and
evaluated. It is the responsibility of defense planners and, especially, the defense
leadership to mitigate the risks as much as possible. As a concept, sea basing has
the potential to mitigate risks involving overseas basing, antiaccess defenses, and
regional presence. The priority given to mitigating these specific risks will be an
accurate indicator of the future that the defense leadership envisions.
A prudent strategy for the United States that mitigates risk in uncertain times
would be to strengthen capabilities that do not rely on nonsovereign overseas
basing, even while working diplomatically to maintain alliances and access to
overseas bases. It would appear best to invest in a balance among SOF capabili-
ties, long-range capabilities based in the continental United States (such as
global strike), and highly maneuverable and well defended sea bases. These ca-
pabilities would seem both compatible and complementary. U.S.-based forces
can provide extensive firepower but cannot sustain “boots on the ground” in a
contested region. Most current American interests overseas lie within range of
sea-based forces, our involvement in Afghanistan notwithstanding.
However, tighter resource constraints usually bring out the worst in organi-
zational rivalries and bureaucratic politics; a clash among sea basing, global
strike, planning for future wars like the wars we are in, recapitalizing or “reset-
ting” land forces, and expanding special-operations capabilities seems inevita-
ble. Under the current Pentagon leadership and the economic constraints facing
the U.S. government, such a clash would likely find sea basing on the short end.
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23. In a 2009 Foreign Affairs article, Secretary
Gates outlined his plan as being one that
maintains balance “between trying to prevail
in current conflicts and preparing for other
contingencies, between institutionalizing ca-
pabilities such as counterinsurgency and for-
eign military assistance and maintaining the
United States’ existing conventional and stra-
tegic technological edge against other military
forces, and between retaining those cultural
traits that have made the U.S. armed forces
successful and shedding those that hamper
their ability to do what needs to be done.”
While “other contingencies” could indicate
operations that sea basing could facilitate, it
should be noted that he refers to maintaining
“the United States’ existing conventional and
strategic technological edge” rather than an
existing edge in capabilities. Analyses of the
article have pointed to “balance capabilities”
as meaning a balance across the spectrum of
conflict—but that may not be what was
meant. In any event, the secretary’s natural
focus has been on unconventional warfare,
counterinsurgency, and counterterror—in
which sea basing would play largely a supple-
mental, not a critical, role. Robert M. Gates,
“A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the
Pentagon for a New Age,” Foreign Affairs
(January–February 2009).
24. Grace V. Jean, “Aluminum ‘Truck,’ Joint
High Speed Vessels: Great Potential, but
Questions Remain,” National Defense (March
2011).
25. Andrew Burt, “New Memo from CNO:
Roughead Seeks ‘Revolutionary’ Concepts in
Information and Computing,” Inside the
Navy, 11 October 2010.
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THREE DISPUTES AND THREE OBJECTIVES
China and the South China Sea
Peter Dutton
The recent heightening of the competition between China and its neighborsover sovereignty, resources, and security in the South China Sea has drawn
the attention of diplomatic and military leaders from many countries that seek
to promote stability and security in these globally important waters. For states
that ring the South China Sea, its waters represent a zone of rich hydrocarbon
and protein resources that are increasingly dear on land as populations exhaust
their territories’ ability to meet their increasing needs. This resource competi-
tion alone could be the basis of sharp-edged disputes between the claimants.
However, the South China Sea also represents the projection of the cultural con-
sciousness of the centuries-long relationship that each coastal nation has had
with its adjoining seas. This fact fuels competing modern-day nationalist ten-
dencies among claimant-state populations, tendencies that in turn magnify the
importance of the disputes and, during times of crisis, narrow the options for
quiet negotiation or de-escalation.
As American leaders discuss policies and strategies in support of regional sta-
bility, some have described the complex disputes in the South China Sea as es-
sentially a tangled knot of intractable challenges. Actually, however, there are
three severable categories of disputes, each with its own parties, rule sets, and
politics. There are disputes over territorial sover-
eignty, in the overlapping claims to the South China
Sea’s islands, rocks, and reefs; disputes over which
coastal states claim rightful jurisdiction over waters
and seabed; and disputes over the proper balance of
coastal-state and international rights to use the seas
Peter Dutton is director of the China Maritime Studies
Institute in the Center for Naval Warfare Studies of the
Naval War College. He served in the Navy’s Judge Ad-
vocate General’s Corps and as a Naval Flight Officer,
retiring in 2006 with the rank of commander.
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for military purposes. Unfortunately, the region’s states are currently pursuing
win-lose solutions to all three of these disputes. A careful analysis of the nature
of each dispute reveals, instead, opportunities for more productive pathways to
resolution achieved through win-win problem solving and recognition of the
mutuality and commonality of interests in these globally important waters.
THREE DISPUTES
The disputes in these three categories have resulted in recurring flashes of ten-
sion and conflict for approximately forty years. Notable incidents over sover-
eignty include the Chinese attack on the forces of the Republic of Vietnam in the
Paracel Islands in 1974, China’s attack on Vietnamese forces near Fiery Cross
Reef in 1988, and China’s military ouster of Philippines forces from Mischief
Reef in 1995. The overall result of this series of incidents was the coalescence of a
unified Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) political position in op-
position to China’s behavior. A politically unified ASEAN persuaded China to ac-
cept the 2002 ASEAN Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China
Sea to decrease tensions among neighbors. The declaration includes an agreement
by all parties to “resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful
means, without resorting to the threat or use of force.”1 The Declaration of Con-
duct became the centerpiece of more than a decade of relative regional calm after
1995, the product of a Chinese shift in policy to pursue improved regional integra-
tion with its Southeast Asian neighbors through generous economic, commercial,
infrastructural, and cultural programs. The United States repeatedly professed
neutrality as to the outcome of the sovereignty and jurisdictional disagreements,
as long as all parties continued to pursue peaceful means of resolution.
This stability was shattered by a series of antagonistic Chinese actions that be-
gan in 2007. A flare-up in tensions in the South China Sea began when China
pressured Vietnam and several oil companies in connection with oil exploration
and drilling off the Vietnamese coasts. As the U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State, Scot Marciel, testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in
July 2009, “Starting in the summer of 2007, China told a number of U.S. and for-
eign oil and gas firms to stop exploration work with Vietnamese partners in the
South China Sea or face unspecified consequences in their business dealings
with China.”2 The Senate hearing was being held in the wake of the March 2009
Impeccable incident, which had awakened many in the United States to China’s
more assertive stance in the South China Sea. In that incident, an American na-
val research vessel was aggressively harassed approximately seventy nautical
miles off Hainan Island by Chinese “fishermen” with the support of Chinese ci-
vilian law-enforcement vessels and under the observation of a People’s Libera-
tion Army Navy intelligence ship.3
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These Chinese actions resulted in a return of tension to the region. In re-
sponse to China’s new strategy, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated at the
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in July 2010, “The United States, like every na-
tion, has a national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia’s mari-
time commons, and respect for international law in the South China Sea. . . . The
United States supports a collaborative diplomatic process by all claimants for re-
solving the various territorial disputes without coercion. . . . We encourage the
parties to reach agreement on a full code of conduct.”4
Until this time, the only attribute common to all South China Sea disputes
had been that they involved China as a party. However, China’s turn in 2009 to-
ward an assertive, even aggressive approach—especially in its efforts to control
U.S. naval activities in the South China Sea—resulted in new American atten-
tion to and interest in all three categories of disputes. In order to find a pathway
to return to the desired state of regional stability, it is helpful to examine the at-
tributes of each of the three types.
Sovereignty
Disputes over sovereignty center on questions of which coastal states have the
right to exercise the full measure of state authority over the physical territory of
the islands in the South China Sea. They involve Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philip-
pines, and perhaps Brunei, as well as China and Taiwan.5 Vietnam claims “indis-
putable sovereignty” over all of the Spratly (Truong Sa) and Paracel (Hoang Sa)
Islands;6 one possible interpretation of some of its recent submissions to the
United Nations (UN), however, is that it might be willing to relinquish its claims,
at least as regards the Spratlys, in return for recognition of wider resource rights in
the South China Sea.7 Malaysia claims sovereignty over approximately twelve of
the southernmost Spratly Islands, based on their situation on its claimed conti-
nental shelf. Likewise, Brunei appears to makes a similar claim to sovereignty over
Louisa Reef, on the basis of its location within its claimed exclusive economic
zone. The Philippines claims sovereignty over many of the easternmost Spratly
Islands, a cluster to which it refers as the Kalayaan Island Group.8
China and Taiwan maintain overlapping, related claims to all the islands in
the South China Sea. In 1947 the Nationalist government of the Republic of
China began to publish maps with a U-shaped series of lines in the South China
Sea delineating its maritime boundaries (see map). These maps were based on a
1935 internal government report prepared to define the limits of China, many
parts of which were dominated by outside powers at the time.9 Though the exact
nature of the claim was never specified by the Nationalist government, the carto-
graphic feature persisted in maps published by the Communist Party after it
came to power on the mainland in 1949, and today the U-shaped line’s nine
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dashes in the South China Sea remain on maps published both in China and on
Taiwan.10 In 1992, further clarifying its claims of sovereignty over all the islands
in the South China Sea, the People’s Republic of China enacted its Law on the
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, which specifies that China claims sover-
eignty over the features of all of the island groups that fall within the U-shaped
line in the South China Sea: the Pratas Islands (Dongsha), the Paracel Islands
(Xisha), Macclesfield Bank (Zhongsha), and the Spratly Islands (Nansha). The
U-shaped line therefore represents one factor in understanding the competing
claims to the numerous islands, shoals, rocks, and islets contained within its
nine dashes.
The Chinese government appears to maintain a studied policy of ambiguity
about the line’s meaning. Among Chinese scholars and officials, however, there
appear to be four dominant schools of thought—some related to sovereignty and
others more relevant to China’s jurisdictional claims (which will be analyzed
below).
Sovereign Waters. The first approach taken by some Chinese policy analysts is
that the expanse enclosed by the U-shaped line should be considered fully sover-
eign Chinese waters, subject to the complete measure of the government’s au-
thority, presumably as either internal waters or territorial seas. One group of
senior Chinese defense analysts, for instance, describes the nation’s offshore inter-
ests as “the area extending out from the Chinese mainland coastline between 200
nautical miles (to the east) and 1600 nautical miles (to the south),” or roughly to
four degrees north latitude as claimed in the 1935 report. They consider these “sea
domains under Chinese jurisdiction . . . [as] the overlaying area of China’s na-
tional sovereignty.”11 Another researcher refers to “China’s debates with neighbor-
ing countries over China’s maritime sovereignty” in advising that the correct
strategy is for China “to struggle rather than to fight.”12 It has been easy for some
to dismiss this perspective as based on mistranslation or the failure of nonspe-
cialists to appreciate the distinction between sovereignty, sovereign rights, and
jurisdiction. However, experienced Chinese legal specialists have specifically
used the term “sovereignty” in presentations about China’s claims in the South
China Sea delivered to legal practitioners of other nations in international fo-
rums.13 The concept that China exercises full sovereignty over all the waters em-
braced by the U-shaped line is also implicit in the description by at least one
military scholar of the seas surrounding China’s shores as “China’s ‘blue-colored
land’” and as a region “owned” by China.14
Historic Waters. Some Chinese have suggested that the concept of “historic wa-
ters” enables the government legitimately to claim broad control over the South
China Sea.15 The concept, a variation on China’s claim of sovereignty in the
NWC_2011AutumnReview.ps
\\data1\john.lanzieri.ctr$\msdata\Desktop\NavalWarCollege\NWC_2011AutumnReview\NWC_2011AutumnReview.vp
Thursday, July 28, 2011 3:16:12 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
51
Naval War College: Full Autumn 2011 Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2011
South China Sea, reflects the view held by many Chinese academics and policy
makers that the nine-dash line represents a claim to historic waters, historic “ti-
tle,” or at least some kind of exclusive rights to administer the waters and terri-
tory within the line’s boundaries.16 Perhaps the most authoritative statement of
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The U-shaped line formed by the nine dashes reflects China’s claim over the waters and islands of the South China Sea. Three types
of legal disputes arise from the claim: sovereignty disputes related to the island features, disputes over resource jurisdiction in the
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international law on the point was issued in 1951 by the International Court of
Justice in the Fisheries Case, in which the United Kingdom challenged before the
International Court of Justice a claim by Norway to sovereignty over waters
along its craggy coastline beyond the traditional three-mile territorial-sea limit
of the time.17
The court considered three relevant factors. The first was the close geograph-
ical dependence of the territorial sea upon the land domain—the relevant por-
tions of the Norwegian coastline being deeply indented, with complex
geographic features and an estimated 120,000 minor islands, islets, rocks, and
shoals. The second factor was the presence or absence of links between the land
formations and the sea space sufficiently close to make the region susceptible to
a fully sovereign regime of governance. Finally, it considered unique economic
interests belonging to the coastal state as clearly evidenced by long usage. Ulti-
mately the court approved Norway’s extension, based on its historic claims, of
sovereignty over the sea areas and the features contained within them.
The requirements laid out in the Fisheries Case for an extension by a coastal
state of sovereignty over water space do not lend support to China’s claim. In
particular, there is no close geographical dependence between the sea and the
land in this region. Indeed, the land features are so insignificant that they have
long been seen more as navigational hazards than as productive territory. Addi-
tionally, the islets themselves are more widely dispersed than are the features
along the Norwegian coastline. The merely sporadic presence of fishermen and
traders and the lack of freshwater and arable land to support an indigenous pop-
ulation in any case strongly suggest that the region is not susceptible to a fully
sovereign regime of governance. Accordingly, China’s claim of historic waters
has weak support on these bases.
Concerning the question of unique economic interests, China has had well
documented contact with the islands of the South China Sea for many centuries
through fishermen, traders, and the occasional government official. But the his-
torical record reflects similarly well documented contact by Vietnam. Neither
country has a record of sustained, exclusive use of or reliance upon the resources
of the South China Sea. The peoples of the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia
have also maintained contact with these islands, in support of traditional fishing
and local trade. Thus, no evidence points to unique economic interests of China
or any other single country in or around the islands of the South China Sea.
Rather the evidence suggests the contrary—that the waters of the South China
Sea and their sparse islands, islets, rocks, and reefs have for many centuries been
the common fishing grounds and trading routes of all regional peoples. Indeed,
this long-standing common usage suggests that far from having been supervised
as any party’s zone of sovereignty, the South China Sea developed as a sort of
D U T T O N 4 7
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regional common in which all parties pursued their interests without fear of
molestation by the authorities of other coastal states.
Island Claims. Some Chinese academics and policy makers view the U-shaped
line as asserting a claim to sovereignty over all the islands, rocks, sandbars, coral
heads, and other land features that pierce the waters of the South China Sea, as
well as to whatever jurisdiction international law of the sea allows coastal states
based on sovereignty over these small bits of land.18 On its face at least, a Chinese
claim to sovereignty over the islands and to jurisdiction lawfully derived from it
is legitimate, in that it complies with the general provisions of the 1982 United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and other aspects of law
of the sea. However, a series of fundamental problems undermine it, including
the fact that Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Taiwan all maintain claims
to sovereignty over some or all of the islands in the South China Sea. Since the
1995 Mischief Reef incident between China and the Philippines, a certain stabil-
ity has been achieved since the five claimants that occupy certain features have
agreed to maintain the status quo.
China, of course, occupies and administers all of the Paracels, though Viet-
nam still maintains its claim to sovereignty over them. The Spratlys represent a
mixed case. Since 1996, Vietnam has occupied or controlled approximately
twenty-two features, China roughly ten features, the Philippines eight, Malaysia
four, and Taiwan one.19 In order to support a claim of sovereignty over an island,
international law requires that a coastal state demonstrate effective occupation
or continuous administration and control.20 Accordingly, China’s claim to those
of the Spratly Islands that it does not occupy or effectively administer or control
is unsupported by international law. The same is true of the claims of any other
parties that do not actually occupy features over which they claim sovereignty.
Some observers wrongly conclude that the non-Chinese claims are based solely
on European claims from the colonial era. In fact, those of Southeast Asian states
are at least in part expressions of the contacts all coastal peoples have had with
the South China Sea’s islands and waters for many centuries and of national
consciousness that international law should protect those interests.
Security Interests. Finally, a fourth Chinese perspective is that the U-shaped line
reflects China’s long-standing maritime security interests in the South China
Sea and that these security interests should have legal protection. The Chinese
have long viewed the Bohai Gulf, the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and the
South China Sea—the “near seas”—as regions of core geostrategic interest and
as parts of a great defensive perimeter established on land and at sea to protect
China’s major population and economic centers along the coasts. As one
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People’s Liberation Army (PLA) major general recently put it, the South China
Sea constitutes part of China’s maritime “strategic stability belt.”21
China’s assertiveness about its claims in the waters of its near seas has grown
in tandem with the size of its navy and maritime services. As one Chinese analyst
put it, “The Navy is just one of the means of protecting our maritime rights and
interests[;] . . . the primary means should be to rely on the law, on international
law and internal legislation.” To enforce these laws and sovereign interests at sea,
“in recent years we have started to carry out periodic patrols to safeguard our
rights in the East and South China Seas.”22 Thus, some Chinese see international
law, in conjunction with their developing maritime power, as a means to estab-
lish the long-desired maritime security buffer throughout the near seas, includ-
ing the South China Sea. That international law does not provide protection for
a coastal state’s security interests beyond the narrow territorial sea has not
deterred Chinese proponents from seeking to change those norms.
Jurisdiction
A second category of disputes involves the delimitation of jurisdictional bound-
aries between neighboring sea zones, including exclusive economic zones
(EEZs) and continental shelves. China complicates these disputes through its
ambiguous claims of authority over the water space within the nine-dash line,
but it is clear that the claim encompasses aspects of jurisdiction as well as aspects
of sovereignty.23 “Jurisdiction” under international law is something less than
full sovereignty, in that it does not include the same degree of absolute and ex-
clusive authority to govern all matters of interest to the state. Like sovereignty,
jurisdiction is a reflection of state power within specified boundaries, but the con-
cept of jurisdiction connotes the application of state authority only over a lim-
ited, specified set of subject matters. All the disputants involved in the question of
sovereignty are also involved in the jurisdictional disputes, plus Indonesia,
which has an EEZ claim extending from Natuna Island that overlaps with
China’s nine-dash line.24
The two main sources of jurisdictional disputes in the South China Sea are
the boundaries of the various national EEZs and continental-shelf zones over
which each state may exercise its authority. Within the geographic limits out-
lined in UNCLOS article 76 (specified boundaries), coastal states are afforded
exclusive authority (state power) to regulate the exploration and exploitation of
the resources of the seabed, although the legal character of the water space above
the continental shelf remains unchanged (a limited, specified set of subject mat-
ters). Thus, international law provides for limited coastal-state jurisdiction
within a specified zone known as the continental shelf.
D U T T O N 4 9
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Similarly, one of the key innovations of UNCLOS was that it specified
coastal-state authority in the water space beyond the territorial sea, a concept
that had been steadily developing over the course of the twentieth century.
UNCLOS Part V established coastal-state jurisdiction over a vast littoral swath
of water space known as the EEZ, which may extend to two hundred nautical
miles from the coastal state’s baselines (specified coastal boundaries), and in
which the coastal state has “sovereign rights” to the resources plus related juris-
dictional authorities (exclusive state power over the specified resource-related
matters), for the purpose of managing those resources. Thus, UNCLOS com-
pleted the creation of jurisdictional regimes over resources in littoral waters. Ac-
cordingly, this second category of disputes is at its core a disagreement over
jurisdictional authority in the South China Sea to explore and exploit the
resources on and under the sea’s continental shelf and in its water column.
China’s Ambiguous Jurisdictional Claims. All states with coastlines that border
the South China Sea claim continental shelves and EEZs; however, very little ac-
tual delimitation of the boundaries between coastal-state zones has occurred.25
China’s nine-dash-line claim presents a particular problem for resolving these
disputes, because in addition to relying on the line as a source of sovereignty,
Chinese policy makers also refer to it as the basis for China’s South China Sea ju-
risdictional claims. As noted above, some Chinese scholars and policy makers
assert that the concept of historic rights (as an alternative to, or in addition to,
China’s claim to historic waters in the South China Sea) applies as a basis for ju-
risdictional control over water space within the nine-dash line. The concept of
historic waters has only the briefest mention in UNCLOS, but it exists in cus-
tomary international law related to bays. It allows coastal states to claim ex-
tended jurisdiction over water space or islands when their claims have been
open and long-standing, exclusive, and widely accepted by other states.
China’s claim to a historic right to jurisdiction over the waters of the South
China Sea is seriously undermined by similar, overlapping claims maintained by
the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia, not to mention paral-
lel claims made separately by Taiwan. This demonstrates that however long-
standing China’s claims of jurisdiction in the South China Sea may be, clearly they
are not exclusive or widely accepted by other states. Nonetheless, Chinese law as-
serts historic rights as a basis for jurisdiction over the South China Sea. The 1998
Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Exclusive Economic Zone and
Continental Shelf claims an exclusive economic zone emanating from all Chi-
nese territory, which would logically mean all relevant Chinese territory as spec-
ified in the 1992 Territorial Sea Law, which in turn, as noted above, specifically
includes each of the island groups in the South China Sea. Thus, in combination,
5 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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these two Chinese laws assert an EEZ and therefore jurisdictional control over
nearly the entire South China Sea area within the U-shaped line.
This impression was reinforced in April 2011 when China submitted a note
verbale to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, formed under
the terms of UNCLOS.26 Ostensibly, China’s note protested a Philippines sub-
mission that had asserted jurisdiction in the waters surrounding the Kalayaan
Islands (i.e., the Philippine-claimed group of Spratly Islands).27 However, these
submissions both join a lengthening portfolio of legal briefs submitted by the
various claimants to clarify and justify their various South China Sea claims.28
China’s note stated, “Under the relevant provisions of the 1982 UNCLOS, as well
as the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Territorial Sea and Contiguous
Zone (1992) and the Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental
Shelf of the PROC (1998), China’s Nansha Islands is [sic] fully entitled to Terri-
torial Sea, EEZ and Continental Shelf.” Given that the domestic laws referred to
in China’s note specifically assert additional “historic rights” that are not relin-
quished by China’s creation of an EEZ or continental shelf, the note verbale does
little to clarify the ambiguity with which China has so carefully cloaked its claims,
since such historic rights continue to leave room to assert legal protection for mar-
itime sovereignty or security interests.
In addition to its ambiguity and lack of specificity, there are many other prob-
lems with China’s approach to jurisdiction in the South China Sea. For instance,
only a very few of the South China Sea’s islands qualify under UNCLOS for more
than the mere twelve-nautical-mile territorial sea. Article 121 requires that is-
lands support human habitation or economic activity before they can accrue a
full two-hundred-mile exclusive economic zone or continental shelf. Smaller is-
lands, referred to as “rocks,” accrue no more than a twelve-mile territorial sea.
Virtually all of the features in the Spratly Islands group clearly fall into the latter
category. Another weakness of China’s claim of jurisdiction over the South
China Sea based on its assertion of sovereignty over the sea’s rocks and sandbars
is that it has objected to similar claims made by Japan to an exclusive economic
zone and continental-shelf rights around Okinotorishima, a small coral feature
in the Pacific Ocean about 1,050 nautical miles south of Tokyo.29 International
law prevents a state from claiming legal rights if it objects to the same type of
claims by other states. Accordingly, neither the provisions of UNCLOS nor his-
toric rights are especially persuasive sources of law on which China can base its
claims.
Jurisdictional Claims by Other States. The jurisdictional claims of Vietnam and
Malaysia conform much more closely than China’s assertions to international
law. Vietnam, for instance, claims an exclusive economic zone that “is adjacent
D U T T O N 5 1
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to the Vietnamese territorial sea and forms with it a 200-nautical-mile zone
from the baseline used to measure the breadth of Viet Nam’s territorial sea.”30 In
addition to clarity about the boundaries of its claim, Vietnam also specifies the
extent of its national jurisdiction.31 Vietnam’s jurisdictional claims track nearly
word for word with the requirements of UNCLOS articles 57 and 56, respec-
tively, although it should be noted that Vietnam’s baselines are considered by the
U.S. State Department to be excessive.32
Malaysia’s Exclusive Economic Zone Act 1984 make similarly normative EEZ
and continental-shelf claims.33 Additionally, the Joint Submission of Malaysia
and Vietnam to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf makes a
reasonable claim to an extended continental shelf beyond the two-hundred-
nautical-mile EEZ in accordance with UNCLOS article 76.34 The submission
starts with each coastal state’s baselines and measures two hundred nautical
miles without regard to any island features. Concerning the Spratly Islands, the
legal approach taken by Vietnam and Malaysia, in contrast with the various Chi-
nese approaches, complies with UNCLOS article 121 concerning the regime of
islands and with recent case law. Specifically, the Malaysia-Vietnam approach
recognizes that the various islets, reefs, and shoals in the southern part of the
South China Sea are too small to form the basis of a claim to an EEZ or a conti-
nental shelf (or any other form of jurisdiction other than a territorial sea) of
their own right.
Another important aspect of Malaysia’s and Vietnam’s claims is that they are
specific and public. They represent a choice made by each government concern-
ing how international law should be interpreted in regard to its jurisdiction over
offshore zones. They provide a basis for discussion, negotiation, and even poten-
tially litigation by other states that have different perspectives. They do not rely on
power—military or economic—to decide the issue. In these ways, the Malaysia-
Vietnam approach provides a basis for a stable resolution to any disputes, which is
the point of the comment by the International Court of Justice in the Fisheries
Case discussed above.
The government of the Philippines established archipelagic baselines for its
main islands in legislation completed in 2009 and filed on deposit with the
UN.35 This legislation also claims a separate, nonspecific regime of islands for its
Kalayaan Islands claims and its separate claim to the Scarborough Shoal. The
Philippines also maintains an EEZ claim based on a 1978 presidential proclama-
tion.36 The Philippines EEZ extends two hundred nautical miles from its baselines,
which were publicly established by the 2009 legislation. Thus, with regard to its
main islands, the Philippines made a specific and public claim concerning the ex-
tent of its EEZ.
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Concerning its continental-shelf claim, the Philippines retains on file with
the UN its Presidential Proclamation of 1968, which claims a continental shelf
“to where the depth of the [Philippines] superjacent waters admits of the exploi-
tation of such resources, including living organisms belonging to sedentary spe-
cies.”37 This outdated expression of the jurisdictional limits of the Philippines
continental-shelf claim stems from the definition that appeared in the 1958
Continental Shelf Convention, the provisions of which were updated by
UNCLOS article 76.38 Additionally, the Philippines made a claim to an extended
continental shelf in the Philippine Sea, but not in the South China Sea. The Phil-
ippines could improve the clarity of its jurisdictional claims to a continental
shelf by bringing its proclamation into alignment with UNCLOS. Additionally,
the government of the Philippines should publicly state what, if any, claims to
jurisdiction over maritime zones it maintains, based on its claim of sovereignty
over some of the Spratly Islands and Scarborough Reef. These steps would pro-
mote stability by removing sources of ambiguity and allowing for negotiations
or arbitration in concert with international law.
In sum, the jurisdictional claims of Malaysia and Vietnam are fully public and
stated with specificity. The claims of the Philippines are improving in clarity, but
there continues to be room for improvement in that regard. The claims of
Brunei should be made more publicly accessible by placing them on deposit
with the UN. The jurisdictional claims of China (and Taiwan) in the South
China Sea, however, remain ambiguous and therefore contribute to regional in-
stability and present problems for all states whose vessels operate in the South
China Sea.
Control
The third category of disputes relates to attempts to assert coastal-state control
over the activities of military vessels operating in the South China Sea and is
fundamentally about the correct interpretation of international law concerning
the balance of coastal-state and international rights and obligations in the EEZ
and other jurisdictional waters. As a practical matter there are only two parties
to the dispute in this category, China and the United States. Many other coun-
tries around the globe, however, have interests and stakes in its outcome, since
this category involves China’s various attempts to alter international norms con-
cerning freedom of navigation for military purposes and to roll back the balance
of coastal-state and international rights in coastal zones that were negotiated in
the development of UNCLOS. This resulted in a series of confrontations be-
tween American and Chinese government vessels in the South China Sea
between 2001 and 2009 that, although tension producing, were manageable from
a political and military perspective.39 China ended this mutual policy of “managed
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friction,” however, on 8 March 2009, when it confronted USNS Impeccable
(T-AGOS 23) with five vessels—a PLA Navy intelligence ship, a government fish-
eries patrol vessel, a maritime surveillance service vessel of the State Oceano-
graphic Administration, and two small fishing trawlers.40
Under the observation of all three Chinese government vessels, the fishing
trawlers maneuvered dangerously to within eight meters ahead of Impeccable
and then abruptly stopped. This forced Impeccable to take emergency action to
avoid a collision. Additionally, the Chinese aboard the fishing trawlers used a
grappling hook to try to snag Impeccable’s towed cable and its related acoustic
equipment.41 These Chinese actions violated international norms related to the
duty to exercise due regard in navigation of vessels at sea and also constituted
unlawful interference with a sovereign vessel of another state. Impeccable left the
scene in order to reduce immediate tensions but returned to the exact location
several days later in the company of an American warship, USS Chung Hoon
(DDG 93).42 Thus, the Chinese escalation from past patterns raised the dispute
over navigation issues from “managed friction” to one of “near conflict,” thereby
initiating renewed American strategic attention to the waters of the South China
Sea and to the international norms governing freedom of navigation for military
purposes in the EEZ.
The creation of the exclusive economic zone in 1982 by UNCLOS as a region
extending beyond the territorial sea to a maximum of two hundred nautical
miles from a coastal state’s shores was a carefully balanced compromise between
the interests of coastal states in managing and protecting ocean resources and
those of maritime user states in ensuring high-seas freedoms of navigation and
overflight, including for military purposes. Thus while in the exclusive eco-
nomic zone the coastal state was granted sovereign rights to resources and juris-
diction to make laws related to those resources, high-seas freedoms of
navigation were specifically preserved for all states, to ensure the participation
of maritime powers in the convention.
Nonetheless, China has persistently attempted to shift this carefully balanced
compromise by making more expansive claims of legal protection for its security
interests, especially in the South China Sea. For instance, one statement by a Chi-
nese military spokesman concerning international freedoms of navigation in
the South China Sea is typical. A Chinese Defense Ministry spokesman, Senior
Colonel Geng Yansheng, stated, “We will, in accordance with the demands of in-
ternational law, respect the freedom of passage of ships or aircraft from relevant
countries which are in compliance with international law.”43 When pressed to
explain the distinction between “passage” and “navigation,” other senior Chinese
officials have stated that the Chinese government has not objected to the passing
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of U.S. Navy vessels through the Chinese EEZ en route to another destination.
However, when such vessels conduct exercises, gather intelligence or other mili-
tarily useful data, or undertake activities other than mere passage, these officials
argue, they are in violation of international and Chinese domestic law.44
Secretary Clinton, however, made clear at the ASEAN Regional Forum in July
2010 that in the South China Sea the United States will not accept China’s limita-
tions on freedoms of navigation for military purposes. She stated that the
United States, like all nations, has “a national interest in freedom of navigation,
open access to Asia’s maritime commons, and respect for international law in
the South China Sea.”45
THREE OBJECTIVES
China is pursuing three main objectives in the South China Sea and Southeast
Asia: regional integration, resource control, and enhanced security. Chinese ac-
tions over the past four decades are better understood in relation to its various
strategies for achieving these objectives.
Regional Integration
Regional integration between China and the states of Southeast Asia is a priority
for China, as part of its overall policy of “Peaceful Rise.”46 Regional integration
with other South China Sea states, therefore, has both political and economic as-
pects. To achieve growth, it is helpful for a state to have peaceful borders so that
resources can be channeled into economic development rather than armies and
border defense systems.47 Accordingly, in order to focus domestic energy on its
rapid economic rise, China entered into a period of “strategic pause” with re-
spect to physical confrontation over the Spratly Islands beginning in the
mid-1990s and after the political setbacks China suffered in connection with the
Mischief Reef incident. This new strategy, pursued from the late 1990s until at
least 2007, resulted in major progress, in that opportunities for regional political
and economic integration with China were largely welcomed by Southeast Asian
states as promoting region-wide economic growth and counterbalancing other
outside powers, such as the United States.
In order to facilitate the political aspects of regional integration, China un-
dertook numerous political relationships with ASEAN. Perhaps the most suc-
cessful aspects of China’s pursuit of regional integration, however, were the
programs of economic, commercial, and infrastructural development. Two-way
trade, for instance, soared from less than eight billion dollars in 1991 to $106 bil-
lion in 2004 and to $231 billion in 2008. The last figure is higher than the trade
between ASEAN states and the United States for the same year, which amounted
to $172 billion. For many years, ASEAN enjoyed a trade surplus with China; that
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has slipped in recent years, and to compensate, China has agreed to increase its
bilateral investment in the region by 60 percent over two years.
Additionally, China has supported major infrastructure projects in the re-
gion. One such project, the Nanning–Singapore economic corridor, focuses on
the construction of an integrated railway transportation system that links
Nanning, Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City, Phnom Penh, Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur, and
Singapore. A second project, the Greater Mekong Subregion, similarly links
Kunming, in China’s Yunnan Province, with Singapore via high-speed rail. More
difficult for China to achieve are Pan Beibu Gulf development and the Hainan
Initiative. These programs face the obvious challenge of dealing with areas in
which sovereignty and jurisdiction remain in dispute.
Some commentators suggest that China’s many initiatives in support of re-
gional integration reflect a “ripe fruit” strategy in which time is on China’s side.
According to this line of thinking, regional integration efforts were designed to
freeze the disputes and create favorable regional political conditions while
China increased its economic and military power. In this view, once a high level
of comparative development is achieved, “if . . . [China] continues to press its ex-
pansive claims in the South China Sea aggressively, the islands and their atten-
dant maritime space may simply fall into its hands like ripe fruit. At the least,
[China] will dominate the issue and obtain the lion’s share of any settlement.”48
Some Chinese believe that the aims of China’s substantial investment in
Southeast Asia and of its policy of freezing disputes were to earn gratitude, or
perhaps leverage, that would result in willing abandonment, in China’s favor, of
South China Sea claims by other states. Recent events, however, suggest that
Southeast Asian states prefer that no major power, including China, gain too
much influence in the region. Thus, in a pendulum swing opposite to the one in
the 1990s that led ASEAN states to welcome greater Chinese regional involve-
ment, Southeast Asian states now invite the attention of outside powers, includ-
ing the United States, to offset China’s present rising regional influence, in part
to ensure that negotiations over South China Sea disputes proceed on a
reasonably equal footing.
Resource Control
In addition to regional integration, China is also pursuing the objective of en-
hancing its long-term resource security by ensuring its control over most of the
South China Sea’s living and nonliving resources.49 As one Chinese commenta-
tor stated, “What is the major challenge now confronting our nation? It is the
question of resources.”50 Zhou Shouwei, vice president of the China National
Offshore Oil Corporation, has stated, “Offshore and especially deep-water oil
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and gas discoveries have great significance for replenishing China’s and the
world’s oil resources.”51
Fishing resources are also important to the Chinese leadership. One govern-
ment publication states, “The . . . Sino-Vietnamese Northern Gulf Fishing
Agreement has dramatically compressed the working space for our nation’s fish-
ermen. These new difficulties for our hard-pressed fleets undoubtedly consti-
tute one disaster after another. Not only have [such agreements] worsened the
situation, but there is also the possibility that it could touch off social instability
in various coastal towns and villages.”52 Indeed, the Chinese navy sees the im-
portance of sea power as an aspect of this resource security.
In the new century, the oceans are . . . strategic treasure troves of natural resources
for the sustainable development of humankind. Humankind’s full exploitation and
utilization of the oceans and joint management of the oceans in keeping with the law
is essentially a redistribution of the world’s maritime rights and interests. Whoever
has the greatest investment in the oceans, whoever has the greatest capacity for ex-
ploiting the oceans, and whoever controls the oceans will have the upper hand and
will acquire more wealth from the oceans, and that nation will be rich and powerful.
Therefore it is inevitable that the oceans will become an important arena for interna-
tional political, economic, and military struggles as well as an important objective in
the struggle of every nation for rights and interests.53
Perhaps this unidentified author’s primary intention was to justify expansion
of China’s navy. However, that he chose to do so using arguments about resource
insecurity and the importance of national control over maritime resources is an
indication of anxiety among the Chinese people and leadership over the pros-
pect of providing food and energy for more than 1.3 billion people, especially as
expectations rise along with China’s economic status. Thus, an important objec-
tive for China is to ensure its future access to the resources of the South China
Sea.
Enhanced Security
China’s third objective appears to be to enhance its control over the South China
Sea in order to create a maritime security buffer zone that protects the major
population centers, industry, and rich cultural sites of China’s developed eastern
coastal area.
As a retired PLA major general has stated,
China’s sea area is the initial strategic barrier for homeland security. The coastal area
was the front line of growth during China’s economic development and the develop-
ment of Chinese civil society. China’s most developed regions are along the coastline.
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. . . The coastal area also possesses the largest population of any of the country’s re-
gions, the highest concentration of high-technology industries, and the most mod-
ernized culture. If coastal defense were to fall into danger, China’s politically and
economically important central regions would be exposed to external threats. In the
context of modern warfare, military skills such as long-range precision strike develop
gradually, which makes the coastal sea area more and more meaningful for homeland
defense as a region providing strategic depth and precious early-warning time. In
short, the coastal area is the gateway for China’s entire national security.54
The idea that China needs to control its littoral maritime zones is based on the
classic approach to geostrategy of a country having security concerns with re-
gard to both land and sea. Such countries generally follow security strategies
that balance land and maritime strength in order to develop concentric circles of
strategic control, influence, and reach around their central regions of vital na-
tional interest.55 Thus, the South China Sea, East China Sea, and Yellow Sea col-
lectively represent an area in which Chinese strategists believe they need to
develop military control in order to exclude external threats and thereby to raise
the level of security of China’s coastal region.56
However, China’s recent actions to enhance its security by competing with
other claimants for sovereignty, jurisdiction, and control over the South China
Sea fail to account for the interests of other states. Thus, beginning in March
2009, when China shifted its regional strategy away from integration and re-
source cooperation toward competition over sovereignty and security, it allowed
the “ripened fruit,” the political benefits, gained by more than a decade of coop-
eration to rot on the vine unharvested. Chinese policy makers would do well to
remember that regional integration, resource control, and enhanced security are
the shared objectives of all regional states and that in the past cooperation has
produced substantial results that the recent turn to competition is unlikely to
duplicate. Win-win solutions that focus on mutual interests are more promising
than win-lose solutions based on competition for sovereignty, jurisdiction, and
control.
NEW THINKING ABOUT AN OLD PROBLEM
It is striking how much the South China Sea interests of China and its Southeast
Asian neighbors overlap. Regional political and economic integration has
greatly benefited each of them. Each has an interest in sustainable development
of the South China Sea’s rich fisheries and other living resources. Each has a
growing economy and a similarly growing demand for hydrocarbons to support
it. The national security of each depends in part on the security of the waters off
its shores. What is also striking, however, is that one of the primary reasons for
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the failure to resolve the disputes is that the chosen mechanisms for resolution
are all win-lose—that is, exclusive state sovereignty and jurisdiction allow for
only one winner and create many losers.
Because the islands and reefs of the South China Sea were for many centuries
open to fishermen and traders of all coastal peoples—Vietnamese, Chinese, Ma-
lay, and Filipinos alike—each nation developed a connection to and an interest
in these islands. Similarly, for many centuries the rich fishing grounds were open
to all without fear of exclusion or dominance by others. The present competition
for exclusive sovereignty over the islands and for jurisdiction over the resources is
shortsighted and self-referential, and it fails to account for the mutuality of the in-
terests at stake. This type of conflict resolution, in fact, fails to resolve anything
—losers of one round become incentivized to begin a new campaign to reverse or
compensate for their loss. In Asia, where memories are long, a win-lose dynamic
would essentially institutionalize tensions rather than reducing them permanently.
Some in China seem to recognize this reality. One Chinese commentator has
observed that “as China’s comprehensive national strength has increased along
with its military capabilities and its requirements for energy resources, so
ASEAN states’ anxiety about a China threat has been increasing by the day since
independently they have no prospect to balance against China. . . . [Thus, they
have taken steps to] unite together in order to cope with China.”57 Because it
helps overcome the perception that growing Chinese strength is a danger to its
neighbors’ interests, this author praises the benefits of joint development. Oth-
ers are less sanguine. As one military scholar put it, “China’s policy toward the
South China Sea is ‘sovereignty is ours, set aside disputes, pursue joint develop-
ment.’ But ‘setting aside disputes’ does not mean setting aside our sovereignty. . . .
China is already not a weak country. . . . [I]t is hoped that related countries will
not make a strategic miscalculation.”58
Although in China there is a rich and varied debate about how best to pursue
the nation’s interests in the South China Sea, there is a common center to the
range of Chinese perspectives.59 All reflect dissatisfaction with the status quo, in
which the Chinese perceive that only China is exercising restraint while all other
claimants actively develop and exploit the resources in the disputed zones. There
is also general recognition that China has few good options for protecting its in-
terests. Finally, there is general agreement that militarization would only aggra-
vate the disputes and that improving and energizing China’s civilian enforcement
capabilities can best protect Chinese interests.
Thus, there is a kernel of hope that solutions to the Three Disputes can be
found in win-win, interest-based approaches that accommodate all and exclude
none.60 A good place to begin would be meaningful implementation of the
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principles of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea,
which emphasize peaceful approaches to the many disputes that currently dis-
turb regional tranquility.61
Win-Win Thinking about Sovereignty Disputes
China’s muscular insistence in the years between 1975 and 1995 on severing the
sovereignty interests of other countries in the Paracel and Spratly Islands re-
sulted only in a coalescence of political and military opinion in Southeast Asian
states against China. Even China’s policies of the past fifteen years of gaining po-
litical and economic rather than military leverage have failed, because they re-
mained focused on obtaining exclusive Chinese domination of territories that
China has never in its history fully controlled and in which all other peoples in
the region were traditionally able to operate. The policy failed because it would
have thwarted the interests of other states in the region to use the physical terri-
tory of the Spratly Islands to pursue commercial interests, research, enhanced
regional and national security, and recreation. This situation suggests that past
proposals for shared regional “ownership” of the islands should be revived.
One such proposal, originally made by Mark Valencia, Jon Van Dyke, and
Noel Ludwig, was to establish a form of “regional sovereignty” over the islands
themselves—that is to say, shared authority over the islands among regional
states, to the exclusion of all others.62 A regional authority established by agree-
ment among the claimants could exercise this authority over the islands, their
territorial seas, and sovereign airspace. Representation in the regional authority
could take many forms but would be based on a combination of such factors as
national population, length of coastline, and extent of current and historical usage
—all of which are recognized in international case law as legitimate bases for re-
solving maritime disputes. This arrangement would allow all regional claimant-
states to pursue their interests in the physical territory in the South China Sea
through a political mechanism designed to manage the territory efficiently and
effectively on behalf of them all.
A second approach that bears consideration is represented by Svalbard, be-
tween the north coast of Norway and Greenland. In order to resolve Svalbard’s
indeterminate status and to avoid international conflict over its resources, con-
cerned states attending the Paris Conference in the aftermath of World War I ne-
gotiated the Treaty of Spitsbergen of 9 February 1920. The treaty gave primary
sovereignty to Norway but allowed resource-related rights to all signatories.
Original signatories included Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Italy, Japan,
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The
Soviet Union signed in 1924 and Germany in 1925; currently there are more
than forty signatories, including China.63 When the treaty came into force on 14
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August 1925, Norway took over sovereignty, subject to rights of all parties to fish
and hunt, to enjoy “equal liberty of access and entry for any reason, [and] to
carry on there without impediment all maritime, industrial, mining and com-
mercial operations on a footing of absolute equality.”64 This creative approach to
sovereignty, which accommodated the mutual interests of the various parties
with the support of the international community, has contributed to regional
security by avoiding conflict and effectively managing living and nonliving re-
sources, and it has productively contributed to international scientific research.
As such, it should be considered a potential model for a negotiated resolution of
the disputes over the Spratly Islands.
Win-Win Thinking about Jurisdiction Disputes
There are many examples of collaborative regimes to share jurisdiction over
maritime resources that could be effectively applied in the South China Sea, in-
cluding several in East and Southeast Asia. The joint Chinese-Vietnamese fish-
ing zone in the Gulf of Tonkin/Beibu Gulf is one example of an approach to
overlapping jurisdictional rights and accommodation of mutual, long-standing
interests.65 Useful elements of this agreement include delimited zones of na-
tional jurisdiction, a cooperative-management zone of mutual jurisdiction, and
an agreement to cooperative management.66
Specifically, the agreement establishes a Joint Fishery Committee (JFC) that
includes representatives from each party. Together they manage common func-
tions, such as fisheries research, consultation with members of the fishing in-
dustry, and recommendations concerning catch quotas for the different types of
species. The JFC is quite powerful, in that it has authority to take binding con-
servation and management measures in order to ensure that fish stocks do not
become endangered through overfishing. Decisions are made on the basis of
consensus, which promotes willing compliance among state parties. At annual
meetings the JFC employs a “quantity-control approach” that sets a “total allow-
able catch” per species for each of several target species and specifies the number
of vessels that may fish them. The total allowable catch is based on the status of
each species, the extent of traditional fishing activity, and the impact of modern
fishing and management techniques.67
A multilateral entity that could potentially serve as a model for the South China
Sea is the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO). NAFO manages the
high-seas fisheries in a rich fishing ground outside any EEZ in the northwestern
Atlantic Ocean. NAFO’s “objective is to contribute through consultation and co-
operation to the optimum utilization, rational management and conservation of
the fishery resources of the Convention Area.”68 The convention establishes a Fish-
eries Commission whose purpose is to achieve “optimum utilization of the fishery
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resources”and to adopt a total annual catch quota based on the recommendations
of a Scientific Council. The total annual catch quota, by species, is allocated by
the commission among the members, giving special consideration to traditional
fishing patterns and coastal communities whose livelihoods are based on re-
sources from fishing regional waters.
The commission is also responsible for the adoption of “international meth-
ods of control and enforcement” by which member states may engage in mutual
enforcement of quotas.69 Mutual-enforcement measures include a mandatory
vessel-monitoring system that uses satellite tracking to provide position updates
every two hours; a mandatory observer program in which every vessel fishing in
the regulatory area must carry an independent and impartial observer to report
any infringements; and a joint inspection and surveillance scheme in which con-
tracting parties have, in rotation, “inspection presence” responsibilities (cur-
rently Canada and the European Union) to monitor compliance by the vessels of
all contracting parties and report apparent infringements of any vessel to its
government for investigation and administrative or judicial action.70 NAFO’s
well developed scheme for multilateral accommodation of mutual fisheries
interests and enforceability shows promise for fisheries cooperation in the South
China Sea.
Win-Win Thinking about Disputes Related to Military Activities
There is at least some geostrategic rationale for Chinese antiaccess-oriented
norms. China seeks to develop control over its near seas in order to enhance its
own security and enjoy a freer hand in Asia to pursue its political objectives.
However, China’s approach to the normative relationship between coastal states
and foreign military power in the EEZ is shortsighted in that it focuses on
China’s regional objectives, seemingly without regard to the importance of na-
val power to the security of sea-lanes around the globe. China relies for its eco-
nomic growth and development on those very sea-lanes. Thus there appears to
be a gap between China’s expression of antiaccess legal norms and its own global
interests, since the logical result of a normative shift from international access to
the EEZ toward coastal-state authority to exclude foreign military power would
be an expanded zone of instability at sea and increased sanctuary for such
destabilizing elements as piracy, human trafficking, and illegal weapons and
narcotics trafficking.
It is Chinese pressure on the norms that govern military activities at sea that is
now drawing the United States into disputes in the South China Sea in the first
place. The United States has long withheld any opinion as to the ultimate dispo-
sition of questions of sovereignty and jurisdiction in the region. But freedom of
navigation and the freedom to pursue traditionally lawful military activities at
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sea are critical interests of the United States. Thus, at the 2010 ASEAN Regional
Forum in Hanoi, the United States and ASEAN nations made it clear to China
that its excessive claims in this regard are politically and legally unsustainable.
Secretary Clinton took the opportunity to remind ARF attendees that freedom
of navigation for all purposes, including for military activities, is a vital Ameri-
can national interest and is in the interest of all states that rely on open and
secure sea-lanes—and indeed, “all” includes China.
During the tense ARF session in Hanoi, published reports pointed to another
by-product of China’s policies—a desire, born of rising friction over South
China Sea security issues, by many regional states for renewed American atten-
tion to regional security dynamics. As one Australian defense scholar stated, “All
across the board, China is seeing the atmospherics change tremendously. . . . The
idea of the China threat, thanks to its own efforts, is being revived.”71 Unfortu-
nately, the Chinese policy-making community currently seems unwilling or un-
able to accommodate the interests of either its regional neighbors or the United
States, despite China’s pledge in the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the
South China Sea to “respect . . . freedom of navigation in and overflight above
the South China Sea as provided for by the universally recognized principles of
international law, including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.”
This intractability reflects a national self-assertion that has only reaped instabil-
ity. More traditional Chinese cultural thinking reflects elements of self-restraint
and responsibility for others, especially those who are weaker, elements that
appear to have been suppressed from the Chinese political body as present
policies were made in 2009 and 2010.
Underlying the concern of other states about China’s behavior and interna-
tional law perspectives is the question of what kind of major power China will
become as it continues to rise. Will it use its increased power to achieve only its
own interests, at the expense of the important interests of others? If so, this is a
win-lose path that is likely to lead to continued tensions and possibly even con-
flict. Or will China undertake a more active leadership role from within the cur-
rent architecture of norms, institutions, and international law and seek to develop
win-win solutions to problems of overlapping interests? Whether the end of the
twenty-first century sees a strong United States or a strong China, or a strong
United States and a strong China, a regional partnership to address nontradi-
tional security concerns will have been a win-win approach, accommodating the
dynamics of mutual interests among the inevitable tensions of international
relations.
{LINE-SPACE}
The Three Disputes in the South China Sea have been sources of instability and
even aggression for more than four decades. Only after the negative reaction to
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the 1995 Mischief Reef incident and China’s shift of policy toward regional inte-
gration and joint resource development was there a period of relative peace. Fu-
ture peace and security in the South China Sea require all regional countries to
remain focused on mutual interests rather than on the pursuit of national inter-
ests alone. This mutuality should include a renewed commitment to political,
economic, and commercial integration and joint development of living and non-
living maritime resources, which form a common Asian heritage. Nonregional
states with regional interests, including the United States, can provide meaningful
assistance and support in these endeavors.
Achieving a lasting situation of regional stability will require new ap-
proaches. The current pursuits of sovereignty, jurisdiction, and control are by
nature win-lose. Power alone may produce settlements, but such settlements
may not be final, because they do not account for the long-standing mutual in-
terests of others. New, win-win forms of problem solving are needed today
—forms marked by shared rather than exclusive authority and mutual rather
than nationalistic interests. Only such approaches will ensure that the
twenty-first century does not mirror the rivalry and conflict that dominated the
twentieth.
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PROGRESSING MARITIME SECURITY COOPERATION
IN THE INDIAN OCEAN
Lee Cordner
The theme of the second Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), hosted inAbu Dhabi by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) Navy on 10–12 May 2010,
was “Together for the Reinforcement of Maritime Security in the Indian
Ocean.”1 Navy chiefs of service and senior maritime security officers or their
representatives from thirty of the thirty-two Indian Ocean region (IOR) navies
and maritime security forces gathered for this significant event. Participants
from the diverse Indian Ocean littoral came from the Arabian Gulf and the Red
Sea, Africa, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Australia.2 Pakistan, which had de-
clined an invitation to attend the first IONS meeting, in New Delhi in 2008, was
represented by the local air attaché. In addition, extraregional maritime force
participants included the U.S. Navy, represented by Commander, Naval Forces,
U.S. Central Command, Vice Admiral William
Gortney, and the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations,
Vice Admiral Bruce W. Clingan; the Italian Navy, rep-
resented by its chief, Admiral Bruno Branciforte; and
the Royal Navy of the United Kingdom, which sent a
senior delegation. Notable was the absence of partici-
pants from the navies of other external countries with
significant and growing interests in the IOR, for ex-
ample, China, Russia, Japan, and the Republic of
Korea.
The opening ceremony saw India, the founder and
inaugural chair of IONS, represented by Admiral
Lee Cordner is a strategic analyst who worked as a Prin-
cipal Research Fellow at the University of Wollongong,
Australia, and was formerly CEO of Future Directions
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Nirmal Verma, the Indian Navy chief, pass chairmanship for the next two years
to his UAE counterpart, Brigadier Naval Staff Ibrahim Salim Mohamed
Al-Musharrakh. Admiral Verma spoke of the vision of IONS bringing regional
navies together for the greater collective good: to enhance safety and security, to
share knowledge, and to support disaster relief and humanitarian assistance for
“the larger benefit of mankind.” Brigadier Al-Musharrakh noted that the con-
cept of security had changed, that it was no longer simply about territory but
now encompassed issues like water availability and the environment. He stated
that trade protection, law and order, regional stability, and the effects of climate
change were key collective-security issues for the region. He emphasized the
need for regional naval forces to work together to ensure that the IOR continued
to be a source of growth and well-being in the face of common threats and
challenges.
Indian Ocean regional maritime security has become a key factor as the IOR
transitions from an international backwater, a mere thoroughfare for maritime
trade, to status as a major global nexus of resource, human, economic, and envi-
ronmental issues. The IONS theme suggested a region moving toward maritime
security cooperation; there was considerable convergence of views on related is-
sues and recognition of the need to take collective approaches.
Moving from a common understanding of issues and aspirations to coopera-
tion to effective action presents enormous challenges. This is particularly the
case for the Indian Ocean, which does not have region-wide security architec-
tures, a common regional identity, a history of regional cooperation, or accepted
regional leadership frameworks. Significant problems are also posed by the need
to recognize the interests and accommodate the involvement of regional powers,
as well as of extraregional powers, like China and the United States. Nonetheless,
emerging strategic and security circumstances in the medium and long terms
dictate a compelling need for effective IOR maritime security cooperation. This
article analyzes the prospects of, and offers ideas for, progressing maritime secu-
rity cooperation in that region.
COMMON INTERESTS, THREATS, RISKS, AND VULNERABILITIES
The international system is fundamentally anarchic, with states acting in accor-
dance with their perceived national interests.3 If progress is to be made toward
effective maritime security cooperation among nation-states, there needs to be a
strong sense that commonly held interests are threatened, at risk, or vulnerable
and that cooperative action among states will help to protect them. States are
most likely to embrace cooperative security measures when there is a compel-
ling, shared belief that the defense of their own interests can be usefully en-
hanced through that course. Pertinent questions that arise include: What are the
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common regional security interests? Whose national interests are affected? How
are those interests threatened? What are the key strategic vulnerabilities? Criti-
cally, how would maritime security cooperation help manage the risks posed?
Short- and long-term regional risk assessments and strategic-level analyses are
required to answer these questions.
The evolving strategic environment in the IOR is profoundly impacted by di-
vergent perceptions about its unique regional political and geographic circum-
stances. For many in this region, especially South Asians, the Indian Ocean has
historically been one of the region’s strongest unifying factors. For centuries, its
waters have carried religions, languages, traditions, and indeed people across
thousands of miles and bound them together in a cultural brotherhood. Accord-
ing to those who hold this view, it is only the failure of the inhabitants to record the
region’s maritime history that has deprived it of the status of a cohesive regional
entity. For most others, however, the IOR appears to be a largely disaggregated
oceanic and littoral zone, more a collection of subregions than a coherent, single
region.4 This view appears to have been reinforced by its division by the United
States between the Pacific, Central, and Africa unified commands, whose tri-
junction is in the northwest Indian Ocean.5
The IOR is demonstrably maritime. The national interests of its states range
from the need to ensure the unfettered flow of maritime trade to support bur-
geoning, or emerging and struggling, economies to the need for effective manage-
ment of the Indian Ocean’s vast “maritime commons,” both national jurisdictions
and high seas.6 It is in the maritime domain that the interests of IOR states largely
converge, and it is at sea that the need for cooperative security is most pressing.7 It
is also at sea that the best opportunities lie to develop mechanisms, and ultimately
habits, of security cooperation that may in the future have application to more
controversial security agendas.
CLIMATE CHANGE, MARINE ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION,
AND OCEAN MANAGEMENT
The direst long-term threats to the collective interests of regional countries and
peoples are nontraditional security risks. The combined impacts of climate
change, environmental degradation, and ocean resource exploitation will pro-
foundly affect the lives of millions in a region where many states have little capa-
bility to manage or respond to them.8
The Impact of Climate Change
The Geneva-based Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has concluded
that the evidence of warming of the global climate system is unequivocal.9 Sea
temperatures of the equatorial areas of the Indian Ocean are rising more quickly
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than elsewhere, and the likelihood of significant variances in the monsoon sea-
son has increased, which could create drought conditions for much of South
Asia. There are increasing incidences of very intense storms, with higher peak
wind speeds and heavier precipitation than has been typical, which could result
in major coastal damage and massive flooding.10 The changing frequency and
intensity of extreme weather events, together with sea-level rise, are expected to
have significantly adverse effects.11
The scale of the potential climate change impact in the IOR is so immense as
to be difficult to comprehend. The region is likely to be faced with a series of ma-
jor weather-related events that, over time, will impose human suffering and en-
vironmental damage that will cumulatively overwhelm and drain response
resources and undermine resilience. The impact will be deeply felt in Asia;12
more than a billion people will have been adversely affected by the 2050s.13 Af-
rica is also very vulnerable.14 The number of people annually subject to flooding
in coastal populations is projected to increase from thirteen million to
ninety-four million, primarily in South Asia and Southeast Asia.15 Millions of
people in low-lying areas of Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, India, Vietnam,
Burma (Myanmar), and Indonesia will be affected. The incidence of increas-
ingly intense tropical cyclones, combined with growing coastal populations, will
result in massive loss of life, damage to property, and large-scale transmigration,
resulting in turn in very frequent requirements for humanitarian assistance and
disaster relief.
Marine Resources. Global warming will also have far-reaching implications for
marine ecosystems.16 The effects of climate change will be compounded by in-
creased competition for and environmental degradation and overutilization of
the ocean’s resources. Illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing is predicted to
increase in the Indian Ocean as stocks in traditional fishing areas are exhausted
and fishermen are forced to move to deeper and more distant waters. There is al-
ready significant evidence of the wider implications of the illegal plundering of
stocks by distant-water fishing fleets off Somalia, for example.17 Local fisheries
are being progressively dispossessed by external enterprises catching marketable
fish, like tuna, to meet international demand.18 These circumstances exacerbate
already tenuous food-security concerns in the IOR.
Maritime Boundary Delimitations. The delimitation of the maritime bound-
aries of many IOR states has not been agreed, although progress is better here
than in some other parts of the world.19 Maritime disputes between adjacent lit-
toral states are likely to occur due to boundary uncertainty and overlapping
claims. There are ocean-management concerns in some areas due to the lack of
clarity over which nations are to exercise rights and accept obligations for
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husbanding, regulating, and enforcing marine zones. Many Indian Ocean states
have submitted extended-continental-shelf claims to the United Nations (UN)
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf; these claims, if established,
will extend the marine zones that require responsible management.20
Maritime and Marine Challenges: Managing the Risks
Many IOR states have little or no capacity to fulfill their responsibilities for man-
aging marine zones effectively. Exploitation, pollution, and water-security in-
fringements will proceed unchecked in many parts of the Indian Ocean, both
under national jurisdiction and in the high seas. Very few regional countries
have the individual capacity to deal with human tragedies and environmental
damage to coastal areas on a massive scale resulting from repeated natural disas-
ters. The overall regional capacity to mitigate the risks from climate change is
grossly inadequate.
The widespread coastal devastation and loss of life caused by the 2004 Asian
tsunami and the 2007 and 2009 Bangladesh cyclones point to the collective human-
security challenges that lie in the future. In those instances, many regional coun-
tries rallied in mutual support; significant response and recovery assistance was
also provided by extraregional nations and organizations.21
The combined effects of climate change and marine environmental degrada-
tion pose profound threats over the medium and long terms to many IOR litto-
ral states. Natural-disaster response and humanitarian aid will demand the
application of resources and the coordination of collective efforts on scales and
at frequencies far beyond anything so far experienced. Related human, food, and
environmental security concerns will be greatly magnified. Vast cooperative re-
sponses will be required that will involve regional and extraregional maritime
security forces.
MARITIME TRADE, ENERGY, AND ECONOMIC SECURITY
Law and order threats to maritime trade that are prevalent in the IOR pose sig-
nificant risks to both regional and extraregional economic and energy security.
The proliferation of failed and failing states in the region adds further dimen-
sions to the security challenges that—along with competition and perhaps con-
flict between regional and extraregional powers, for example, China and
India—could impinge upon freedom of navigation and therefore the flow of
maritime trade.
Energy Supply and Demand. Asia is forecast to experience by far the world’s
greatest increase in energy demand into the medium term.22 China and India’s
proportions of world energy use have greatly increased.23 More than a third of
the world’s oil exports come from the IOR, with the vast majority of known
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reserves in the Arabian Gulf subregion; “energy-surplus nations” have assumed
increased importance in the global economic hierarchy.24 The largest energy-
growth area is in the demand for coal, forecast to grow by 73 percent between
2005 and 2030, most of the increase coming from China and India. Australia is
the world’s largest exporter of coal, with South Africa close behind;25 both coun-
tries ship much of it via the Indian Ocean.
The Indian Ocean Sea-Lanes. The Indian Ocean is now the world’s most impor-
tant route for the movement of long-haul cargo.26 More than 80 percent of the
world’s seaborne trade in oil passes through the Indian Ocean’s choke points:
the straits of Hormuz, Malacca, and Bab el Mandeb.27 In addition to energy, vast
quantities of bulk commodities and manufactured goods are moved by sea as
part of the increasing intra- and extraregional trade.28 The integrity of the In-
dian Ocean sea lines of communication (SLOCs) is vital to global and regional
economic security. In the complicated international shipping and trading con-
text, maintaining the flow of trade is very much in the collective interest of the
world’s nations; to ensure it, cooperative maritime security efforts are required.
Piracy. The current international response to piracy off Somalia presents an ex-
ample of the complexities of maintaining that flow. The multinational nature of
the interests involved is clearly evident, as are the great challenges of dealing
with even a relatively small piracy problem in a vast oceanic area. Despite the re-
quirements of international law for flag states to exercise jurisdiction over ships
and crews, the onus upon all states to repress piracy, ten UN Security Council
resolutions since 2008, and the commitment of naval task forces, the international
community continues to struggle with the problem of piracy off Somalia.29
The incidence of piracy elsewhere in the IOR—for example, the Malacca
Strait—has lessened, due to the combined efforts of littoral and extraregional
nations. The advent of international cooperative entities—including the Re-
gional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery
against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) and, more recently, the Djibouti Code of Con-
duct, aimed to “help address the problem of piracy and armed robbery against
ships off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden”—brings together re-
gional nations and other interested parties to combat piracy.30 Both are coopera-
tive maritime security initiatives; however, there are some significant differences
between them. ReCAAP is supported by Asian nations with capable maritime
security regimes and some history of cooperation. The Djibouti Code of Con-
duct nations, in contrast, have very limited maritime security capabilities and
little experience of cooperation.
Maritime Terrorism. The likelihood of terrorist attacks continues to be a major
concern;31 the IOR retains the dubious distinction of being one of the world’s
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sanctuaries for violent extremism.32 Although the threat of terrorist attack on
shipping remains relatively low, it must be taken seriously, and some incidents
have occurred in the IOR.33 The terrorist threat at sea must be viewed as credible;
major attacks can disrupt global security and the global economy.
In recent years, the need to counter that threat has led to substantial changes
in the international maritime security environment. The International Ship and
Port Facility Security Code and the Suppression of Unlawful Acts conventions
and protocols have profoundly improved the security preparedness of the inter-
national maritime community, with respect to both ports and shipping.34
Other Threats to Law and Order at Sea. Other law and order issues that threaten
the interests of IOR states include illegal immigration, illegal fishing, marine pol-
lution, and the smuggling of people, drugs, and arms. The protection of maritime
boundaries and the policing of maritime domains are largely the responsibilities
of individual nations. Threats to law and order at sea often have transnational
dimensions—for example, crime and illegal immigration, which require collec-
tive regional or subregional responses. Illegal immigration is likely to increase sig-
nificantly, given the impacts of climate change on burgeoning populations,
combined with local conflicts.
REGIONAL STABILITY
The Indian Ocean region contains a large proportion of the world’s failed and
failing states, including eleven of the twenty states listed in the journal Foreign
Policy’s 2009 “Failed State Index.”35 Parts of the IOR have been labeled the “arc of
crisis”;36 the term “arc of instability” has also been used.37 Conflicts in the Mid-
dle East; political instability and conflict in Yemen, Sudan, and Eritrea; the
“Talibanization” of Pakistan, extending from Afghanistan;38 social unrest in parts
of India; the political polarization in Bangladesh; the prodemocracy movement in
Burma; simmering ethnic tensions after the recently concluded civil war in Sri
Lanka—all these add fuel to the perception of a region riddled with political insta-
bility, actual or potential conflict, and uncertain security.
Somalia is the quintessential failed state, having long disintegrated as a func-
tioning entity. A key consequence is a “yawning maritime security gap off the
Horn of Africa,” both a symptom and a result of the lack of law and order ashore.39
The prospect of the degeneration of other states adjacent to vital international
SLOCs and straits must be seriously considered. The maritime security interests
of regional and extraregional states are likely to be affected if this occurs.
In a related vein, the Mumbai terrorist attacks are symptomatic of a lack of ef-
fective maritime-border control.40 India and (to a lesser extent) Pakistan have
capable naval and other maritime security forces, as do Arabian Gulf states
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(Saudi Arabia, Iran, the UAE). Some other countries, however, have small naval
forces of little effectiveness (Yemen, Kenya, and Djibouti, in the western Indian
Ocean), and in many respects the region is a maritime security void. Many IOR
states lack intelligence, early warning, and maritime air surveillance and recon-
naissance or the coordinated maritime security patrol and response capabilities
necessary to exercising sovereign control over their maritime domains. The lack
of national capabilities is exacerbated at regional and subregional levels by the
lack of cooperative bodies to coordinate the use of sparse resources.
Many extraregional countries have significant and legitimate interests to pro-
tect in the IOR. The extensive involvement of the U.S., Chinese, South Korean,
and various European navies in the antipiracy effort off Somalia, for example, is
aimed at protecting a common stake in the free flow of maritime trade. The
United States, Britain, and other Western powers remain deeply engaged in the
Middle East in support of global energy security and in addressing the sources of
Islamist extremism. It can be argued that the involvement of external states
helps to stabilize regional security; in many cases such involvement is essential
to make up for shortfalls in the capabilities of regional states. However, in many
IOR nations that experienced colonial rule it remains easy for politicians to in-
voke the specter of imperialism or “gunboat diplomacy.” External intervention
is not universally welcomed by regional states, and certain types of intervention
are potentially destabilizing. However, realization has dawned, especially since
the 2004 tsunami disaster relief episode, that “cooperative engagement” with
outside powers offers many benefits.
The emergence of China as a maritime power with increasing involvement in
the Indian Ocean has created angst among some IOR states, particularly India.
The Indian-Chinese strategic circumstance, in fact, presents a “security dilem-
ma.”41 New Delhi perceives Chinese involvement as an attempt to strategically en-
circle India.42 The pace and scope of Chinese naval expansion and military mod-
ernization and the lack of transparency with which they have proceeded are
certainly causing concern around the IOR.43 China has extensive and legitimate
interests there, including maritime trade and cooperative relationships with sev-
eral IOR states.44 However, China’s assertion that “it will never seek hegemony or
engage in military expansion now or in the future, no matter how developed it
becomes” is viewed with suspicion in India.45 India too is modernizing and ex-
panding its naval capabilities, which it seeks to justify because of its extensive
coastline and maritime domain and broadened interests in IOR security and
freedom of the seas.46
India’s relationships with China are characterized as “cooperative at present
but there is a competitive rivalry in trade and power projection.”47 Some analysts
consider that a potentially dangerous security situation is developing between
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the two great Asian powers.48 Strategic competition is likely to be played out
largely at sea.
All parties with security interests in the IOR are likely to benefit from coopera-
tion to manage the challenges presented by failed and failing states, as well as by
great-power competition, with its attendant potential for miscalculation. Present
circumstances represent compelling reasons why IOR states should collaborate
among themselves and with extraregional states to promote regional stability.
MARITIME SECURITY COOPERATION
The case for cooperative security in the Indian Ocean region, then, is driven
primarily by extreme vulnerability to the combined impacts of climate change and
environmental degradation. This situation presents dire consequences over the
medium and long terms for both regional and extraregional countries. Signifi-
cantly, environmental security–related interests converge in the maritime
domain.
A Compelling Case for Maritime Security Cooperation
The threats posed are insidious. There is unlikely to be a single defining moment
that will galvanize collective action—and herein lies a major difficulty. Without
a stark and immediate threat, like the prospect of global nuclear war during the
Cold War period, persuading political leaders to act upon cooperative responses
will present major difficulties. But unless regional and extraregional leaders ex-
ercise vision and imagination and take early, proactive action, crises will inevita-
bly arise of enormous and unmanageable proportions, and only highly
inefficient, largely ineffective, and essentially inadequate reactive responses will
be available. The hard lessons will ultimately be learned by the international
community, but it will be too late in many respects. Regrettably, it is difficult to
avoid a pessimistic sense that late and ineffectual reaction is the most realistic
and likely scenario.
The outcomes will be costly—financially, environmentally, and morally, in
terms of human misery and lives. The threats to maritime trade security and en-
ergy security will also significantly affect the interests of external and regional
nations. In the IOR, threats to the economic, environmental, and human secu-
rity interests of regional and external countries have already grown to the extent
that the common interests—especially in the maritime realm—of maintaining a
stable region have become paramount.
Conversely, however, maritime security issues in the IOR could, if managed
astutely and prudently, bind a diverse and largely disaggregated region. The
maritime and marine context provides the opportunity for nations to cooperate
to protect common interests—against a range of vulnerabilities that no single
7 6 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
NWC_2011AutumnReview.ps
\\data1\john.lanzieri.ctr$\msdata\Desktop\NavalWarCollege\NWC_2011AutumnReview\NWC_2011AutumnReview.vp
Thursday, July 28, 2011 3:16:16 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
82
Naval War College Review, Vol. 64 [2011], No. 4, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol64/iss4/1
state has the power to mitigate effectively—without significantly compromising
territorial integrity or sovereignty. The risks posed in the maritime context are
huge and must be faced, but in cooperative security terms they represent the
“low-hanging fruit” that offer the potential for rapid and mutually beneficial ac-
tion. Dealing with them could catalyze habits of region-wide cooperation that
might arguably be applicable to harder and more sensitive security issues, like
arms control and territorial, ethnic, ideological, and religious disputes ashore.49
Risk Management
Managing the risks posed by an environment beset with uncertainty needs to be
at the core of cooperative security in the IOR. Risk management is fundamen-
tally about a structured approach to uncertainty. The international standard
ISO 31000:2009—Risk Management: Principles and Guidelines presents a com-
prehensive framework that is intended to help “ensure that risk is managed ef-
fectively, efficiently and coherently . . . in a systematic, transparent and credible
manner.”50 A formal, strategic risk-management approach would be useful in
defining the magnitude of challenges and identifying mitigation options. In a
regional, cooperative context, the hard questions to be addressed include: How
will risks be recognized? Who has the capability, capacity, and will to respond?
What cooperative arrangements and mechanisms are needed? What would be
the consequences of doing nothing?
Governments are increasingly applying risk-management approaches to stra-
tegic issues. The international risk-management standard offers an internation-
ally accepted framework, a systemized approach to dealing with regional security.
An independent, collaborative, and authoritative regional risk assessment would
help inform IOR and external nations about the scale of the risks being faced
and options for addressing them. In the maritime domain, a regional maritime-
security risk assessment represents a way to initiate cooperation. Such a proposal
would need regional champions and a deal of support from extraregional nations
to proceed.
How Are IOR Maritime-Security Cooperative Arrangements to Be Developed?
Deciding the nature of cooperative arrangements and devising methodologies
to achieve cooperative agendas present serious problems and pose many ques-
tions. What is meant by “maritime security cooperation”? What are the desir-
able extent and scale of cooperation? Who needs to participate? To what extent
should extraregional nations and forces be involved? How can regional and
extraregional capabilities be effectively coordinated in the common interest?
Who has the capability and capacity to contribute, and who should do so? Who
is responsible, and who will pay? Where are capability and capacity lacking?
What alternate options and models for cooperation need to be considered? For
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example, do we need standing, combined naval forces and formal agreements, or
will loose coalitions of the willing assembled on ad hoc bases suffice? Are there
lessons to be drawn from security cooperation in other regions? What are the
risks associated with various possible courses of action versus the risks of inac-
tion? What international instruments are in place (e.g., the 1982 UN Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea), and to what extent have these been adopted by
regional states? Do these instruments aid or impede cooperation? What leader-
ship structure would accommodate most appropriately the aspirations and con-
cerns of both regional and extraregional participants? Importantly, what
maritime security cooperative arrangements are likely to be achievable in
practice?
It is much easier to ask such questions than to formulate acceptable, work-
able, and achievable solutions in the IOR context. Real progress toward mari-
time security cooperation is likely to be torturous, slow, and frustrating.
MECHANISMS FOR COOPERATION: EXPLORING OPTIONS
The distinct nature of the geostrategic environment must be at the core of any
cooperative-security considerations. The circumstances of the Indian Ocean re-
gion are in many respects quite different from those of the Atlantic or Pacific, for
example. In the IOR, the concept of regionalism is not well developed. The dis-
parate and disaggregated subregional IOR geography, lack of common region-
wide historical integration and identity, and an absence of accepted regional
leadership represent considerable obstacles. The Indian Ocean is too big, too di-
verse, and too important and the challenges too large to be dominated or
“owned” by any single nation or small group.
There is a strongly held view in some states, particularly India, that the re-
sponsibility for IOR maritime security should rest primarily with the regional
states. However, as outlined earlier, most of them lack the capacity, whereas ex-
ternal powers have both the capacity and interests to protect; they need, there-
fore, to be constructively engaged. For reasons of identity, security and
long-term stability, and to take account of regional peculiarities, some tailor-
made version of regional cooperation must be devised.51 International regimes
that are self-generated and based on negotiation are likely to offer the greatest
utility and the greatest chances of success for the IOR, in terms of legitimization
and regional cooperation.52
Does ARF Provide a Useful Model for the IOR? The ASEAN (Association of
Southeast Asian Nations) Regional Forum, focused primarily on the western Pa-
cific and East Asia, may provide a model to work from.53 ARF has been operating
for sixteen years and provides a forum for nation-to-nation dialogue on political
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and security issues. In some respects, ARF represents a strategic and security
parallel to Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).54 Notably, however, In-
dia and Pakistan are participants in ARF but not of APEC. Neither ARF nor
APEC is a formal alliance or treaty arrangement; both are nonbinding forums
for dialogue and cooperation. ARF includes the major Pacific powers—the
United States, China, India, Japan, and Russia—both Koreas, Australia, and
many smaller states. Importantly, ARF has established a very active agenda for
discussion of security-related matters.
However, there are significant factors that make direct translation to the IOR
less than ideal. ARF has at its core ASEAN, originally established in 1967, a col-
lection of ten mainly small (except for Indonesia) Southeast Asian states; there is
no IOR equivalent.55 Given the Indian Ocean geography, there are several subre-
gional groups that would need to be accommodated. Participation by external
countries with significant interests in IOR maritime security, like the United
States, China, France, Japan, and Russia, could be envisaged for an IOR version
of ARF. However, underpinning ARF is a web of bilateral and multilateral formal
security alliances between the United States and many western Pacific states;
that is not the case, at least to the same extent, in the IOR.
CSCAP. The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific in many respects
parallels and feeds directly into the ARF and other official regional-security and
defense forums.56 This “Track 2” entity performs a very useful function in en-
abling sensitive and controversial issues to be informally discussed by experi-
enced former diplomats, officials, and academics, generating proposals that can
be put forward to official forums and regional governments for consideration.57
CSCAP includes four IOR states: India, Australia, Indonesia, and Thailand, but
there is currently no similar Track 2 organization to deal with security-related
matters specifically in the IOR. Creation of such an entity would be worth
consideration.
Does NATO Offer Lessons Relevant to the IOR? NATO, of course, was devised in
the context of the Cold War; it is a formal security alliance originally created to
coordinate U.S. and European responses to the threat of invasion and potential
nuclear war with the former Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact. The clear, compel-
ling, and immediate threat to the survival of Western Europe drove the need for
formal cooperative security arrangements. The shared history of two world wars
and the key leadership role of the United States have been central to NATO.
Strong political and military leadership and a cooperative approach generated
by a shared sense of threat to individual interests have been essential. There
would seem to be little in common with the evolving situation in the IOR. In any
case, NATO’s journey of over sixty years highlights the challenges of building,
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gaining, and maintaining consensus between nation-states in a formal alliance
even with survival at stake.
What about the IOR-ARC and Other Existing Regional Entities? The Indian
Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation is cited by some analysts as
potentially meeting the need for an IOR security forum.58 However, it does not
currently encompass all the key players.59 Its charter is to facilitate and promote
economic, business, and cultural cooperation by bringing together government,
business, and academia. It specifically does not deal with security matters, al-
though piracy off Somalia has been discussed in the context of trade implica-
tions.60 In fact, senior Indian officials have been outspoken about the
ineffectiveness of the IOR-ARC.61 There may be an opportunity to revitalize it
when India assumes the chair (and Australia the vice chair) during 2011–12, and
when Australia succeeds India 2013–14.62 However, the charter, national mem-
berships, participants (including government ministers and officials), and the
nature of IOR-ARC business would need to be significantly changed if political,
strategic, and security issues were to be included.
How Useful Is IONS? The emerging role of the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium,
along the lines of that of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS), repre-
sents useful progress toward regional maritime security cooperation.63 How-
ever, in the absence of something akin to the Track 1 ARF, perhaps supported by
the Track 2 CSCAP—to work security, strategy, and policy issues at head-of-
government, senior-minister, senior-official, and academic levels—IONS is
likely to facilitate only minor and relatively low-level, navy-to-navy cooperation.
Such issues as regional strategic-risk assessments, national security policies,
rules of engagement, and multinational strategic and operational directives, and
regional security regimes, arrangements, and agreements need to be considered
at and directed from national political levels. As does WPNS, IONS may usefully
consider and coordinate issues like military and naval doctrine, naval proce-
dures and training, and technological compatibility (protocols, information
technology connectivity, logistics). But WPNS took many years to evolve to the
stage where worthwhile multilateral naval exercises and training were possible,
and IONS is currently well short of achieving this.
At the second IONS meeting, in Abu Dhabi, much useful discussion occurred
on a range of naval professional, technical, and tactical matters. There was also a
well supported session that discussed development of a common maritime se-
curity strategy. However, in the final plenary, involving only the lead national
representatives, a proposal that this idea be pursued gained no support. There
was no appetite even for preliminary work that would inform the possibility of
common strategic perspectives. IONS is the wrong level for such matters; they
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lie more appropriately with governments. There appeared to be reluctance in the
fledgling IONS to move too quickly. Notably, India, the originator of IONS, ap-
peared to adopt a conservative and low-key approach to the future agenda.
Subregional Structures. There are several subregional entities in the IOR that
have limited, subregionally based membership; examples are the South Asian
Association for Regional Cooperation, the Southern African Development
Community, and the Gulf Cooperation Council.64 These entities generally do
not address security issues and would be unlikely to form the basis for the evolu-
tion of IOR-wide maritime security cooperation. The key leaders of each of these
subregional groupings could, however, play critical roles in devising a region-
wide way ahead.
{LINE-SPACE}
Moving toward collective maritime security and common maritime security
strategies requires active engagement at the highest political levels. In the IOR,
India needs to play a key leadership role. However, India appears to be more
comfortable in bilateral relationships with the United States and others and ap-
pears reluctant to take a collective-security leadership role. Other key regional
and subregional states—for example, Australia, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, and
Indonesia—have the potential to perform vital leadership roles and need to be
engaged. The core leadership of IOR security initiatives needs to come from
within the IOR, at least initially.
NEW IOR SECURITY DIALOGUE FORUMS
Forging a way ahead for maritime security in the Indian Ocean region is not go-
ing to be easy. Current mechanisms are at best fragmented and incomplete.
There may be suspicion toward external powers in some quarters and a lack of
willingness to engage with them. Similarly, external powers may well differ
among themselves as to what cooperative IOR security arrangements should be
supported. The nature of the IOR and the maritime security risks it faces mean
that a region-wide entity would need to accommodate both regional and key
extraregional countries.
Options that represent the status quo could be attractive to some parties
—they could wait and do nothing. Regrettably, this may be the most likely out-
come. But waiting until crises emerge offers the lowest likelihood of mitigating
the emerging risks. Another and related option would be to continue to rely
upon ad hoc “coalitions of the willing” to deal with crises as they arise. This reac-
tive approach has been applied to maritime security challenges to date—for ex-
ample, antipiracy operations off the Horn of Africa and responses to the
Indonesian tsunami and other natural disasters. Like the “do nothing” option, it
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gives little hope of dealing effectively with the massive maritime security-related
risks anticipated to beset the IOR in the future.
Both options would ensure that the results of attempts to prevent, respond to,
and recover from the massive human and environmental tragedies of the kinds
forecast would be suboptimal. Responses to crises would remain inadequate due
to the lack of mechanisms to coordinate action, including training, collective
learning, and the sharing of capabilities. They would also allow some regional
states, and extraregional states in certain cases, to abrogate their responsibilities
to control effectively the marine areas under their national jurisdiction and to
protect their maritime security interests.
Creating an informal IOR dialogue and policy discussion entity (that is,
Track 2), similar to CSCAP in concept, would be a good first step. A possible
foundation for such an entity, if appropriately supported and resourced, would
be the Indian Ocean Research Group (IORG), which has been operating for sev-
eral years.65 The IORG leadership comes primarily from India and Australia,
with participants from numerous regional as well as external nations. It brings
together academics and former senior officials from a broad range of back-
grounds, including security and strategy. The key objective of IORG is “to initiate
a policy-oriented dialogue, in the true spirit of partnership, among govern-
ments, industries, [nongovernmental organizations] and communities, toward
realizing a shared, peaceful, stable and prosperous future for the Indian Ocean
region.”66 Its published materials suggest it would be well placed to fulfill the
need for a Track 2 security-policy forum. The first task of an invigorated IORG
could be to develop policy options for progressing maritime-security risk as-
sessment and cooperation.
But as argued above, a Track 1 entity along the lines of ARF but tailored specifi-
cally to IOR circumstances—to the region’s unique nature, character, and
needs—would appear to be necessary as well. An entirely new entity would appear
to offer a greater likelihood of success than an attempt to graft national and regional-
security agendas upon the IOR-ARC, which has an unfortunate reputation for
impotence. There would be significant benefit in creating a fresh regional-
security forum, one that begins with recognition of the massive regional security
challenges that lie ahead, without the burdens of association with the past.
Once formed, a new Track 1 body would find a number of steps necessary as
matters of urgency and high priority, such as:
• Commissioning a multinational team of “experts” (a research group) to de-
velop proposals for security cooperation in the IOR, with its first priority
being maritime security cooperation, perhaps using IORG as the founda-
tion, augmented and resourced as necessary.
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• Establishing an “eminent persons group” comprising esteemed elders—
“wise men” (and women)—to act as a reference and advisory panel to gov-
ernments and the proposed research group.
The members of both the research group and the reference panel should include
representatives of both IOR and extraregional countries.
The IOR-ARC may be a useful vehicle for initiating these proposals. But who
will champion, support, and fund them? One option would be a “pilot” model, a
“test” entity for maritime security cooperation dialogue. The aim would be to
start small, learn, build trust, engender confidence, and evolve, noting how time
pressures mount. Strong and inspirational leadership is needed to get the ball
rolling. This could initially come from India and Australia, perhaps to be joined
by, say, South Africa, Indonesia, or Saudi Arabia. External countries with signifi-
cant IOR maritime security interests, like the United States, China, France, and
Japan, could be drawn in at an early stage.
There is a compelling, imperative need to develop maritime security cooper-
ation in the Indian Ocean region to address the massive human, economic, envi-
ronmental, and energy security risks of the future. The maritime domain is
where the collective interests and common security concerns of regional and
extraregional states converge. Both regional and extraregional countries—those
with interests in the Indian Ocean and the capacity to assist—need to be in-
cluded in security dialogue and cooperative arrangements. Work should com-
mence immediately.
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needed to be reviewed. The Indian Minister
of State for External Affairs, E. Ahamed, is re-
ported to have declared, “Areas of common
interest that bind the (IOR) countries, such
as ocean bed exploration, hydrographic sur-
vey, disaster management and information
sharing, shipping, coastal infrastructure, fish-
eries, weather forecasting, should be given
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62. The Hon. Stephen Smith, Australian Minister
for Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Australia
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sociation for Regional Cooperation,” media
release, 7 August 2010, The Hon. Kevin Rudd
MP: Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs,
www.foreignminister.gov.au/.
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Cambodia, Canada, People’s Republic of
China, France, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of
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Thailand, Tonga, the United States, and Viet-
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WHY OPERATIONS ASSESSMENTS FAIL
It’s Not Just the Metrics
Jonathan Schroden
In any military campaign, commanders, politicians, and the general public all de-sire to know whether the effort is succeeding. For conventional conflicts, well
developed theories of war give a good understanding of the objectives to pursue
and how to pursue them. These theories also enable the derivation of well de-
fined metrics for progress, such as terrain held, numbers of enemy fighters killed
or captured, or amount of enemy equipment and materiel destroyed. In uncon-
ventional conflicts the theories of war are more complex, objectives and ways to
achieve them are less straightforward, and notions of “winning” and “losing” are
more difficult to define. As a result, it is also more difficult to gauge and demon-
strate progress in such conflicts. For the specific case of counterinsurgency, how-
ever, gauging and demonstrating progress is at least as important as in a conven-
tional war, since the former tends to last longer and therefore requires sustained
political and public support to conduct—and such support is often tied to proof
of progress. Thus operations assessment, designed to show whether progress is
being made, should be a vital part of any unconventional conflict, especially
counterinsurgency.
For the current conflict in Afghanistan, assessments of progress have been
highly criticized. Early in the war, efforts to measure and demonstrate progress
were relatively immature, as evidenced by the “initial assessment” prepared by
General Stanley McChrystal soon after he took com-
mand of the International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF) in 2009:
ISAF must develop effective assessment architectures . . .
to measure the effects of the strategy, assess progress to-
ward key objectives, and make necessary adjustments.
Jonathan Schroden is currently a research analyst at
CNA’s Center for Naval Analyses. He holds a PhD and
MS from Cornell University and BS degrees from the
University of Minnesota–Duluth. During his career he
has deployed multiple times to Iraq and Afghanistan in
direct support of combat operations and assessments.
Naval War College Review, Autumn 2011, Vol. 64, No. 4
NWC_2011AutumnReview.ps
\\data1\john.lanzieri.ctr$\msdata\Desktop\NavalWarCollege\NWC_2011AutumnReview\NWC_2011AutumnReview.vp
Thursday, July 28, 2011 3:16:17 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
95
Naval War College: Full Autumn 2011 Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2011
ISAF must identify and refine appropriate indicators to assess progress, clarifying the
difference between operational measures of effectiveness critical to practitioners on
the ground and strategic measures more appropriate to national capitals.1
The fact that General McChrystal did not find such processes and products in
place when he took command in 2009 implies that we were poorly assessing
progress eight years into the war. In part because there was no single effective
campaign assessment at that time, many groups then took it upon themselves to
create one. At a recent NATO conference an attendee-generated list showed over
twenty different campaign-level operations assessments being prepared by vari-
ous organizations for Afghanistan.2 Clearly, the importance of assessing prog-
ress in the campaign has been realized, and considerable effort has been exerted
to improve our assessment capabilities. However, criticisms of our ability to
measure and demonstrate progress in a clear, credible, and transparent manner
have only increased. The reasons for these criticisms vary considerably, from
confusion in planning to shortfalls in availability of data or in doctrine, to flaws
of current processes and products.3 By far the most popular criticism, however,
is that we do not have the right metrics for Afghanistan. Many papers have been
published on this subject, and in 2010 I was invited to no fewer than three con-
ferences, each convened to generate a better list of metrics for Afghanistan.4
Even the former head of the ISAF Afghan Assessments Group (AAG) is on rec-
ord as saying, “Our metrics suck.”5
Given these efforts, it seems clear that what should be a vital part of the cam-
paign in Afghanistan is not going well. But if the problem were simply one of
finding the right metrics, it seems likely the solution would have been found by
now, especially since similar criticisms were levied during the war in Iraq.6 Based
on my five years of personal experience with operations assessments in Iraq, in
Afghanistan, and at several commands (e.g., U.S. Central Command), I submit
that the problem goes beyond the wrong metrics and that more fundamental
problems with operations assessment exist—for Afghanistan, for Iraq, and in
general. As I will show, operations assessments suffer from a number of serious
issues that feed upon and reinforce each other. The resulting “failure cycle” is the
reason why the theoretical utility of operations assessment is rarely realized in
practice, and for the specific case of Afghanistan it is a large contributor to our
inability to measure or demonstrate progress.
DEFINITION, PURPOSE, AND THEORETICAL UTILITY OF
OPERATIONS ASSESSMENT
Before launching into a critique, it is worth reviewing the doctrinal definition, the
purpose, and the theoretical utility of operations assessment. In terms of defini-
tion, Joint Publications (JPs) 3-0 (Joint Operations) and 5-0 (Joint Operation
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Planning) define operations assessment as “a process that measures progress of
the joint force toward mission accomplishment”;7 the U.S. Army’s Field Manual
(FM) 5-0, Operations Process, says it is “the continuous monitoring and evaluation
of the current situation, particularly the enemy, and progress of an operation.”8
The Army’s counterinsurgency manual (FM 3-24) defines operations assessment
as “the continuous monitoring and evaluation of the current situation and prog-
ress of an operation.”9
These definitions highlight the main purpose in conducting operations as-
sessment, which is to measure the progress of an operation toward accomplish-
ing its mission. But these documents elaborate in a variety of ways:
• [JPs 3-0 and 5-0] Commanders adjust operations based on their assessments to
ensure that military objectives are met and the military end state is achieved.
The assessment process is continuous and directly tied to the commander’s deci-
sions. Assessment actions and measures help commanders adjust operations and
resources as required, determine when to execute “branches and sequels” [op-
tional or successive operations envisioned in a plan of action], and make other
critical decisions to ensure current and future operations remain aligned with
the mission and military end state.10
• [FM 5-0] Assessment involves deliberately comparing forecasted outcomes with
actual events to determine the overall effectiveness of force employment. Assess-
ment helps the commander determine progress toward attaining the desired end
state, achieving objectives, and performing tasks. It also involves continuously
monitoring and evaluating the operational environment to determine what
changes might affect the conduct of operations.11
• [FM 3-24] Effective assessment is necessary for commanders to recognize
changing conditions and determine their meaning. It is crucial to successful
campaign adaptation and innovation by commanders. Assessment is a learning
activity and a critical aspect of [campaign] design. This learning leads to rede-
sign. Therefore, [campaign] design can be viewed as a perpetual design–learn
[assess]–redesign activity.12
From these and other documents on the subject one can compile a set of
points describing possible theoretical purposes for, and utilities of, operations
assessment. These include informing commanders’ decision making (e.g., on
resource allocation); completing the planning or design cycle (i.e., “observe-
plan-execute-assess,” or “design-learn-redesign”); recognizing changing condi-
tions in the environment; stimulating and informing adaptation and innova-
tion; reducing uncertainty and bounding risk; showing causal linkages between
actions and the achievement of objectives; documenting the commander’s
decision-making process; and evaluating performance of subordinate units.
While these items are not all-inclusive, the list certainly comprises actions that
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most commanders would find useful. The question is: How well do operations
assessments perform these functions in practice? In my experience with assess-
ments for Iraq and Afghanistan, and in the experience of several objective ob-
servers for Afghanistan, the answer is not very well.13
REASONS OPERATIONS ASSESSMENTS FAIL
There are many reasons why operations assessments fail, by which I mean that in
practice they do not realize the theoretical utilities listed above. I will focus on a
few key reasons, chosen because they are particularly important and because
they result in a cascading chain of issues that reduce the effectiveness of opera-
tions assessments and ensure the propagation of these issues into the future.
Doctrinal Deficiencies
One reason operations assessments fall short is that there are deficiencies, con-
tradictions, and confusion in the doctrine that is supposed to guide their con-
duct. For joint military operations, the first stop for doctrine is the joint
publications, especially JPs 3-0 and 5-0. Unfortunately, when it comes to opera-
tions assessment, these publications are notably vague. While they do offer guid-
ance on the purpose of conducting assessments, they mainly focus on making
clear the distinctions between “measures of effectiveness” (MoEs) and “mea-
sures of performance” (MoPs). Nowhere do they discuss in detail how to do op-
erations assessment. Thus, to a practitioner they provide little more than a
beginner’s lesson in vocabulary.
The doctrine issued by individual services is another source of guidance.
Field Manual 5-0 provides more detail on how to do assessment, and much of its
guidance is useful and sound from a practitioner’s viewpoint. However, its guid-
ance also contains many contradictions that detract from its overall utility. Ex-
amples include:
• FM 5-0 says detailed analysis is to be avoided, that “committing valuable
time and energy to developing excessive and time-consuming assessment
schemes squanders resources better devoted to other operations process ac-
tivities.”14 However, it says later that “establishing cause and effect is some-
times difficult, but crucial to effective assessment. Commanders and staffs
are well advised to devote the time, effort, and energy needed to properly
uncover connections between causes and effects.”15 While the latter may
seem straightforward, in practice it is typically very time-consuming.
• It stresses the need to incorporate quantitative and qualitative indicators in
the assessment, observing that “the appropriate balance depends on the
situation—particularly the nature of the operation and available resources
for assessment—but rarely lies at the ends of the scale.”16 However, in the
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manual’s appendix H, which explains how to develop a formal assessment
plan, the sole assessment framework presented is strictly quantitative
(figure 1).
• It describes the framework in figure 1 as “a hierarchy used in formal assess-
ments that numerically describes progress toward achieving desired condi-
tions.” It recommends such an assessment be combined with “expert
opinions of members of the staff, subordinate commanders, and other
partners. In this way, the commander receives both a mathematically rigor-
ous analysis as well as expert opinions.”17 While this may seem true on its
face, the sample framework is actually not mathematically (or even logi-
cally) rigorous. It involves weight-averaging numbers with different units,
thereby comparing “apples and oranges.” Also, the weights used in the
framework are entirely subjective (and likely arbitrary), thereby undermin-
ing its “mathematical rigor.” Finally, the framework implies a model of war-
fare in which all actions are independent and so can (along with their
effects) be counted, added, and averaged together. This is highly unlikely to
be true in a military campaign.
S C H R O D E N 9 3
FIGURE 1
SAMPLE ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK
FM 5-0, app. H.
MOE measure of effectiveness
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These contradictions regarding the importance of analysis and intellectual rigor
and the balance between quantitative and qualitative information are just a few
of the confusing aspects of Field Manual 5-0 that reduce its usefulness to practi-
tioners of operations assessment.
For counterinsurgency, FM 3-24 has only three pages on how to conduct as-
sessments. While one of them gives a useful set of example indicators, nowhere
does the manual discuss how to structure an assessment framework or product,
how to collect and analyze data, etc.—which is odd, given that it stresses the crit-
ical role that assessments play in design, adaptation, and redesign. Overall, it
provides little in the way of value to practitioners of operations assessment.
Some might reply that doctrine exists to provide broad guidance and that we
should not expect it to provide detailed instructions on how to conduct opera-
tions assessment. Instead, some suggest, practitioners should look to “best prac-
tices” guides, such as one produced by the Center for Army Lessons Learned.18
However, even that handbook has its deficiencies: it simply rehashes much of
FM 5-0, its descriptions of the roles of military echelons are unrealistic, it con-
tains few helpful examples of assessment products, and it argues throughout
that the U.S. Agency for International Development’s Tactical Conflict Assess-
ment and Planning Framework model should be the foundation of stability op-
erations assessment without justifying why or explaining how a tactical model
could be used to assess progress at the operational level. Thus even our assess-
ment handbooks provide little value to practitioners.19
In addition, there is confusion in our doctrine as to whether the principles of
“effects-based operations” (EBO) still apply. General James N. Mattis, then
Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command, instructed his organization in 2008
that the terms and concepts associated with EBO were to be stricken from joint
doctrine, training, and education.20 Yet it remains unclear whether EBO should
continue to be used, and one study of Afghanistan concluded that “EBO and
EBA [effects-based assessment] are alive and well.”21 This is true in my experi-
ence also, and it is perhaps not surprising, since Joint Publications 3-0 and 5-0
have not been fully updated since General Mattis’s memorandum. While the
Army’s FM 5-0 was published afterward, it still contains references to effects,
and its sample assessment framework simply replaces “desired effects” with “de-
sired conditions” (figure 1).22 Thus even our planning doctrine is confusing and
deficient. In any case, even if planners do not use EBO, practitioners of opera-
tions assessment often still use an effects-based approach, because it is all they
can find in doctrine (figure 1). In these cases, it is prudent to ask whether one
should expect an effects-based assessment to succeed, since these efforts amount
to “cherry-picking” aspects of coherent doctrinal processes. Indeed, I have yet to
see this approach succeed in practice.
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Lack of Training for Practitioners
Another reason operations assessments fail is that those who produce them are
not adequately trained. In my experience, two types of people get tasked to con-
duct operations assessment: staff officers who, regardless of their skill sets, have
been placed in assessments billets (many of them former pilots, for some rea-
son); and “ORSAs” (individuals formally trained in operations research and sys-
tems analysis). Neither of these groups receives any specific training on how to
conduct operations assessment—they are typically left to decipher doctrine on
their own or to hunt for assessment products created by others that they can
copy.23
Given the deficiencies and confusion that exist in doctrine, it is not surprising
that many practitioners fail in their attempts to devise useful assessment processes
from scratch. Those who find fully formed assessment products from another
command will usually fail, because the products they copy are typically deriva-
tions of the framework in figure 1, which suffers from the drawbacks identified
earlier. Anyone who has attended conferences on operations assessment can at-
test that the approaches presented tend to use that structure, with the same
weighted-average “roll-ups” of metrics into the same “stoplight chart” (i.e.,
red/yellow/green coding) products. In the absence of sound doctrine and train-
ing, we have left practitioners either to flounder on their own or to steal flawed
products from others, both of which are recipes for failure.
Expectations of Audiences
Operations assessments also fail because in practice they rarely live up to the ex-
pectations of commanders. More specifically, though commanders establish as-
sessment cells because they desire to reap the theoretical benefits of operations
assessment identified earlier, practitioners of assessment are set up for failure by
doctrinal and training shortcomings; the results tend to be processes and prod-
ucts that do not deliver the theoretical utilities that commanders expect. When
commanders realize this, they stop paying attention to assessments, which leads
to the slow death of the latter. A related issue is that commanders who do not see
the theoretical promise of operations assessment translated into practical utility
do not go on to be advocates for the process. This indifference to assessment al-
lows poor doctrine and practices to persist, since if commanders lose interest in
assessment while in command, they certainly will not care about assessment
thereafter.
BREAKING THE FAILURE CYCLE
If we now look more broadly at the reasons operations assessments fail, it is clear
they are not isolated and independent; rather, they are linked together in what I
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call a “failure cycle.” This cycle, which is de-
picted in figure 2, runs as follows: poor and
confusing doctrine leads (in part) to inade-
quate (or no) training of assessment practi-
tioners, which leads to poor assessment
processes and products, which leads to com-
manders who are uninterested in assessment,
which leads to a lack of advocacy for fixing
assessment, which leads to a perpetuation of
poor doctrine—and the cycle continues.
How can the failure cycle for operations
assessment best be broken? In principle, one
could start at any point in the cycle, but in
practice certain spots would be easier or
more logical than others.
Gaining an Advocate. While on their face
other aspects of the failure cycle may seem more important, the lack of advocacy
within the Department of Defense (and other departments) for operations as-
sessment is in fact the most crucial problem, for several reasons. First, without
an advocate to highlight to the department that its current doctrine and pro-
cesses are inadequate, there will be no impetus for change. It is too easy to repub-
lish or slightly tweak current doctrine rather than to rethink completely the way
in which operations assessments are designed and implemented—and in the
quasi-post-EBO environment in which plans are currently being written and as-
sessed, a complete rethinking is required. Second, without an advocate there is
no center of gravity around which to accumulate knowledge and thus there will
never be an established cadre of experts in operations assessment. Instead, we
will continue to cannibalize other military occupational specialties, most nota-
bly the ORSA pool, to conduct assessments. Thus, the first step in breaking the
failure cycle is to gain a high-level advocate for operations assessment within the
Defense Department.
Improving Doctrine. Once an advocate is gained and the argument can be made
at the right levels that our doctrine needs to be dramatically improved, the first
issue to be addressed will be whether “effects-based operations” is still an opera-
tive planning process for the U.S. military. This is a larger issue than assessment,
but the way in which planning is conducted directly impacts the way in which
assessments are conducted. If the U.S. military decides to keep EBO, perhaps
simply adding more detail to Joint Publications 3-0 and 5-0 (and Field Manual
3-24) and fixing the contradictions in FM 5-0 will suffice. What seems more
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likely is that some new planning construct would come to the fore in such a dis-
cussion and that as a result we would need to revisit fundamentally the purpose
and design of operations assessment. Regardless, those who are responsible for
improving this doctrine need to understand that assessing the progress of mili-
tary operations (especially counterinsurgencies) is difficult and that therefore
doctrine needs to provide much more detail on how to do it.
Improving Training. Improving doctrine, though necessary, will not in itself im-
prove the ability of practitioners to conduct assessments, for two reasons. First,
there is currently no “training pipeline” for practitioners of assessment, so even
when doctrine is fixed, practitioners in the field will still flounder. Second, there
is no dedicated cadre of experts in the practice of operations assessment, so even
if a training program is designed, those who go through it will inevitably revert
to their primary military occupational specialties and their knowledge and expe-
rience will be lost. This second reason creates two further issues: there will be a
lack of feedback from the field to the schoolhouse, so the development of better
assessment techniques will stagnate; and there will be no pipeline of advocates for
assessment to replace the initial advocate called for above. Thus, improving train-
ing for operations assessment relies on three factors: improvement of doctrine, a
formal course of instruction, and establishment by the personnel-management
community of a military occupational specialty for operations assessment.
The latter deserves further elaboration. There is a popular belief that ORSAs
are trained to conduct operations assessment, when in fact they are not. I believe
this stems from a broader confusion of the terms “operations assessment” and
“analysis” (or “operations research”). A practical way of differentiating the two
might be to say that operations assessment focuses on measuring the progress of
an operation, while operations analysis focuses on optimizing the performance
of units and individuals (i.e., the organization) conducting the operation. These
are distinct activities. Accordingly, we should stop presuming that people
trained in operations analysis are somehow experts in operations assessment.
Additionally, we should realize that by tasking ORSAs with operations assess-
ment we are unconsciously sacrificing our capability to conduct operations
analysis (i.e., to optimize our performance). Hence my assertion that what is re-
quired is both a formal course of instruction for operations assessment and a
dedicated military occupational specialty in it.
Improving Processes and Products. It would be easier to design better assessment
processes and products were doctrinal and training issues resolved, but in the
interim there are steps that can be taken. To begin, practitioners of operations
assessment should abandon the sample framework in FM 5-0 (figure 1). As dis-
cussed above, it does not balance qualitative and quantitative information as
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doctrine (and common sense) dictates, nor is it “mathematically rigorous.” Ade-
quate arguments in support of this notion have been made, and I will not rehash
them here.24 Instead, I will highlight three key shifts in thinking that, if imple-
mented in the field, would go a long way toward improving our current attempts
at assessment.
First, it is absolutely necessary to balance quantitative and qualitative informa-
tion. While it is easier to work with numbers and their extensive use tends to en-
hance the appearance of objectivity and robustness of assessment (if only through
a facade of rigor), from a practical viewpoint it is silly to expect that one can mea-
sure the progress of a military operation through quantitative means alone. Thus,
instead of eschewing qualitative information as “unreliable” or “too subjective,”
we should embrace both qualitative and quantitative sources, so long as the infor-
mation is useful in addressing progress toward mission accomplishment.
The second shift in thinking is to move away from slide shows and stoplight
charts as the products of operations assessment. A recommendation made else-
where that practitioners move toward narrative formats for their products is
solid and should be accepted.25 Again, from a practical viewpoint, it is naïve to
think that something as simple as a colored map or a series of red, yellow, and
green circles can convincingly communicate progress in something as complex
as warfare. Such presentations inevitably engender questions from the audience
that require further explanation; arguments that they can stand on their own are
contrary to empirical observation. While narratives can be more time-consuming
both to write and to read, for assessment they have a number of advantages: they
allow variations and nuances across the area of operations to be captured and
appreciated; they remind people of the context and complexity of the operation;
they force assessors to think through issues and ensure that their assessment is
based on rigorous thought; and they are the only way to ensure that a proper bal-
ance is struck between quantitative and qualitative information, analysis and
judgment, and empirical and anecdotal evidence.26
The third shift in thinking is to realize that to assess progress in a modern mil-
itary operation properly, it is necessary to gather, analyze, and fuse information
on the activities of enemy (“red”), civilian (“white”), and friendly (“blue”)
forces.27 Our military is not well suited to doing this. Currently, intelligence or-
ganizations focus on information pertaining to the enemy and to a lesser extent
on civilian activities, and the good ones perform some fusion of the two.28 As
highlighted above, operations analysts typically gather and analyze information
about blue forces. However, there is no entity that currently specializes in fusing
and analyzing information across the red, white, and blue spectrum. This is an
area in which future operations assessment cells could look to specialize.
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Currently, though, what one finds in a place like Afghanistan is a cadre of
people gathering and analyzing information on the enemy, a much smaller
group focused on civilians, and hardly anyone gathering and analyzing material
on blue-force activities (largely because the bulk of ORSAs are manning assess-
ments cells). This absence of blue-force data collection and analysis and of
red/white/blue fusion severely constrains our ability to link blue-force actions
with changes observed in the environment. These are serious problems that have
not yet been widely appreciated as primary reasons why assessments for Afghan-
istan are failing. Recognition would go far toward improving current assess-
ments and would induce a further realization that more emphasis needs to be
placed on data collection, management, and analysis resources across the red/
white/blue spectrum for future military operations.
Increasing the Interest of Commanders. If the above issues were worked out, the
indifference of commanders as part of the failure cycle would likely fix itself,
since many of the theoretical promises of assessment would be realized in fact.
However, two additional steps could be taken to ensure that once commanders
become interested in assessments they stay interested.29 The first is to include in
the training that commanders receive at least a cursory discussion of operations
assessments, their purpose and utility and how they can be effective tools for
measuring and communicating progress (this would be useful for planners to
hear as well). This discussion should be facilitated by someone with experience
with assessments in the field. Second, commanders should be instructed as to
the importance of their own involvement in the assessment process, since if a
commander does not back the process the staff will quickly stop supporting it.
Additionally, commanders can use the process as a means of articulating and pe-
riodically adjusting their guidance to the staff regarding broader intent, priori-
ties, and focus of effort.
TIME FOR A RESET
The problems with operations assessment run much deeper than simply having
poor metrics. There is an entire failure cycle at work, and until its associated is-
sues are rectified the theoretical promises of operations assessment will con-
tinue to go unrealized. To recap, these issues are identifying an advocate for
assessments, fixing our planning and assessment doctrine, creating a military
occupational specialty and formal course of instruction for operations assess-
ment, and shifting our thinking away from strictly quantitative and picture-
based assessment products toward balanced, comprehensive, analytic narratives.
Until and unless these issues are addressed, my overarching recommendation is to
stop doing operations assessments altogether. The bulk of current assessment
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products and processes for Afghanistan, for example, do as much harm as good.
As has been argued, they consistently undermine the transparency and credibil-
ity of military judgment, because they themselves are neither transparent nor
credible.30 Additionally, current efforts on generating better metrics are simply
tweaking the margins of a much larger problem. Until the failure cycle is com-
pletely and comprehensively fixed, we should stop pretending that assessments
are playing a useful role and acknowledge the opportunity cost of using un-
trained staff officers and specialists in operations research and systems analysis
to conduct them. Overall, we would be better served to take a “time-out” on as-
sessments, fix the failure cycle, and come back with an improved approach. Con-
tinuing on our current circular path will simply ensure that progress in the next
war will be as difficult to measure as progress in our current wars.
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20. James N. Mattis, “Assessment of Effects
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21. Connable, Alternative to Effects-Based Cam-
paign Assessment in Afghanistan, p. 37.
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effects (DEs) from a plan’s objectives and
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ment of the DEs, FM 5-0 suggests that a com-
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conditions are then derived from the intent
(end state) and are measured using MoEs.
While the language is slightly different, the
end result is much the same.
23. As evidence of this, at the U.S. Naval Post-
graduate School, in Monterey, California, the
curriculum for operations analysis consists of
advanced math, modeling and simulation,
and programming courses. It does not con-
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Measuring Progress in Afghanistan (Washing-
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27. This is perhaps more true in a counterinsur-
gency, but given the prevalence of the media
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cant civilian populations, information from
all three sources will be increasingly impor-
tant in conventional wars as well.
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OPERATIONS ASSESSMENT IN AFGHANISTAN
IS BROKEN
What Is to Be Done?
Stephen Downes-Martin
In the absence of a credible numbers-based theory of counterinsurgency therecan be no objective, numbers-based assessment for Operation ENDURING
FREEDOM. The U.S. military nonetheless has attempted to conduct a numbers-
based assessment process. Thus, when a new commander and staff take over du-
ties as a regional command in Afghanistan, they inherit an operations assess-
ment process riddled with highly visible flaws that emanate from the improper
use of numbers and flawed logic. While no assessment process can be perfect or
free of any criticism, the flaws the author observed during a six-week stint
in-country are sufficiently egregious that they seriously reduce the value those
assessments provide to commanders’ decision sup-
port. In addition, the visibility of these flaws means
that military assessments, and by association the mili-
tary commanders, are rightfully distrusted by higher
civilian authority and by other organizations within
the theater. It is therefore imperative that incoming
commanders and staffs taking over responsibilities for
regional commands address these flaws to improve
decision making and to earn the trust of higher civil-
ian authority and organizations with whom they have
to work.
Staffs and commanders in Afghanistan created op-
erations assessment processes under extraordinarily
difficult circumstances while fighting, and it is ex-
traordinary how well they have done given those
Dr. Stephen Downes-Martin, research professor at the
Naval War College, has over thirty years of experience
in developing and applying war gaming, game theory,
decision analysis, and systems thinking to tactical, oper-
ational, and strategic decision support. He has a PhD in
physics from King’s College, University of London, was
a military intelligence officer in the British Army, and is
now a U.S. citizen. The commander of I Marine Expedi-
tionary Force (Forward) invited him to be his assess-
ments adviser for the spring of 2010, during which time
he worked with, observed, and interviewed officers, senior
noncommissioned officers, and civilians at a variety of
assessments-related staffs at regional commands, provin-
cial reconstruction teams, the International Security As-
sistance Force Headquarters, and the International
Security Assistance Force Joint Command Headquarters.
This article is a product of that work and of discussions
with officers and analysts during the year since his visit.
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circumstances. Nevertheless, it is necessary to identify and fix the flaws in the
present operations assessment process to strengthen decision support and the
validity of the assessments, without apportioning blame or criticism. In this ar-
ticle I avoid identifying individuals or organizations as much as possible in dis-
cussing flaws in the assessments processes that I have observed. Instead, I
address the proliferation of “junk arithmetic” and flawed logic within the cur-
rently used assessment processes and discuss why regional commanders and
their staffs should care about these problems, by describing the damage to com-
manders’ credibility and decision support created by flawed processes. Finally, I
propose an approach to operations assessment that regional commanders can
immediately put into place. I do not discuss or comment on strategy, operations,
or the broader arguments concerning counterinsurgency versus counter-
terrorism. I focus solely on the operations assessment process.
Dr. Jonathan Schroden convincingly argues (in an accompanying article)
concerning operations assessment that “there is an entire failure cycle at work,
and until its associated issues are rectified, the theoretical promises of opera-
tions assessment will continue to go unrealized.” Regional commanders do not
have to wait for higher command to deal with these key issues, nor should they;
they have the authority and capability to deal with them within their own re-
gional commands. The assessment approach I propose in this article meshes
with the requests for information from higher command and fits within the op-
erational planning process of the regional command. It uses military and civil-
ian professional judgment applied to the appropriate combination of objective
and subjective data, backed up with valid arithmetic and sound logic.
WHAT IS OPERATIONS ASSESSMENT?
Joint doctrine describes assessment as “a process that measures progress of the
joint force toward mission accomplishment.”1 Joint doctrine also makes clear
that simply measuring progress is insufficient, that the assessment process must
“help commanders adjust operations and resources as required, determine
when to execute branches and sequels, and make other critical decisions to en-
sure current and future operations remain aligned with the mission and military
end state.”2
Implications of the Doctrinal Definition of Operations Assessment
How exactly does one measure progress toward accomplishing a mission? Un-
less one has already accomplished the mission, mission accomplishment or fail-
ure will occur in the future, but one does assessment in the present, using present
and past information. Therefore, by definition, operations assessment is an at-
tempt to forecast future success based on current and past experience.3 It attempts
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to provide insight into how well the command is achieving its operational objec-
tives (occurring in the future) using information from the environment (describ-
ing the present and the past). Assessment should include a measure of the gap
between the current situation and the future desired end state, the rate of closure
(or widening) of that gap and a forecast of its future rate of closure (or widen-
ing), and an assessment of the risk to the endurance of the end state after the
achievement of objectives and termination of military action.
Therefore, in order to provide decision support to the commander within the
guidelines laid down by joint doctrine, operations assessment must answer what
I call “the assessment question,” which in general has the form: “What is the like-
lihood of, and what are the risks to, the conditions for the specified end states
occurring or remaining stable if military operations are terminated on the spec-
ified date?”
In the context of Afghanistan, I propose that the assessment process at the re-
gional command level must answer the more specific question: “What is the
likelihood of, and what are the risks to, the conditions for the specified end states
occurring or remaining stable if the region transitions from coalition forces to
full Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) control on the
specified date?”4
If the operations assessment cell answers this question, the commander and
staff will be in a better position to report progress toward the objective, iden-
tify risks to achieving the objective, and propose reallocation of resources to
minimize or mitigate the risks.5 Assessing any individual line of operation or
objective is a matter of answering the assessment question in the context of the
likelihood that the end states specified for the objectives remain stable after
transition and what the risks are to those end states should transition occur.6
In my opinion, lines of operation or objectives in Afghanistan are only of in-
terest to the extent that they enable a transition of power to GIRoA by the spec-
ified date with the specified end states remaining stable.
Forecasting has a long and dubious history, full of pseudoscience, junk arith-
metic, and flawed logic, practiced by witches and listened to by kings.7 Forecast-
ing should be done using a combination of subjective professional judgment,
objective logic, (social) science, and mathematics.8 However, for many people
the differences between pseudoscience and real science are hard to spot. Fur-
thermore, approaches that are valid in one context can become invalid in others,
even if the differences in the contexts are not obvious. So although most officers
would subscribe to the notion of using valid logic, mathematics, and science
(everyone believes that they themselves are rational and logical), it is difficult
for those not explicitly educated and trained in science, analysis, and critical
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thinking to identify whether an approach is logically or scientifically valid. This
difficulty is the root cause of many of the flaws I have observed in operations as-
sessment as practiced in Afghanistan.9
Requirements for Operations Assessment
I claim that four primary requirements must be met if an operations assessment
process is to provide good decision support to a regional commander.
Assessments at the different levels of warfare (tactical, operational, strategic)
and across the instruments of national power must be linked. Linkage “up” the lev-
els of warfare means that the assessments for all districts in a region should play
major parts in the regional assessment and that the assessments for all regions
should play major parts in the national assessment. There will be emergent ef-
fects at each level that are not described by combining the assessments from
lower levels, but any assessment should provide logical reasons for them, based
on the inputs. Linkage “across” the instruments of national power provides an
integrated assessment combining the separate diplomatic, information, mili-
tary, and economics assessments from civilian and military branches of the in-
volved coalition governments.
Metrics and operational end states must be logically connected. There must be a
logical connection between the processed metrics data and a forecast of the en-
durance of the end states if transition were to occur—that is, credible and logical
reasons why the (qualitative and quantitative) values of the metrics forecast the
stability (or instability) of the end states, should transition occur. Satisfying this
requirement provides a mechanism for addressing the risks to the end states,
which is critical to supporting the commander’s decisions about the allocations
of resources needed to deal with those risks. In addition, this requirement helps
determine what metrics are required.
The appropriate metrics must be identified and the data to process them col-
lected. There are three possible failure modes here: collecting irrelevant metrics,
not collecting necessary metrics, and not knowing which of the previous two
failures are present.
The metrics data must be processed using valid logic, arithmetic, and science. In
the absence of an objective, numeric theory of counterinsurgency, it is especially
necessary that assessment staffs creatively apply subjective, professional judg-
ment to the objective and subjective metric data in order to answer the assess-
ment question.10 It is critical that such creativity not violate established rules of
logic, mathematics, or science, lest staffs generate unidentified errors when
making an assessment and damage any decision that uses the assessment.
I argue that the military assessments I have observed in Afghanistan clearly
do not satisfy these four requirements.
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FLAWS IN ASSESSMENT AS CURRENTLY PRACTICED
I have identified by direct observation six major flaws to credible and quality oper-
ations assessments. These render assessments unfit for providing decision support
to the commander, thereby casting doubt on the credibility of the assessments and
upon the credibility of the commands and commanders that use them.
Overoptimism
An officer must be prepared and able to wear two very different hats. One of
these is the “planner and analyst” hat worn when, among other occasions, doing
assessments. The other is the “leader” hat, worn when leading subordinates in
the execution of plans. The first requires a pessimist mind-set (“the glass is
half-empty”) and focuses on critical thinking and the application of logic to
identifying and overcoming what can go wrong, in order to identify and mitigate
risk and, in turn, to ensure mission success. The second requires an optimist
mind-set (“the glass is half-full”) and a focus on inspiring subordinates, politi-
cians, and civilians to achieve objectives despite the risks.11 The two mind-sets
(pessimism and optimism) are very different, but the former is critical to assess-
ment, for the following reasons.
Operations assessment requires analysis using logic and elements of the sci-
entific method. A critical component of the scientific method is the concept of
“falsifiability”—that a hypothesis must be capable of being disproved in order to
be worthwhile. One does not prove some hypothesis to be true; instead the best
one can do is fail to disprove it.12 Similarly, in applying evidential reasoning to
distinguish between alternative explanations using “analysis of competing hy-
potheses,” one does not compare the strengths of supporting evidence for vari-
ous alternatives; instead one compares the weaknesses of evidence against
them.13 Underlying these concepts is the fact that knowledge is contingent.14
These notions are counterintuitive, but they are well established, and they un-
derlie the last three hundred years of successful Western science and the last
2,400 years of Western philosophical and logical thought.15
Officers who wear their leader hats when analyzing or assessing risk produc-
ing poor analyses or assessments, and officers who wear their analyst hats while
leading place execution at risk. In addition an officer must be very careful if de-
liberately deciding to wear a “glass half-full” hat when reporting an assessment,
whether up the chain of command (including to higher civilian authority) or
to external organizations, such as the media. The risk here is inappropriate
optimism.
In addition to the necessary critical attitude for assessment, an officer who is
required to bring creative subjective assessment to bear must be capable of ap-
plying inductive logic, which requires a divergent mind-set capable of
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recognizing patterns from partial information. The danger here is that human-
ity has evolved mostly to err on the side of false positives when looking for pat-
terns (“better safe than sorry”), which in the case of a naturally positive attitude
will lead to claiming optimistic patterns in the data.
Although military commanders and their staffs work hard at avoiding over-
optimism, they tend to bring their leadership (“we can do it”/“glass half-full”)
characteristics to bear during analysis and assessment, and there is an institu-
tional drive to produce “good-news stories.” This latter drive is partially in re-
sponse to the “bad-news stories” reported in the press, and partially in response
to the imperative to show progress in time to serve the ends of various political
timetables. It is extremely difficult, to the point of impossibility, for an individ-
ual to achieve the correct positive and negative balance, but an organization can,
and it best achieves this balance by deliberately setting up an adversarial process,
using devil’s advocacy. The goal of this process is to identify and examine all the
ways in which things can go wrong, in order to institutionalize the critical “glass
half-empty” attitude and ensure that the natural desire for good news to pass on
up the chain of command does not dominate assessment or reporting.
Metrics Collection
I have observed two major types of metrics collection problems. The first prob-
lem, promiscuous metrics collection, breaks down into two parts, self-inflicted
and inflicted from above. Some assessments cells and teams told me they collect
as much information and as many metrics as they can think of, “just in case.” In
these cases, the stated goal was to be able to “change what we analyze as objec-
tives or requests for information change without having to change what we are
collecting.” This results in a high likelihood that many of the collected metrics
are not relevant to the situation being assessed.
In addition, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the ISAF
Joint Command (IJC), and some regional commands have issued “fragmentary
orders” (FRAGOs, or FRAGORDs), requiring the collection of large numbers of
numeric metrics (see, for example, the Regional Operational Design Effects As-
sessment [RODEA] structure used for a while by Regional Command [South],
described in figure 1).16 It is beyond the capacity of most forces in the field to
collect on the large numbers of demanded metrics and produce a credible prod-
uct. Frequent attempts by subject-matter experts to reduce the number of met-
rics by brainstorming are unlikely to help, for two reasons. First, there is no
guarantee that the original lists of metrics contained all those required, so
any reduced list may miss necessary ones; second, it was mostly brainstorming in
the absence of an analytic framework that gave rise to the problem of metrics
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“bloat” in the first place. Trying to
correct a problem by doing the same
thing that created it is unlikely to
succeed.
The second problem, blinkered
metrics collection, attempts to avoid
the first problem but introduces
worse consequences. Some assess-
ments cells told me that they try to
identify up front which metrics are
hard or impossible to collect, and
then set these aside. The problem is
that there is no analysis as to whether
these ignored metrics should be col-
lected, and therefore there is a risk
that critical metrics will be neither
collected nor considered. What is
worse, commanders are not in-
formed that the assessment is ignor-
ing metrics whose importance has not been determined. This jeopardizes the
accuracy of the assessment and hides from the commander and from later asses-
sors the original decision to ignore hard- or impossible-to-collect metrics. Since
the assessment may very well be poor, the credibility of the commander is ulti-
mately placed at risk.
Junk Arithmetic
Using arithmetic on numeric metrics is optional, but the rules of arithmetic are
not optional.17 The following examples of junk arithmetic I encountered suffice
to demonstrate the broader problem.
Many of the assessments processes I observed in-theater take qualitative and
quantitative data, rank order them, and average the rank-order numbers. For ex-
ample, in the RODEA process, assessors coded answers to questions on a point
scale of one through five, similar to the “rating definition levels” used by ISAF
and IJC. These codes are not ratio-scale numbers, and therefore, by the laws of
arithmetic, functions such as “averaging” cannot be performed on them—it
would be meaningless.18 To put this into a familiar context, officer pay grades are
rank ordered by “O number”—that is, pay grades O-1 (second lieutenant)
through O-10 (four-star general). But no one believes that a brigadier general
(O-7) is the same as a major (O-4) paired with a captain (O-3) just because four
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plus three is seven.19 Averaging ordinal numbers, such as rank orders, within an
assessment process is just as nonsensical, and this kind of obvious error subjects
the credibility of the assessment, and the command promoting it, to justifiable
suspicion.
Values for many metrics are obtained using polls. In Afghanistan, these polls
have claimed margins of error of approximately plus or minus 3 percent for na-
tionwide surveys, 5 percent for regions, and 10 percent for districts.20 Given a
plus-or-minus 10 percent margin of error, a district metric would have to
change by approximately 20 percent before one could claim a trend. When a
change is less than approximately double the margin of error, the soundest con-
clusion that can be drawn is “We do not know whether there has been a change
or not.” Unfortunately in most assessments I observed in-theater these margins
of error were ignored, and in a significant number of instances officers claimed
unjustified trends on small changes of data. An “assessments dashboard” I ob-
served did not even have a symbol for “trend unknown,” just check-boxes for
“trend improving,” “static,” and “declining”; it was impossible to report that it
was not known whether there even was a trend. When I asked about this, the of-
ficer in charge replied, “The military does not like to admit we do not know, so
we report one of the dashboard options and then caveat the report.” To report
“We know that this measure is not changing” is obviously not the same as to re-
port “We do not know if this measure is changing”; the two situations have very
different implications for the commander’s decision making. It is doubtful
whether anyone remembers caveats after a trend report has been delivered.
Another observed example of junk arithmetic (this time leading to an overly
optimistic claim) was an Afghan National Police assessment claiming that the
organization was “nearly 100 percent filled.” Examination of the underlying
data showed that patrolmen were overmanned while officers and noncommis-
sioned officers were undermanned, by significant amounts. Whether or not the
assessment reported the underlying data along with the conclusion, the fact re-
mains that “nearly 100 percent filled” simply did not faithfully summarize the
situation in this case. The “nearly 100 percent filled” summary had been derived
by applying junk arithmetic to the underlying data, and all too often the under-
lying data that would reveal the true situation do not make it into the reports.
The use of any arithmetic on numeric metrics in counterinsurgency is subject
to suspicion, the more so when one attempts to roll up the numbers into some
grand score of how well we are doing. Even in a country as stable as the United
States, with all the economic data and information one could conceivably ask for
and no one trying to kill you as you ask for it, we still do not have credible eco-
nomic forecast models that can avoid near-catastrophic economic meltdowns.
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Where then is the credible numbers-based model for governance, development,
and security in Afghanistan during an insurgency? Certainly, a professional,
subjective, qualitative assessment of progress will make use of certain numbers,
but not by running arithmetic functions over them.
Simplistic Color Coding
Senior commanders’ time is a precious and nonrenewable resource; staffs right-
fully guard it jealously. The most common approach in-theater to providing
senior commanders with the conclusions of assessments is to produce a color-
coded map, each district shown in one of five colors indicating the level of suc-
cess there (see figure 2; the actual colors are displayed in the Web version of this
article).21 But as has been pointed out and persuasively argued to a working
group of senior officers, including generals, at IJC, “The color-coded map di-
lutes transparency and accuracy and offers a simplistic and misleading represen-
tation of the battle space.”22
I have observed that most senior commanders demand narrative explana-
tions from subordinates during briefings and forward narrative assessments up
the chain. However, staffs do not usually collect, document, or store these
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FIGURE 2
EXAMPLE OVERALL DISTRICT ASSESSMENTS, COLOR CODED BY LEVEL OF SUCCESS
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narratives in a database form suitable for later analysis. Since these senior com-
manders apparently believe it is necessary to spend time on narratives, it is nec-
essary to find a way to present them with pertinent narratives in the first place
within their time constraints. Claiming that color-coded maps serve the pur-
pose is disingenuous. Any changes in color to a district or province will immedi-
ately require a narrative explanation; any nonchange in color will also require an
explanation of why, despite effort, the situation has not improved. In either case,
it is important in the narrative to answer the questions the briefer knows the
commander is going to ask.
In addition, a color-coded map hides information. The single color coding rep-
resents an average (not a summary) of a large number of underlying factors, most
of which it is nonsensical to average. An average can quite possibly stay the same as
some factors improve and others degrade; the color tells us nothing useful about
this situation, so one must add narrative explanations. Since smart staffs often
provide such narratives anyway, the color-coded map becomes pointless at best
and a misleading time waster at worst.
Logic Failures
Even if valid success/fail statistics exist at the district level, validated and docu-
mented methods of “rolling them up” into a forecast of success or failure at the
regional or national level do not exist. Nor are there any past data on which to
base methods for such roll-ups.
No Compelling Combination of Assessments. Furthermore, validated and docu-
mented models of how to combine assessments across the instruments of na-
tional power (diplomatic/political, information, military, and economic) do not
exist. There is no credible model for how to combine the assessments of objec-
tives within the lines of operation (governance, development, and security) into
a final assessment. Regional commands appear to be “color averaging” when at-
tempting to combine assessments from separate lines of operation. The regional
commands present separate colors for their respective regions for security, gov-
ernance, and development, then provide an overall assessment color that hap-
pens to be the average point on the color-bar chart of the three lines of operation
(see figure 3; the actual colors are displayed in the Web version of this article).23
This is not coincidence; I have observed regional command briefers struggle to
explain in operational terms why they had given a particular color to an overall
assessment.
The combined coding scale for assessing a district or region (see figures 2 and
4—again, shown in color in the Web version) is drawn directly from the popula-
tion component of what is known as a “systems thinking” model of counterin-
surgency in Afghanistan.24 In that model, each box contains the part of the
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population described by that box. The model spreads the population across all
five boxes. It is incorrect, however, to interpret each box as a position on a scale
that describes the whole population; the color scale used by coalition forces, as
shown in figures 2 and 4, is an incorrect oversimplification of the original model
and cannot describe the majority of popular-support situations.
For example, this representation cannot handle a polarized society where, say,
50 percent actively support the government and security forces and 50 percent
the insurgency. One solution proposed by a staff in-theater was to assess a polar-
ized example as being neutral, “on the fence.” But clearly a fractured polarized
society is not the same as a neutral society, and this staff was also unable to ex-
plain how it would represent and assess a population equally distributed along
the support dimension (i.e., with 20 percent of the population in each of the five
boxes). This simplistic color-bar approach also cannot handle other very likely
distributions of support (with different percentages of the population distrib-
uted across all support-level boxes). I observed some regional commands
spreading their assessments across two contiguous boxes (as in figure 4); unfor-
tunately, this extension does not solve the problem.
D O W N E S - M A R T I N 1 1 3
FIGURE 3
EXAMPLE COLOR-CODED PROVINCIAL ASSESSMENT
This example combines the colors of the assessments of the three lines of operation.
ISAF Joint Command Metrics Workshop.
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No Compelling Connection among Objectives, Metrics, and Assessment. All mil-
itary forces are employed for reasons—in order to achieve end states laid out in
the commander’s objectives—and progress is measured against those end states.
Therefore, the commander’s objectives must determine the metrics used.
I have heard no compelling arguments as to why staffs collected certain met-
rics and not others. For example, a staff at one command claimed it had carried
out a rigorous process but was unable to describe or document what that process
was, who executed it, and why their predecessors had selected those specific met-
rics. Staff members at another command claimed to have decided on its metrics
“from a book or paper, added some from Iraq, and then added a few of our own.”
Another command has had metrics pushed on it multiple times by various aca-
demics, think tanks, and civilian agencies and has been obliged to take these seri-
ously, since their authors have political influence.
Since lines of operation, taken alone and out of context, are broad, any con-
ceivable metric is plausible. For example, during an IJC Metrics Evaluation
Meeting held in Washington, D.C., on 17–18 March 2010, one participant
claimed that “child mortality” was an appropriate metric under “Development.”
Asked to explain how this metric supported counterinsurgency, the participant
replied simply, “Afghan families care about their children.” Unless on such occa-
sions military commanders want to argue in public that they do not care about
the lives of Afghan infants (or whatever other such topics are under discussion)
or are willing to collect on and measure any metric proposed by whoever hap-
pens to be in the room, they had better have clear, cogent reasons for how the
metrics they are using are tied to their objectives, and therefore why other met-
rics are not being collected by their commands.25 Unfortunately, most com-
mands do not appear to have clear connections between their objectives and the
metrics they are collecting;26 and at this conference no sound answer was forth-
coming from the officers present as to how infant mortality was or was not tied to
their counterinsurgency objectives.
Staffs that are unable to justify the metrics they are collecting cannot justify
not collecting others foisted on them by an entire cottage industry of academ-
ics, think tanks, newspaper columnists, retired officers, politicians, and
1 1 4 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
FIGURE 4
AN OVERLAPPED ASSESSMENT EXAMPLE
Combined assessment of population support places the entire population into one of five levels of support for GIRoA and security
forces or the insurgency, or into an overlap between two contiguous levels.
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congressional staffers, or by history books about Iraq, or even brainstorms “by
whoever is in the room at the time.” I observed a staff at higher command at-
tempting to reconcile at least four collections of metrics to see which ones were
duplicates and which were new, instead of determining what metrics they
should be collecting, based on the objectives.
No Compelling Connection between Assessment and End State. For operations
in Afghanistan, the end state is, loosely speaking, a region (or district, or the en-
tire country) that is suitable for transition to full GIRoA control, where “suit-
able” means there is some, good chance that the GIRoA will be able to keep it
stable and secure. However, unless we have a credible theory that links the level
of active support for the insurgency to the likelihood of GIRoA successfully run-
ning an area, we have no connection between the rolled-up color-coded assess-
ment and the desired end state. Therefore, the assessment does not provide
senior leaders tasked with judging the suitability of a region or district for tran-
sition with a credible assessment of its suitability. What it does provide to those
decision makers is information from which to argue either way, depending on
political convenience.
Higher-Command Demands for Objective Assessments
ISAF and IJC (supported by higher civilian authority) demand a “set of indica-
tors that complements the commander’s qualitative assessment of the environ-
ment.”27 Unfortunately, in practice, “indicators” are all too often interpreted as
being “quantitative” (or “numeric”) and thus “objective,” whereas the “com-
mander’s qualitative assessment” is seen as “subjective.” An example is a report
from one provincial reconstruction team that referred to “overreliance on quali-
tative and subjective assessments” as a challenge.28
An objective numeric assessment for Afghanistan requires a credible numbers-
based theory of counterinsurgency that is applicable to Afghanistan—a way of
computing from the metrics the probability that if we transitioned an area to
GIRoA the desired end states would endure.29 For such a theory to be credible,
one must be able to apply it to past insurgencies with known metrics and with
known outcomes; at the very least, one would want such data to construct a
model. However, although there have been hundreds of counterinsurgency wars
in the past century, comprehensive data on the operational environments and
how they changed over time have been kept for only a small number of them;30
we do not have enough data for credible success/failure statistics. Some would
argue that the data we have from the approximately four hundred districts in Af-
ghanistan could provide a numbers-based statistical analysis; the problem is we
do not have success/fail outcomes for any of these—the war is not over yet.31
Therefore, we have no outcome data for Afghanistan. Although statistical
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models are applicable at the tactical level (we have large amounts of data con-
cerning tactical/small-unit engagements), they are not applicable to assessing
success or failure at the operational or strategic level (since we do not have statis-
tically valid sample sizes).
Consider the assessment problem faced by Robert Norton, an artilleryman of
the seventeenth century (see figure 5). Despite Norton’s skill at mathematics and
his recognition that mathematics was important to the artilleryman, he did not
have an objective numbers-based theory of external ballistics—Newton had yet
to develop his theory of gravity and equations of motion. Norton could collect
all the numeric data he liked concerning the present (for example, muzzle veloc-
ity, weight of ball, amount of powder, and angle of elevation), but without a
numbers-based theory of ballistics he had to apply subjective professional judg-
ment to those objective and subjective numbers to assess where a shot would fall
in the future. In fact, the subjective judgment of artillerymen in pre-Newtonian
days was superior to the many “objective” but wrong numbers-based assess-
ments published during those times.32
In the absence of a credible numbers-based theory of counterinsurgency in
Afghanistan, there is no objective, numbers-based assessment for military oper-
ations there. Pretending otherwise gives the illusion of precision without the reality
of accuracy.
For tactical and small-unit actions, performance directly generates predict-
able effects using Newtonian physics (ballistics, logistic flows, time and distance
calculations, etc.) and the statistics of millenniums of documented lessons
learned from small-unit engagements. Furthermore, the time lag between per-
formance and effect is short, seconds to days. One can use measures of perfor-
mance as proxies for measures of effect and rapidly check for the necessity of
changes of plan, since valid numeric theories of physics and valid statistical the-
ories of small-unit tactics exist. However, there are no valid numeric theories for
dealing with operational and strategic levels of counterinsurgency; one must
build logical connections between current actions and future effects on the ob-
jective and then generate the required metrics from the connections. The obses-
sion with objective assessments is tactical thinking applied to strategic problems.
Although purely objective (and numbers-based) predictive theories of the
physical world are possible, the likelihood that the same will become true for
operational- and strategic-level complex social interactions—such as insur-
gency and counterinsurgency, terrorism and counterterrorism, and warfare
—in time to be useful in Afghanistan is extremely small. Therefore, operational/
strategic counterinsurgency assessment in Afghanistan must be subjective,
based on senior leaders’ subjective professional judgment of pertinent qualita-
tive and quantitative data.33 Even if all relevant data were available and all of
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them accurate, numeric, and objective, assessing what they mean for success is
still a professional military subjective judgment call, since there is no credible,
objective numbers-based theory of counterinsurgency.
DISTRUST GENERATED BY POOR ASSESSMENT PRACTICE
The military’s focus on good-news stories, obviously flawed arithmetic and logic,
and lack of transparency causes the press to distrust military statements. It then
looks for and writes about what appear to be contradictions between military
statements and reality; higher civilian authority then demands explanations from
ISAF commanders. Both higher civilian authority and IJC accordingly demand
“objective assessments using metrics to complement the commander’s subjective
in-the-field assessment”and then push metrics systems down the chain for collec-
tion. The message is clear: they do not trust military commanders’ assessments. A re-
action I observed was a demand from higher command to the relevant regional
D O W N E S - M A R T I N 1 1 7
FIGURE 5
Artillery illustrations published before the existence of a numbers-based physics of gravity show impossible exterior ballistic trajectories. Artillerymen had to as-
sess fall of shot subjectively, on the basis of objective measurements.
Norton, Gunner. See note 32.
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command to provide good-news stories to counter media claims of military fail-
ure. This makes the military look defensive, makes the distrust worse, and spreads
the distrust to the domestic population, upon whose political support for the mis-
sion the military relies for funding.
In my opinion, the number of metrics demanded overwhelms the collection
capacity of regional commands’ partner civilian organizations and major sup-
porting commands. Furthermore, neither those organizations nor supporting
commands appear to trust the value of collecting on those metrics or of assess-
ments done using them. For example I was openly told by a head of planning in
one civilian two-star-equivalent organization that in response to his regional
command’s request for assessment metrics he makes up what he does not have
and does not check the quality of what he does have. An additional reason given
me for not taking metrics seriously was the absence of feedback from requesting
organizations. Another example is the attitude one colonel encountered when
he asked troops in the field whether they “collected all the requested metrics or
made stuff up”; the response was foot-shuffling and “Is this a trick question,
sir?” Additionally, civilian partner organizations have expressed annoyance and
suspicion of the military when the military lines of operation overlap civilian
ones (such as governance and development).
WHAT IS TO BE DONE?
A regional commander and staff must separate the task of responding to higher
commanders’ requests for information to feed their assessment processes from the
task of assessing the regional command’s own progress with its own operational
war-fighting objectives, to provide its own assessors time for the latter.
The pathologies inherent in higher command’s assessment processes, specifi-
cally the enormous numbers of metrics demanded, mean that the regional com-
mand staff members responsible for responding to requests for information
from higher command should not be the same people who must assess the re-
gional command’s progress with its own operational objectives. Otherwise there
will never be time to do the latter, because the former inevitably comes first. If
the same people have to do both tasks, the commander must set a maximum per-
centage of time they are to spend responding to requests for information from
higher command in order to ensure they have time to produce adequate assess-
ments for the regional commander.
Regional commands must decide what metrics are required to support as-
sessment of their operational objectives. As we have seen, at the tactical level
Newtonian physics and the statistics of millenniums of small-unit engagements
provide a model for generating metrics and using those metrics to assess effects.
At the operational level, there is no established numeric model for translating
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performance into effect, and as argued, no credible numeric model is forthcom-
ing. The regional command must build a qualitative understanding of the inter-
acting elements of the operational environment in order to understand that
environment, identify relevant assessment metrics, and erect a defense against
externally imposed, plausible, but irrelevant metrics.34 Build the model by ana-
lyzing commander’s intent during the mission-analysis phase—that is, answer
the question, “Why are the objectives important in the context of the objectives
and associated desired end states?”—and collect the answers in concise narrative
form. (If they cannot be expressed in clear English, slide-show bullets, “Penta-
gonese,” and cartoons just hide that fact.) The narrative generates metrics
—“things we want more of and things we want less of ”—with explanation, and
clusters these into topics of interest. The narrative is the summary of subject-
matter experts’ opinions on how the environment works, within the context of
the objectives, end states, ways, and means. The logic within the narrative pro-
vides a qualitative understanding of what is likely to happen as regional com-
mand actions alter the qualitative and quantitative values of the metrics. The
assessment team then uses professional subjective judgment and the logic
within the narratives to assess the implications of the collected metric informa-
tion against the assessment question we have already postulated.
Identify Operational/Strategic Objectives and End States from the Relevant
Operation Orders, FRAGOs, or Other Planning Documents. If the objectives are
at the operational/tactical, or lower, level of war, use lines of operation instead of
objectives. For each objective, identify the end states; if these are not explicitly
available in the planning documents, analyze the documents for implied end
states. Identify explicit and implicit “critical requirements” and “in order to”
statements attached to the objectives in the planning documents; these are the
critical requirements for success.
Write the “Assessment Question.” For operations in Afghanistan this will likely
be of the form given above: “What is the likelihood of, and what are the risks to,
the conditions for the specified end states occurring or remaining stable if the
region transitions from coalition force control to GIRoA?”
Analyze Commander’s Intent. For each critical requirement, ask the question,
“Why is this important to coalition forces, to the insurgents, to the population,
to GIRoA, to our partners, to our governments?”35 There will likely be more than
one answer, but restrict yourself to the important answers; they help identify
strengths, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities for friends, enemies, and other stake-
holders in the context of the specific objective. For each answer, in turn, ask the
same question—“Why is this important?”—and continue until you can make a
logical and clear link to the end state. Write a narrative expressing the chain of
D O W N E S - M A R T I N 1 1 9
NWC_2011AutumnReview.ps
\\data1\john.lanzieri.ctr$\msdata\Desktop\NavalWarCollege\NWC_2011AutumnReview\NWC_2011AutumnReview.vp
Thursday, July 28, 2011 3:16:30 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
125
Naval War College: Full Autumn 2011 Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2011
links between the objective and the end state. There will be a temptation when
analyzing intent to focus on “what we want to happen.” However, the real ques-
tion is, “Why is this important?”—and so it is also necessary to consider what we
do not want to happen. In addition, one should consider the most dangerous and
the most likely actions or reactions of the stakeholders, including the “upsides”
of any “downside,” and the downsides of any upside.36
Use a variety of sources to generate the answers and to build the narrative, in-
cluding planning documents, conversations and interviews with colleagues, in-
ternal advisers, external subject-matter experts and organizations, literature and
databases, and your own professional military knowledge. Although regional
command staffs are the experts in military matters, they are not the experts in
politics, economics, social information, or infrastructure and must seek external
assistance for these areas.37
Note that the analyses of intent of the various objectives will overlap each
other. This is expected, since multiple objectives apply to the same area of opera-
tions and support the same set of end states. Overlap in the analysis of intent
represents the linkages between the objectives. However, one should write each
narrative as though the reader were going to read only that one—introduce the
overlaps but focus on the core objective (or line of operation).
Identify Topics and Metrics. For each narrative, identify the actors and their ac-
tions, as well as their strengths, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities implied in the
narratives. Pay attention to “who is doing what to whom” and to “who wants, or
does not want, what”—that is, to the verbs and nouns (hence the emphasis on
declarative English). From these factors derive your topics.38
Analysis of commander’s intent explains why these topics are important and
guides collectors in the field. Analysis of the narratives concerning the topics will
provide the specific metrics. For example, a critical capability for a governance-
related objective might be “tax base of the GIRoA,” resulting in a “tax base”
topic. Metrics might be “tax revenues,” “tax revenues skimmed,” “taxes avoided,”
etc., to give the required picture of the “tax base” topic. Just as commander’s in-
tent is part of military operational art, the selection of metrics to cover topics is
also a matter of art guided by analysis of commander’s intent.
Each narrative for an objective may contain more than one discussion linking
the objective to the end state. It may be useful to prioritize them within each nar-
rative, thus prioritizing the topics and metrics, in order to discard less important
topics and metrics if their numbers grow too large. Important topics may include
some that are risky to collect (for example, likelihood of casualties suffered during
collection), expensive to collect (because, for example, they require resources not
currently allocated), or impossible to collect (inherently unknowable). Identify
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these and inform leadership: uncollected pertinent metrics introduce risk to the
quality of the assessment and hence to the credibility of the command and of the
commander. “Unknowables” aside, it is up to the leadership to decide whether to
accept the risk of an incomplete assessment by ignoring topics and metrics or to
accept the risk of collecting on them.39
Provide Guidance to Collectors. Provide collectors the topics (not the full collec-
tion of metrics) and the intent behind them (the analysis of commander’s in-
tent); do not ask for numeric metrics;40 ask for patrol reports, with whatever
numbers and narrative they can provide about the topics. This approach avoids
overburdening troops or other collectors in the field by pushing initiative down
to the lowest possible level, and it allows collectors in the field latitude to inter-
pret what they should collect and can deliver within the context of local condi-
tions and commander’s guidance.
Make the Assessment. Argue the case both for (optimistic) and against (pessi-
mistic) a successful outcome, and then make a final judgment based on the two
cases. As would be done in legal proceedings, provide, along with the final judg-
ment and the reasons for it, both “for” (optimistic) and “against” (pessimistic)
arguments and all the evidence. If the resources are available, have separate
teams do the optimistic and pessimistic assessments and argue their respective
cases to a senior assessor for final assessment. Otherwise, do the pessimistic as-
sessment first.
Gather all the evidence that supports the negative answer to the assessment
question—that is, that the likelihood of success is low and the risks are high. Us-
ing professional military judgment, pessimistically assess the risk to different ar-
eas of the commander’s intent were the district to transition from coalition force
to full GIRoA control on some specified date. Make as persuasive a professional
argument as possible for a pessimistic answer; record it, along with the evidence.
Be rigorous and ruthless when doing the pessimistic assessment; any squea-
mishness here will result in challenges to the final assessment in (probably) an
embarrassing arena.
Then gather all the evidence that supports a positive answer to the assessment
question—that the likelihood of success is high and the risks low. Again, using
professional military judgment, assess the risk to different areas of the com-
mander’s intent, but this time optimistically, were the district to transition from
coalition force to full GIRoA control on some specified date. Again, make as per-
suasive a professional argument as possible, recording the evidence along with
the optimistic assessment.
Finally, examine the two cases, their arguments and their evidence, and de-
cide on an overall assessment of likelihood and risks. Pay particular attention to
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pessimistic items that overwhelm positive ones and to positive items that fix
negative ones. Record the final assessment and the reasons for it. When one pro-
duces good “for and against” arguments before making a final case, not only is
the quality of the assessment improved but opposition to the assessment is more
likely to focus on the interpretation of evidence and not the integrity or compe-
tence of the assessors.
{LINE-SPACE}
The flaws in the operations assessment processes I observed in-theater clearly pro-
duce untrustworthy decision support; they are so manifest that commanders
place their own credibility at risk when they support the resulting assessments.
Regional commanders have the authority and means to fix operations assessment
within their commands. However, doing so requires institutionalizing a rigorous
process and separating it from the task of responding to higher-command re-
quests for information. If the regional commander decides that this separation is
unacceptable or does not have the time or staff resources to implement it, an alter-
native is to base the regional command’s operations assessment entirely on its
commander’s subjective professional judgment combined with that of the re-
gion’s civilian provincial reconstruction team and of other regional stakeholders.
The continued use of junk arithmetic and flawed logic robs decision makers of
the most essential requirements that assessment is supposed to supply—sound,
verifiable, and accurate information upon which to make life-and-death
decisions.
N O T E S
I thank the personnel of I Marine Expedi-
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and assistance while I was with them in Af-
ghanistan. They are truly ferocious fighters
and courteous colleagues. I am grateful to
Ben Connable, Jonathan Schroden, Peter
Perla, other colleagues in the field too nu-
merous to mention, and the faculty and staff
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and criticism.
1. U.S. Joint Staff, Joint Operations, Joint Publi-
cation [hereafter JP] 3-0 (17 September 2006,
incorporating change 2, 22 March 2010), p.
IV-30, available at www.dtic.mil/; U.S. Joint
Staff, Joint Operation Planning, JP 5-0 (26 De-
cember 2006), p. III-57, available at www.dtic
.mil/; U.S. Army Dept., Counterinsurgency,
Field Manual [hereafter FM] 3-24 (Washing-
ton, D.C.: 15 December 2006), para. 5-90,
describes assessment in similar terms; avail-
able at www.fas.org/(FM 3-24 is also issued
by Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, as Ma-
rine Corps Warfare Publication [MCWP]
3-33.5).
2. JP 3-0, p. IV-31.
3. Although “forecast” and “predict” are often
used interchangeably, I use “forecast” as a
broad description of a likely future rather
than a precise “prediction” of exactly what
will happen.
4. Note that one can replace “region” with “dis-
trict” or “Afghanistan,” depending on the
level of the assessment. The commander’s
plan should specify the end states and will
probably include items dealing with security,
stability, economic development, governance,
al-Qa‘ida, etc. Also, the “specified date” can
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be any date that is useful, either in the future
or the present. See JP 3-0, sec. IV, for a broad
discussion of end states and objectives.
5. It is worth noting what the assessment cell’s
task is not. The assessment cell does not de-
cide how to achieve the operational objectives
or what to do to achieve the conditions for
success. Those are planning functions. The
assessment cell’s mission is to assess how well
the executed plan is achieving the end states
that the objectives are supposed to enable and
the risks to that achievement.
6. The three lines of operation for coalition
forces in Afghanistan are “governance,” “eco-
nomic development,” and “security.” Devel-
oping the Afghan National Police or army is a
separate topic, and I do not deal with it in
this article. See FM 3-24, chap. 5, for a broad
discussion of the “Logical Lines of Opera-
tion” during counterinsurgency operations.
7. Belief in pseudoscience and conspiracy
theories and inability to use valid reasoning
are disturbingly frequent in the American
population—see “Science and Technology:
Public Attitudes and Public Understanding,”
National Science Foundation: Science and En-
gineering Indicators 2002, www.nsf.gov/, esp.
“How Widespread Is Belief in Pseudosci-
ence?” It would be unwise to assume that ex-
cellence in leadership is incompatible with
these kinds of thinking failure. Such thinking
failures are not a cause for concern when
those involved are facing familiar operational
and strategic situations of the kind they have
successfully dealt with in the past. However,
experience with past operational (or strate-
gic) situations is only as relevant to the cur-
rent situation as the past and current
situations are similar.
8. See J. Scott Armstrong, Principles of Forecast-
ing: A Handbook for Researchers and Practi-
tioners (New York: Springer, 2001), for a
good overall introduction to forecasting. See
also Forecasting Principles: Evidence-Based
Forecasting, www.forecastingprinciples.com/.
9. I have also observed these flaws throughout
both the U.S. Department of Defense and ci-
vilian commercial organizations—as would
be expected, since the root causes are present
throughout the Defense Department and ci-
vilian worlds.
10. FM 3-24 is the closest the U.S. military has to
a theory of counterinsurgency; however, it
does not even come close to providing a
numbers-based theory, and no one pretends
that it does so.
11. I use the broader, explanatory form of pessi-
mism and optimism concerning value judg-
ments on the agreed facts, rather than the
dispositional form, concerning one’s confi-
dence in the success of an endeavor—hence
the traditional “glass half-empty versus glass
half-full” value judgment rather than any im-
plication as to the effects of the glass’s state of
emptiness on the success of an endeavor.
12. See, for example, Karl R. Popper, The Logic of
Scientific Discovery (New York: Basic Books,
1959), and Stanford Encyclopedia of Philoso-
phy, s.v. “Karl Popper,” plato.stanford.edu/.
13. See Richards J. Heuer, Psychology of Intelli-
gence Analysis (Washington, D.C.: Center for
the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence
Agency), chap. 8, available at https://www.cia
.gov/. Note that the very public arguments
criticizing analysis of competing hypotheses
(ACH) deal mostly with failures to execute
the method properly or with the difficulties
of executing the method. See Tim van Gelder,
“Hypothesis Testing: What’s Wrong with
ACH?,” Tim van Gelder: Bringing Visual Clar-
ity to Complex Issues, timvangelder.com/, and
“How Not to Free Your Mind,” The Inter-
preter: Lowy Institute for International Policy,
www.lowyinterpreter.org/. Both these criti-
cisms hold for any valid analysis method, and
the idea that the validity of a method depends
on the ease of its use is ludicrous.
14. See, for example, Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, s.vv. “Naturalized Epistemology”
and “Underdetermination of Scientific
Theory.”
15. The use of negative words such as “fail,” “dis-
prove,” and “weakness” may be problematic
to some people’s professional ethos. How-
ever, the rules of logic are not optional, the
value of the scientific approach is proven, and
one ignores either at one’s peril.
16. Maj. Jonathan Roginski (10th Mountain Di-
vision) informs me that “under the guidance
of William Upshur and David Kilcullen the
Afghanistan Assessment Group of Regional
Command (South) replaced RODEA”
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in September 2010 “with a system of 17
indicators—informing 11 metrics—describing
the environment and critical conditions spe-
cific to southern Afghanistan in the spring
and summer of 2011, narrowing the process
to only that which is central to the environ-
ment and the mission.”
17. The rules of arithmetic—including the fact
that adding or averaging rank orders is
nonsense—were established over two millen-
niums ago by, among others, Pythagoras and
are taught in every elementary school
worldwide.
18. The attempt to get around this by scoring
metrics using Likert-like items (for example,
the five-point rating definition level) fails,
since with every point defined by a text de-
scription the numbers associated with each
text item are rank-ordered ordinals that, by
the rules of arithmetic, cannot be averaged
(or have any other arithmetic function used
on them).
19. It may be that in certain instances one can re-
place a brigadier general by a major paired
with a captain, but I suggest that in these
cases one has other problems that are beyond
the scope of the assessments process.
20. These margins of error appear to be those
that would be computed from the population
sizes if there were no corruption, fraud, or in-
timidation involved in the data collection.
Therefore, these margins of error are at best
the minimum error, and in my opinion it is
highly probable that they are much greater
within the context of Afghanistan.
21. “IJC Metrics Assessment” (IJC briefing to the
ISAF Joint Command Metrics Workshop,
Washington, D.C., 17–18 March 2010), slide
15. Note that, in addition to the five colors,
“white” indicates “not assessed.”
22. By Ben Connable, at discussions held 5 May
2010. See also Ben Connable, “Afghanistan
Assessments and Metrics: Trip Report Analy-
sis and Recommendations for ISAF and ISAF
Joint Command” (document MG 1086,
RAND Corp., 2011).
23. “IJC Metrics Assessment,” slide 29.
24. See PA Consulting Group, Dynamic Planning
for COIN in Afghanistan (London: 2009),
available at msnbcmedia.msn.com/.
25. They may very well be important or even vital
to other commands or government agencies,
but unless they are tied to this command’s ob-
jectives, they are not important to it.
26. Other than the promiscuous approach of
“This metric appears to have something to do
with the objective, so therefore we must col-
lect on it.”
27. IJC guidance to the ISAF Joint Command
Metrics Workshop.
28. Coffey International Development, “Intro-
duction to the Helmand Monitoring & Eval-
uation Programme,” Helmand Provincial
Reconstruction Team, Afghanistan, October
2010.
29. In scientific parlance, a “theory” is not an un-
proved speculation but a hypothesis (or a sys-
tem of hypotheses) that has been so verified
through testing that to deny it contingent
upon acceptance would be perverse, where a
“hypothesis” is an untested (but testable)
proposal for how some part of the world
might work.
30. Dr. Jonathan Schroden, in personal conversa-
tion, 4 January 2011.
31. For the figure of four hundred districts, see
Statoids, s.v. “Districts of Afghanistan,” www
.statoids.com/. For outcomes, Dr. Jonathan
Schroden points out (note 30) that one could
look to some of the districts in Kabul Prov-
ince to see what “success” looks like—though
he counterargues as well that Kabul is a spe-
cialized case, given how urban it is compared
to the rest of Afghanistan.
32. See, for example, the trajectory illustrations
in Robert Norton, The Gunner (n.p.: Hum-
phrey Robinson, 1628), and in Diego Ufano,
Artillerie (1621), information on both avail-
able at www.biografiasyvidas.com/, www
.mpiwg-berlin.mpg.de/, and www.uh.edu/
engines/nortontrajectories.jpg (full URL ad-
dresses are provided in the Web version of
this article). It was not until over half a cen-
tury later, in 1687, that Isaac Newton pro-
vided an objective numbers-based theory of
ballistics in his Principia.
33. A combination of diplomatic/political, infor-
mational/ideological, military, and economic
leadership and expertise must be involved.
34. “A comprehensive systems perspective con-
siders the interaction between the individual
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elements of a system and across multiple sys-
tems (political, military, economic, social, in-
formational, infrastructure, and others)”; JP
5-0, p. III-22. “Joint planners analyze the op-
erational environment in terms of six interre-
lated operational variables: political, military,
economic, social, information, and infra-
structure”; U.S. Army Dept., Operations, FM
3-0 (Washington, D.C.: February 2008), p.
1-5, available at downloads.army.mil/.
35. This does not “second-guess the com-
mander”; it is a drilling-down into the details
of the commander’s intent, placing them
within the context of the environment and
using the commander’s objectives and staff
planning documents as the primary inputs. It
states what it is about the environment that is
critical for a valid assessment; it covers politi-
cal, military, economic, social, informational/
ideological, and infrastructural issues, identi-
fying the relevant stakeholders (own forces,
coalition forces, friendly forces, enemy forces,
the local population, etc.). It is analogous to
the “intelligence preparation of the opera-
tional environment” carried out during mis-
sion planning.
36. For example, the downside of damaging
Taliban finances by poppy eradication might
be an upsurge in murder and intimidation by
the Taliban to make up for its inability to buy
labor from the local population. The upside
of Taliban murder and intimidation, in turn,
might be an opportunity for the coalition to
engage in information operations.
37. Since for most topics there is a surplus of
subject-matter experts, grouped into several
“schools of thought” that often contradict
each other, the choice of which “school” to
incorporate into assessments amounts to a
command decision. The difficulty is to bal-
ance subject-matter experts whose views
match the regional commander’s or who are
“popular” with those holding opposing or
unpopular views. See Philip Tetlock, Expert
Political Judgment (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
Univ. Press, 2005), for an analysis of how the
popularity of an expert is a poor measure of
the quality of that expert’s forecasts.
38. For the purposes of this article, “topic” refers
to a broad subject (for example, education),
and “metric” refers to an item of data (quali-
tative or quantitative) whose collection tells
us something about that broad subject (for
example, the number of schools).
39. The latter may require reallocation of re-
sources and perhaps adjustment of the plan.
40. An officer briefing several multistar generals
in May 2010 told them there were seven
schools in the area. However, another credi-
ble source had previously stated that there
were three, although no one mentioned that
figure at the briefing. It was only afterward
that the discrepancy was tracked down: there
were three “brick” schools and four “tent”
schools. Asking for the “number of schools”
will produce a number, but if the quantity of
metrics demanded is too high (which it cur-
rently is), amplifying and useful narrative will
not result. Asking instead for the topic—“De-
scribe the state of schools in your area”—and
explaining in terms of the commander’s in-
tent why we are asking is much more likely to
generate useful information.
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Commander Granger has served in various assignments
at sea, including as chief engineer of USS Spruance
(DD 963) and in command of USS Zephyr (PC 8) and
USS Donald Cook (DDG 75). He holds a bachelor of
science degree in history from the U.S. Naval Academy
and a master’s in marine affairs from the University of
Rhode Island. A June 2011 graduate of the Naval War
College, in Newport, he is currently deputy commodore
of Patrol Craft Squadron 1 in Little Creek, Virginia.
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DEWEY AT MANILA BAY
Lessons in Operational Art and Operational Leadership from
America’s First Fleet Admiral
Commander Derek B. Granger, U.S. Navy
On the night of 30 April 1898, the six-ship U.S. Asiatic Squadron, com-manded by Commodore George Dewey, steamed into Manila Bay in the
Spanish Philippines to do battle with the Spanish South Pacific Squadron. In less
than seven hours Dewey sank or captured the entire Spanish fleet and silenced
Manila’s shore batteries, all while suffering just eight wounded and without the
loss of a single American life.1 Dewey’s success in a distant bay most Americans
could not have pointed to on a map transformed the United States into a colo-
nial power, causing Europe to take note.2 An editorial in a German newspaper
observed that Dewey’s victory marked “a new epoch in history, not only for the
United States but likewise for Europe.”3
In light of the dramatic change to the world political landscape brought by Ma-
nila Bay, it is notable how little attention Dewey’s exploits receive today from stu-
dents of naval history. Perhaps the passage of 113 years since Dewey’s victory has
led historians to conclude that his accomplishments, though impressive for their
day, are irrelevant to students of operational art marked now by satellite surveil-
lance and cruise missiles. If that is the case, however, why should service colleges
pay attention to the accomplishments of Napoleon Bonaparte, Ferdinand Foch, or
Raymond Spruance? Are not their achievements little more than historical curios-
ities in an age of globalism, stealth technology, and smart weapons?
Worse, it would seem, Dewey—like most of his contemporaries (and many
naval leaders who followed him over the next half-century)—subscribed to an-
other historical curiosity, the Mahanian theory of engaging and decisively de-
feating the enemy battle fleet. His victory at Manila, in fact, was arguably a prime
example of Mahanian warfare. The subsequent discrediting of Mahanian tactics
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has rendered Dewey irrelevant to many students of modern naval warfare. Fur-
thermore, Dewey’s action against the Spanish at Manila Bay involved only six
fighting ships and so hardly represents the operational level of war at all using
more recent yardsticks. When compared to the forces commanded by Nimitz
and Spruance at Midway, Dewey’s was little more than a tactical detachment. In
this view, Dewey’s accomplishments are worthy of study only insomuch as they
demonstrate his thorough mastery of Mahanian tactics. Referring to the Ameri-
can victories at Manila Bay and Santiago, Cuba, during the Spanish-American
War, historian Ronald Andidora submits that the “small size of these engage-
ments and the disproportionate material advantage enjoyed by the Americans in
each of them rendered their instructional value almost nil.”4
But in fact the basic tenets of operational leadership and operational art are
timeless. Napoleon, Foch, and Spruance—and Mahan too—are indeed worthy of
study by today’s students of warfare, and so is Dewey. Dewey’s operational leader-
ship and his practice of operational art are relevant to twenty-first-century practi-
tioners of the operational level of war. In making this argument, this article details
how America’s first “Admiral of the Navy”—in effect, its first fleet admiral—won
the battle of Manila Bay before the first round was fired, by carefully incorporat-
ing into his campaign planning the operational functions of intelligence, com-
mand and control, logistics, and protection so as to mitigate adverse circumstances
related to the operational factors of time, space, and force.
PREPARATIONS FOR WAR
At 5:41 AM on 1 May 1898, sixty-year-old Commodore George Dewey cemented
his place in history books with his famous command to the captain of his flag-
ship, the protected cruiser USS Olympia (C-6): “You may fire when you are
ready, Gridley.”5 Over the next seven hours, the American line of battle made five
firing runs past the numerically superior Spanish squadron, commanded by
Rear Admiral Patricio Montojo and riding at anchor in Manila Bay beneath the
cover of heavy shore-based batteries. Suffering 381 dead and the destruction of
most of his fleet, Montojo had little choice but to surrender to Dewey’s virtually
undamaged force, handing America what amounted to total victory.6 While the
events of 1 May 1898 were unquestionably decisive, the American victory had
been for all practical purposes assured before Dewey and his squadron steamed
into Manila Bay. As Dewey observed shortly after his victory, “This battle was
won in Hong Kong Harbor.”7
Early that year, on 3 January, with the specter of war with Spain over alleged
Spanish atrocities in Cuba looming, Commodore Dewey had assumed com-
mand of the Asiatic Squadron in a ceremony on board Olympia at Nagasaki, Ja-
pan. While the six-ship squadron under Dewey’s command was small compared
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to the fleets later amassed during World War II, it was a sizable and formidable
naval force for the day, especially for a U.S. Navy that was only now expanding
following a considerable downsizing in the decades following the Civil War.8
Dewey, after the required diplomatic proprieties with his Japanese hosts, or-
dered his squadron on 11 February to make for Hong Kong, having received no
direction from higher authority to do so but realizing that it would put his force
in the most advantageous position from which to mount an offensive against the
Spanish fleet.9 Upon the squadron’s arrival at Hong Kong on 17 February, he was
greeted with news of the sinking of the USS Maine only two days prior in Havana
Harbor, nearly halfway around the world. In the relative safety of Hong Kong’s
neutral harbor, Dewey wasted no time preparing for war with a fading but still
dangerous colonial power.
First and foremost, Dewey was facing enormous logistical challenges associ-
ated with the operational factor of space. Various plans for war with Spain drafted
in the 1890s called for the U.S. Asiatic Squadron to seek out and destroy the Span-
ish navy in the Spanish Philippines.10 Adopting these general plans, Dewey real-
ized his force would be operating more than seven thousand miles from his
nearest base, which meant it would take nearly two months to transport coal,
ammunition, and reserves into the theater. He also realized that a formal decla-
ration of war by the United States would render neutral ports, including Hong
Kong and all ports in Japan, off-limits in accordance with international law, in-
creasing his logistical concerns by compressing the operational factor of time.
Dewey had to make all preparations he could while in Hong Kong, a task compli-
cated by the fact that his every move was readily observable to the civilian vessels
and foreign warships plying the harbor.11
Of equal concern to Dewey was that the Spanish navy would be fighting in its
own waters and within easy range of numerous, heavily fortified Spanish bases. In
contrast, shortly after his appointment to the Asiatic Squadron, Dewey became
painfully aware of the inadequacy of U.S. intelligence on the region when his re-
quest for information about the Philippines was answered with a sorely outdated
1876 report from the Office of Naval Intelligence.12 The Office of Naval Intelli-
gence was certainly not alone in being unprepared for war in the Philippines. Prior
to the sinking of Maine, even President William McKinley confessed, “I could not
have told where those darned islands were within 2,000 miles.”13
Dewey’s challenges in the operational factors of space and time were exacer-
bated by yet others concerning the factor of force. Many historians have argued
that Dewey commanded a fleet that was, in nearly every aspect, vastly superior to
Montojo’s. Dewey’s autobiography acknowledges that he perceived a distinct
advantage in armament over his Spanish adversaries, mounting as he did fifty-
three “large guns” (above four inches) to thirty-one for the Spanish.14 A critical
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deficiency faced by Dewey, however, was in the quantity of vessels available. Al-
though Dewey’s force of six combatants was slightly less than Montojo’s seven,
the Spanish had more than twenty-five small gunboats that could mount a seri-
ous threat if brought into action.15 Furthermore, rumors circulated in Hong
Kong regarding the impregnability of Spanish shore defenses at Manila, a formi-
dable arsenal of more than 225 guns, many of heavy caliber.16 In all, prospects for
victory looked grim for Dewey’s Asiatic Squadron; the exclusive Hong Kong
Club offered heavy betting odds against the Americans.17 Only days before war
was formally declared, British officers of the Royal Navy entertained their Amer-
ican guests with a sort of farewell party. When it concluded, a British officer
commented, “What a very fine set of fellows. But unhappily, we shall never see
them again.”18
DEWEY’S GROWTH INTO AN OPERATIONAL LEADER
The manner in which Dewey proceeded in preparing for battle despite poor
odds and considerable difficulties attests to his qualities and effectiveness as an
operational leader. Milan Vego, a modern scholar of the history and practice of
operational art, contends, “The principal requirements for a successful opera-
tional leader are high intellect, strong personality, courage, boldness, and will to
act, combined with extensive professional knowledge and experience.”19 All of
these traits, as well as others, applied in various degrees to Dewey. His boldness
and experience, however, were the primary influences on his planning and exe-
cution at Manila Bay.
By the time he was appointed to command of the Asiatic Squadron, Dewey
was already renowned for his boldness. When his prestigious appointment pro-
duced outspoken criticism by some who favored other officers, Secretary of the
Navy Theodore Roosevelt was undeterred. Addressing a protesting delegation of
California congressmen, Roosevelt declared, “Gentlemen, I can’t agree with you.
We have looked up his record. We have looked him straight in the eyes. He is a
fighter. We’ll not change now.”20
Dewey’s boldness had emerged from experience. Within three years of his
graduation from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1858, Dewey was assigned to the
side-wheel steam frigate USS Mississippi. When the American Civil War broke out,
Mississippi was assigned to the West Gulf Blockading Squadron, commanded by
David Glasgow Farragut. Dewey’s first engagement was Farragut’s attack on New
Orleans, just one of several successful and high-profile endeavors that were to dis-
tinguish Farragut as an aggressive and bold commander. Though not assigned to
Farragut’s flagship, USS Hartford, Dewey was able to observe Farragut’s leadership
style closely and quickly became a “disciple.” One of Farragut’s tactics, employed
to considerable effectiveness at New Orleans, was to pass heavily fortified shore
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positions at night. This experience would prove pivotal to Dewey at Manila Bay.
Following the capture of New Orleans, Dewey learned from Farragut another
lasting lesson, this time on initiative. After weeks of trying, a Confederate gun-
boat slipped passed the Union blockade, prompting Farragut to assemble his
commanding officers and others on board Hartford. Dewey, by then Mississippi’s
executive officer, attended. After all the officers were seated, Farragut demanded
an explanation of how the gunboat had snuck by. A junior officer from another
ship, who had been officer of the deck the night the incident occurred, spoke
out, admitting, “I could have rammed her, sir, only I was awaiting orders.”
Farragut, visibly disgusted, replied quietly, “Young man, you had the opportu-
nity to make a great name for yourself in your profession, but you missed it. I
doubt that you will get another.”21 Dewey would not miss his own opportunity
when the time came.
Some two years after his success at New Orleans, Farragut led a similarly bold
attack on Mobile, Alabama. As Farragut’s ships proceeded up the channel be-
tween Forts Gaines and Morgan, USS Tecumseh hit a mine (referred to during
that period as a “torpedo”) and sank almost immediately. Behind Tecumseh, USS
Brooklyn stopped in the channel and backed its engines, prompting Farragut to
yell down from his position in the rigging of Hartford, “What’s the trouble?”
When the reply from Brooklyn came back, “Torpedoes!” Farragut abruptly and
famously issued what would become his signature command: “Damn the torpe-
does! Go ahead!”22 Although Dewey was not present at the battle of Mobile Bay,
there is no doubt he was deeply impressed by reports of Farragut’s intrepidity in
the face of the enemy.
In his autobiography Dewey admitted, “Farragut has always been my ideal of
the naval officer: urbane, decisive, indomitable. Whenever I have been in a diffi-
cult situation, or in the midst of such confusion of details that the simple and
right thing to do seemed hazy, I have often asked myself, ‘What would Farragut
do?’ In the course of the preparations for Manila Bay I often asked myself this
question.”23 Unsurprisingly, his response would be very Farragut-like.
DEWEY’S CAMPAIGN PLAN
Having distinguished himself as a bold leader during his Civil War service,
Dewey would now distinguish himself as a well prepared commander. His prep-
arations for war with Spain commenced even before he arrived in Nagasaki to
take command of the Asiatic Squadron. Receiving notification of his pending
appointment while serving as the president of the Board of Inspection and Sur-
vey in Washington, Dewey immediately and exhaustively studied charts on the
Far East, placing particular emphasis on the Philippines.24 Keenly attuned to the
challenges of sustainment inherent in operating so far from his closest base, he
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undertook an investigation into the readiness of the ships assigned to his pro-
spective squadron.
His findings were disturbing: not one ship had even a full peacetime allow-
ance for ammunition and powder, let alone a wartime allowance.25 Upon being
informed by the Department of the Navy that merchant steamers would not
transport ammunition, due to safety concerns, Dewey worked with Roosevelt to
have additional ammunition shipped via the USS Concord, outfitting at Mare Is-
land, near Oakland, California, for service with the Asiatic Squadron.26 Demon-
strating exceptional foresight and resourcefulness, he stopped by Mare Island on
his journey west, calling on the commanding officer of Concord to persuade him
to minimize all supplies save his squadron’s badly needed ammunition, maxi-
mizing every inch of storage capacity for that purpose.27 Additionally, Dewey
recommended revising Concord’s track across the Pacific to include a brief stop
for coal in Hawaii, allowing the ship to make it to Japan, where additional stores
could be easily procured.28 Realizing that Concord was too small to carry more
than half the required ammunition, Dewey arranged for the sloop of war USS
Mohican to transport the balance. The speed in which these logistical arrange-
ments were made was critical: Mohican arrived in Hong Kong only forty-eight
hours before Dewey took his squadron to sea en route to Manila Bay.29
Dewey’s other chief logistical concern while at Hong Kong was coal. Dewey was
well aware that with the news of Maine’s sinking at Havana, war with Spain was
imminent. Faced with the inevitable prospect of then being directed by the British
authorities to depart Hong Kong and having no American bases available, Dewey
undertook discreet negotiations to purchase merchant colliers to provide floating
support. Obtaining Secretary of the Navy John Davis Long’s approval, Dewey pur-
chased the British merchant ships Nanshan and Zafiro and obtained the revenue
cutter McCulloch. Dewey, however, disobeyed Long’s orders to arm these newly
acquired auxiliaries, choosing instead, rather ingeniously, to register them as
American merchants cleared for Guam, in 1898 an exceedingly remote island that
Dewey regarded as an “almost mythical country.”30 Additionally, he elected to hire
the British crews and leave them intact, augmenting them with only small contin-
gents of U.S. Navy personnel. His efforts ensured that these vital support vessels
would not be ordered to leave the safety of Hong Kong upon the official declara-
tion of war, as well as their freedom to resupply in Japanese and Chinese ports.31
Another critical consideration for Dewey was the operational movement of
his forces. With fully half of his ships then considerable distances from Hong
Kong (USS Petrel was in the Bering Sea on fishery-protection service), Dewey
had to assemble them rapidly for redistribution of ammunition, bunkering, tac-
tical planning, dry docking for structural repairs, repainting of ships (grey, from
peacetime white), and the countless other preparations required for battle.32
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Effective use of transoceanic telegraph cables brought about the expeditious ar-
rival of all his warships at Hong Kong, though USS Baltimore arrived from Ho-
nolulu only on 22 April, two days before the governor of neutral Hong Kong
requested the withdrawal of all American ships.33
Even while collecting his force in Hong Kong, Dewey had embarked on an in-
telligence campaign to assist him in devising his plans for war. On 23 April,
Dewey sent a coded cablegram to O. F. Williams, the U.S. consul at Manila, re-
questing information on Manila’s defenses, the presence of mines, and Spanish
fleet movements.34 Despite a very real threat to his safety from the Spanish au-
thorities, Williams responded with a report of the mounting of six new, heavy
guns at Corregidor, the laying of mines in Manila Bay, the disposition of Spanish
surface forces, and efforts to fortify land positions.35 Furthermore, Williams re-
layed rumors from the streets of Manila detailing the organization of a coalition
European naval force being sent to defeat the Americans.36 Dewey also used his
own officers to gather intelligence, sending them ashore in Hong Kong disguised
as tourists or businessmen to obtain information from steamers arriving from
the Philippines. Through this method, Dewey heard of a policy requiring ships
entering the Corregidor channel to use Spanish pilots because of heavy min-
ing.37 Having acquired knowledge of the currents and water depths in Subic and
Manila Bays, Dewey deduced that extensive mining of the channels into either
port would be problematic for the Spanish and that the countless reports of
mines were nothing more than a ruse to deter attack.38 Through his deliberate
analysis of the information collected through this combination of highly re-
sourceful, if amateur, intelligence-gathering methods, Dewey obtained a sur-
prisingly accurate picture of what awaited him in Manila. In a cable to Secretary
Long sent on 31 March, fully a month before the battle of Manila Bay, Dewey
outlined with remarkable precision the Spanish naval and land forces at Manila,
concluding with confidence that he could take Manila in a single day.39
Enabled by his productive intelligence campaign, Dewey now set out to final-
ize his battle plans. According to modern U.S. joint doctrine, the preparation of
battle plans is one of several tasks encompassed by the command-and-control
function, along with communicating the status of information, assessing the sit-
uation, and commanding subordinate forces. If Dewey had learned boldness
during the Civil War, his planning was deliberate, thorough, and cautious.
Somewhat surprisingly, his planning process was very much a collaborative af-
fair, drawing extensively from the inputs of his subordinate commanders. “Day
after day, he summoned his captains to discuss all the possibilities and eventuali-
ties of a conflict with the enemy. He gave them an opportunity to say when,
where, and how the battle should be fought. From junior to senior he called
upon them to express their opinions freely. If any man had a novel idea, it was
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given careful consideration.”40 In assessing Dewey’s command and control prac-
tices, an officer serving under Dewey in the Philippines observed that Dewey
“had the respect and confidence of every officer and man who served under
him.” He added, “Prior to leaving Hong Kong, every contingency which might
arise was considered and studied, and plans made to meet each one, so that when
the time actually came to engage the enemy’s fleet, we had a prearranged plan
which fitted the case perfectly.”41
Despite the absence of an official proclamation of war by the United States,
the governor of Hong Kong sent word to Dewey on 24 April that British neutral-
ity necessitated the departure of all American ships within twenty-four hours.
Dewey did not bother to wait for the full twenty-four hours to elapse, for by that
time he had essentially completed combat preparations and the bold plan that
would be executed to near perfection less than a week later.
Having closely studied China, Dewey correctly surmised that so loosely orga-
nized a nation as it then was would be unable to enforce neutrality laws. That
consideration prompted him to steam his squadron from Hong Kong to Mirs
Bay, an anchorage in Chinese territory thirty miles from Hong Kong.42 There he
meticulously oversaw final preparations, including such details as jettisoning
decorative woodwork from all of his ships to reduce the threat of splinters and
fire and draping chains over the sides of the ships to serve, to some degree, as ar-
mor.43 Additionally, he relentlessly drilled his forces in critical skills like target
practice and damage control, as well as in skills less likely to be needed, like hand-
to-hand combat.
In the midst of all of the activity, on the morning of 27 April, a small tug en-
tered Mirs Bay to deliver an urgent cablegram from Secretary Long: “War has
commenced between the United States and Spain. Proceed at once to Philippine
Islands. Commence operations, particularly against the Spanish fleet. You must
capture vessels or destroy. Use utmost endeavors.”44 At once, Dewey summoned
all commanding officers for a final meeting on board Olympia to discuss the lat-
est intelligence on Manila and Subic Bays and promulgate what would now be
called his “commander’s guidance.” Less than three hours after receiving Secre-
tary Long’s cable, the Asiatic Squadron steamed from Mirs Bay to seek out the
Spanish fleet some six hundred miles away. Dewey had little chance of achieving
the element of surprise, however, as the Spanish consul at Hong Kong informed
Montojo by cable that “the enemy’s squadron sailed at 2 PM from the Bay of Mirs,
and according to reliable accounts they sailed for Subic Bay to destroy our squad-
ron and then will go to Manila.”45 That is precisely what Dewey did, arriving first
at Subic and dispatching two vessels to reconnoiter for the Spanish fleet before
continuing on to Manila Bay, reaching it in the early morning of 1 May 1898.
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Mahanian doctrine presumably led Dewey to consider the Spanish fleet as the
enemy center of gravity. While he was confident that his own squadron’s morale,
training readiness, and superior projectile weight would give him a decided ad-
vantage over the Spanish fleet, he had serious concerns regarding the heavy
shore batteries overlooking the approaches to Manila Bay. Dewey observed in
his autobiography, “If the guns commanding the entrance were well served,
there was danger of damage to my squadron before it engaged the enemy’s
squadron.”46 Through his experience at the Board of Inspection and Survey and
his study of Mahanian doctrine, he was fully aware of the effectiveness of mod-
ern guns when fired from a stationary position and of the legitimacy of Mahan’s
maxim that one shore-based gun was the equal of four guns of similar caliber
afloat.47 Accordingly, his plan focused heavily on operational protection and
passive defensive measures intended to neutralize this critical Spanish strength.
First, Dewey decided to enter Manila Bay through Boca Grande, the wider of the
two entrances, to maximize the separation between his squadron and the batter-
ies.48 Second, Dewey planned to complicate targeting by entering the bay at
night, with all navigation lights extinguished.49 As a result, despite Montojo’s ex-
cellent intelligence on the movement of the American squadron and the advan-
tageous positions of his powerful shore batteries, the Spanish failed to engage
the U.S. ships until they were very nearly inside Manila Bay, even then firing only a
couple of rounds, with no effect. The Americans returned fire with a few rounds
of their own, but Dewey had made it clear to his commanding officers that the
squadron would not stop to fight it out with the shore batteries but would remain
focused on the objective—the Spanish fleet.50 Safely past the shore batteries and
seeing no threat of the rumored Spanish mines, the American squadron had now
only to wait for the sun and seek out and destroy the Spanish fleet, a task that it
carried out with little difficulty and no loss of American life.
DEWEY USHERS IN AMERICAN IMPERIALISM
When the Spanish-American War began, the strategic American objective was to
liberate Cuba from alleged Spanish atrocities, not to gain colonial possessions.51
That objective decisively shifted three days after the defeat of the Spanish Pacific
fleet, when Dewey cabled to Secretary Long, “We control bay completely and can
take city at any time, but have not sufficient men to hold.”52 The prospect of seizing
territory had not been seriously considered by the McKinley administration, but
Dewey’s cable prompted the mobilization of additional forces to do just that. Two
significant challenges faced Dewey. First, the Filipinos were mounting an insur-
gency against the Spanish forces occupying the countryside around Manila. Sec-
ond, ships of the powerful German navy were conspicuously patrolling the waters
adjacent to Manila Bay, threatening to claim the Philippines for their nation.53
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Almost immediately following Montojo’s defeat, Spanish general Don Basilio,
realizing the hopelessness of his situation, had communicated through intermedi-
aries his willingness to surrender his thirty-one thousand troops to Dewey’s
squadron.54 Dewey was unwilling to accept the offer, fearful that his lack of suffi-
cient occupation forces would prompt looting and widespread bloodshed of
Spaniards at the hands of the Filipino insurgents. Accordingly, he waited for
American expeditionary troops under the command of Major General Wesley
Merritt, U.S. Army, to arrive.
Even as Dewey was declining the offer of Spanish surrender, exiled Filipino
leader Emilio Aguinaldo arrived in Manila Bay seeking to create a native, inde-
pendent government under American advisers.55 Realizing that the growing
number of native insurgents could be of assistance in pushing the Spanish forces
from their garrison into the city of Manila, Dewey assisted Aguinaldo by allow-
ing the insurgents the use of captured Spanish guns and ammunition; he was
careful, however, not to forge an alliance that might imply recognition of a Fili-
pino state.56 Unhindered by Dewey, a band of a thousand Filipino insurgents
drove the nearly thirteen thousand Spaniards from their garrison on 29 May,
forcing their withdrawal to Manila. Emboldened by his success, Aguinaldo now
proclaimed establishment of the “First Republic of the Philippines,” with himself
as dictator. Dewey, despite his delicate and conditional support of Aguinaldo,
faced a major problem: three separate authorities were now attempting to exercise
rule over the Philippines.57
When Merritt arrived with 8,500 troops in early August, Dewey continued his
negotiations for a Spanish surrender. He eventually obtained an agreement with
Don Basilio’s successor, General Firmin Jaudenes, that Spanish forces would sur-
render, provided they faced an American assault—Jaudenes’s “honor demanded
that.” As Dewey later recalled, “So I had to fire, to kill a few people.”58 The agree-
ment thus made, Dewey and Merritt carried out what amounted to a staged joint
attack from land and sea on 10 August, prompting a swift Spanish surrender. With
the Spaniards out of the power struggle, the Americans would shift their focus to
Aguinaldo and embark on a counterinsurgency campaign that would ultimately
prove lengthy, costly, and bloody. Recognizing that a counterinsurgency campaign
required professional diplomacy as well as military might, Dewey wrote his friend,
Senator Redfield Proctor of Vermont, “This appears to me an occasion for the tri-
umph of statesmanship rather than of arms.”59
To prevent the Germans from clawing their way into the power vacuum,
Dewey established a naval blockade of Manila Bay. Despite initially having far
fewer ships than the Germans would ultimately operate in the region, the Amer-
icans enforced the blockade with an aggressiveness that prompted cooperation
from most foreign naval vessels. Numerous situations developed between
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American and German warships that risked open conflict, but Dewey repeatedly
distinguished himself as a highly effective diplomat, balancing resolve with deli-
cacy, projecting strength without heavy-handedness.60
If Dewey’s skillful diplomacy with the Japanese, Germans, Spaniards, British,
and Filipinos is somewhat surprising in view of his reputation for boldness, so
too was his perception of the importance of what are now known as “informa-
tion operations” during an age that gave rise to muckraking and “yellow jour-
nalism.” John Barrett, a newspaper correspondent who was embarked on board
Olympia from May 1898 to March 1899, later described Dewey as lenient in his
press censorship, adding that nobody “could rival the Admiral in quick percep-
tion of what was permissible news and what was not, together with the rare fac-
ulty of showing the correspondent with unfailing urbanity why this or that
sentence should be changed or omitted.”61 An example of his keen awareness of
the value of public perception occurred during preparations for the joint staged
attack on Manila. After reviewing a proposed release that referred to the pending
“bombardment” of the city, Dewey recommended instead the phrase “reduce
the defenses of the city.” He explained, “It is necessary for us to remember that
we are making history. If we left in words which implied no respect for noncom-
batants, women and children and property, we would be censured for it by the
future historian.”62
DEWEY’S RELEVANCE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
The term “operational art”—the theory and practice of preparing for and con-
ducting military operations on land, at sea, and in the air—was coined by the
Russians in the 1920s, more than two decades after Dewey’s victory at Manila
Bay.63 Nonetheless, there is little argument that Dewey essentially practiced op-
erational art in the design of his campaign plan in the western Pacific. What
makes Dewey’s success relevant today is not his textbook use of Mahanian tac-
tics but his careful and deliberate crafting of a battle plan that mitigated sizable
deficiencies in the operational factors of space, force, and time. Several recent
conflicts have shown that Dewey’s approach remains prudent.
Take, for example, Dewey’s resourcefulness in combating his logistical diffi-
culties and lack of cargo-lift capacity. Faced with similar problems preparing for
the Falklands War of 1982, the British did exactly as Dewey did, chartering
containerships, commercial tankers, and cruise liners to transport cargo, fuel,
and troops eight thousand miles from the United Kingdom to the Falklands the-
ater.64 Furthermore, the British decision to leave behind wheeled vehicles to
maximize loading space for tracked vehicles echoes of Dewey’s efforts to sacri-
fice less critical supplies for vital ammunition on board Concord.65
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Vego observes, “Intelligence should provide the operational commander
timely, accurate, and relevant information about the enemy forces’ order of battle
. . . and capabilities, and the enemy’s critical strengths and weaknesses.”66 Dewey’s
energetic “intelligence preparation of the battlefield,” though he had practically
no professional intelligence resources, paved the way for his success. Of particular
importance was Dewey’s careful consideration of rumors of mines, and his ulti-
mate (and correct) dismissal of them as a ruse. The failure to ascertain enemy ca-
pabilities accurately, despite vastly superior intelligence capabilities than Dewey
enjoyed, has proved disastrous to many modern commanders. Dewey, dissecting
the Spanish disinformation campaign and comprehensively war- gaming every
potential Spanish course of action, avoided falling into the trap of postponing his
attack due to overestimating the strength of his enemy. In essence, Dewey knew
his enemy and knew when to press the issue to preclude the Spaniards from rein-
forcing or further constructing shore defenses.
A 13 August 2010 New York Times article observed, “Mastery of battlefield
tactics and a knack for leadership are only prerequisites. Generals and other top
officers are now expected to be city managers, cultural ambassadors, public rela-
tions whizzes and politicians as they deal with multiple missions and constitu-
encies in the war zone, in allied capitals—and at home.”67 Dewey, it appears, was
ahead of his time. His astute media awareness, coupled with the delicacy with
which he handled myriad political and cultural sensitivities, should serve as an
example for modern-day military leaders facing an increasingly complex secu-
rity environment in an age of globalism.
Perhaps most important, modern students should seriously question
Andidora’s assertion that Dewey’s material advantages in age and capability of
his ships somehow guaranteed success at Manila Bay. History is rife with exam-
ples of superior forces falling to inferior ones. The American Revolutionary War,
the Japanese invasion of Malaya in 1941, and Midway in 1942 were all “under-
dog” victories. Advantages in the operational factor of force have often been off-
set by the hubris of reliance on sheer numbers or technology rather than careful
and deliberate planning to identify and exploit weaknesses. Vego argues, “Expe-
rience shows that no new technologies, no matter how advanced, can replace
operational art,” adding that “the excessive focus on tactics of platforms and
weapons/sensors reduces all fighting to simple targeting and shooting.”68
Dewey’s careful application of operational art despite material advantages
over his adversaries ensured that his forces remained focused on the enemy’s
center of gravity while offsetting Spanish critical strengths.
Finally, Dewey’s performance as an operational leader is worthy of careful con-
sideration. The 2010 U.S. Joint Forces Command Joint Operating Environment
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observes, “Those commanders who have listened and absorbed what their sub-
ordinates had to say were those who recognized what was actually happening in
combat, because they had acculturated themselves to learning from the experi-
ences of others.”69 Dewey’s collaborative approach to planning for war, an ap-
proach that drew heavily from the inputs of his subordinates, supports this
observation. A collective MIT, Carnegie Mellon, and Union College research ef-
fort yielded a 2010 report that concluded, among other things, “In groups where
one person dominated, the group was less collectively intelligent than in groups
where the conversational turns were more evenly distributed.”70 Arguably,
Dewey’s willingness to participate in, rather than dominate, planning, notwith-
standing his positional authority and bold predisposition, was the critical
enabler of his success. With the adoption of the 2007 Cooperative Strategy for
21st Century Seapower and its underlying emphasis on international partner-
ship and shared responsibility, that quality is becoming increasingly important.
There can be no mistaking that experience matters in the development of our
military leaders. Dewey’s experience, particularly his participation in the Amer-
ican Civil War, provided him with real-world tactical expertise as well as a highly
successful role model to emulate. The forging of similar leaders in that way in to-
day’s Navy is problematic due to the dearth of naval conflicts since the conclu-
sion of World War II. This reality underscores the importance of “providing the
education so that future leaders can understand the political, strategic, histori-
cal, and cultural framework of a more complex world, as well as possess a thor-
ough grounding in the nature of war, past, present, and future.”71 Accordingly,
future leaders in the U.S. Navy must continue studying historical applications of
operational art. In doing so, they would be wise not to overlook Dewey.
N O T E S
1. David Traxel, 1898: The Birth of the American
Century (New York: Knopf, 1998), p. 137.
2. Craig L. Symonds, Decision at Sea: Five Naval
Battles That Shaped American History (New
York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2005), p. 143.
3. Ibid., p. 192.
4. Ronald Andidora, Iron Admirals: Naval Lead-
ership in the Twentieth Century (Westport,
Conn.: Greenwood, 2000), p. 9.
5. Laurin Hall Healy and Luis Kutner, The Ad-
miral (Chicago: Ziff-Davis, 1944), p. 181.
6. H. W. Wilson, The Downfall of Spain: Naval
History of the Spanish-American War (Lon-
don: Sampson Low, Marston, 1900), p. 141.
7. John Barrett, “Admiral George Dewey,”
Harper’s New Monthly Magazine 99
(June–November 1899), p. 801.
8. Lisle A. Rose, Power at Sea: The Age of
Navalism 1890–1918 (Columbia: Univ. of
Missouri Press, 2007), p. 16.
9. George Dewey, Autobiography of George
Dewey: Admiral of the Navy (New York:
Scribner’s, 1913), p. 178. Dewey’s account is
disputed by William Braisted, who suggests
G R A N G E R 1 3 9
NWC_2011AutumnReview_Granger.ps
\\data1\john.lanzieri.ctr$\msdata\Desktop\NavalWarCollege\NWC_2011AutumnReview\NWC_2011AutumnReview.vp
Tuesday, August 02, 2011 10:44:43 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
145
Naval War College: Full Autumn 2011 Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2011
Dewey did not assemble his squadron in
Hong Kong until directed to by Roosevelt on
25 February 1898; William Reynolds Braisted,
The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1897–
1909 (Austin: Univ. of Texas Press, 1959), p.
23.
10. Symonds, Decision at Sea, p. 160, refers to the
drafting in 1895 of plans for war with Spain
by students at the Naval War College, in
Newport, R.I., calling for the U.S. Asiatic
Squadron to attack the Philippines. Braisted
cites subsequent plans drafted in 1896 by Lt.
William W. Kimball calling for the establish-
ment of a base of supply at Manila in the
event of war with Spain; Braisted, United
States Navy in the Pacific, pp. 21–22. Despite
the existence of general war plans for the U.S.
Navy action in the Philippines, it remained
Dewey’s responsibility to devise and imple-
ment specific details associated with opera-
tions and logistics.
11. Symonds, Decision at Sea, p. 163.
12. Dewey, Autobiography, p. 175.
13. Symonds, Decision at Sea, p. 184.
14. Dewey, Autobiography, p. 203.
15. Ibid.
16. Symonds, Decision at Sea, p. 168; Dewey, Au-
tobiography, pp. 187, 192.
17. Dewey, Autobiography, p. 192.
18. Healy and Kutner, Admiral, p. 166; Dewey,
Autobiography, p. 192.
19. Milan Vego, Joint Operational Warfare: The-
ory and Practice (Newport, R.I.: Naval War
College, 2007), p. X-13.
20. Healy and Kutner, Admiral, p. 140.
21. Ibid., p. 68.
22. S. S. Robison, A History of Naval Tactics from
1530 to 1930: The Evolution of Tactical Max-
ims (Annapolis, Md.: U.S. Naval Institute,
1942), p. 651.
23. Dewey, Autobiography, p. 50.
24. Nathan Sargent, Admiral Dewey and the Ma-
nila Campaign (Washington, D.C.: Naval
Historical Foundation, 1947), p. 4.
25. Dewey, Autobiography, p. 170.
26. Sargent, Admiral Dewey and the Manila Cam-
paign, p. 5; Dewey, Autobiography, p. 170.
27. Healy and Kutner, Admiral, p. 140; Dewey,
Autobiography, p. 171.
28. Healy and Kutner, Admiral, p. 140.
29. Dewey, Autobiography, p. 171.
30. Ibid., p. 191; Symonds, Decision at Sea, p.
162.
31. Dewey, Autobiography, p. 192.
32. Wilson, Downfall of Spain, p. 121.
33. Ibid., p. 122.
34. Dewey, Autobiography, p. 180.
35. Sargent, Admiral Dewey and the Manila Cam-
paign, p. 14.
36. Dewey, Autobiography, p. 187.
37. Sargent, Admiral Dewey and the Manila Cam-
paign, p. 15.
38. David F. Trask, The War with Spain in 1898
(New York: Macmillan, 1981), pp. 98–99;
Healy and Kutner, Admiral, p. 157; Dewey,
Autobiography, p. 199.
39. Healy and Kutner, Admiral, p. 157.
40. Barrett, “Admiral George Dewey,” p. 801.
41. Healy and Kutner, Admiral, p. 171.
42. Dewey, Autobiography, p. 190.
43. Symonds, Decision at Sea, p. 165. The four
“protected cruisers” in the force were ar-
mored only to the extent of protection of
their machinery spaces from plunging fire.
44. Sargent, Admiral Dewey and the Manila Cam-
paign, p. 22.
45. Healy and Kutner, Admiral, p. 175.
46. Dewey, Autobiography, p. 208.
47. Healy and Kutner, Admiral, p. 171; Trask,
War with Spain in 1898, p. 101.
48. Symonds, Decision at Sea, p. 146.
49. Dewey, Autobiography, p. 207.
50. Symonds, Decision at Sea, p. 146.
51. Trask, War with Spain in 1898, p. 95.
52. Healy and Kutner, Admiral, p. 195.
53. Germany posed a problem not just in the
Philippines following Dewey’s victory but
also to U.S. interests in the Samoan Islands.
Braisted provides a brief overview of the acri-
mony between the United States and Ger-
many over Pacific interests in United States
Navy in the Pacific, pp. 57–63.
1 4 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
NWC_2011AutumnReview_Granger.ps
\\data1\john.lanzieri.ctr$\msdata\Desktop\NavalWarCollege\NWC_2011AutumnReview\NWC_2011AutumnReview.vp
Tuesday, August 02, 2011 10:44:43 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
146
Naval War College Review, Vol. 64 [2011], No. 4, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol64/iss4/1
54. Dewey, Autobiography, p. 273.
55. Healy and Kutner, Admiral, p. 222.
56. Dewey, Autobiography, p. 247.
57. Symonds, Decision at Sea, p. 186.
58. Traxel, 1898, p. 224; Dewey, Autobiography,
p. 275.
59. Healy and Kutner, Admiral, p. 239. The Phil-
ippine insurrection that followed Dewey’s
victory is beyond the scope of this article.
However, it is noteworthy that Dewey advo-
cated a liberal policy with the native Filipinos
that would increase their privileges and ca-
pacity for self-government. Dewey strongly
urged a diplomatic solution to the insurgency
rather than a military one. This opinion
stood in stark contrast with that of Maj. Gen.
E. S. Otis, the commanding U.S. Army gen-
eral, who advocated subduing the Philippine
Islands with twenty-five thousand troops and
a military government. Recent events have
shown the merits of Dewey’s position and the
limits of Otis’s. For a more detailed discus-
sion see Braisted’s United States Navy in the
Pacific, pp. 64–75.
60. Healy and Kutner, Admiral, pp. 207–209;
Braisted, United States Navy in the Pacific, p.
37.
61. Barrett, “Admiral George Dewey,” p. 806.
62. Healy and Kutner, Admiral, p. 231.
63. Vego, Joint Operational Warfare, p. I-5.
64. Julian Thompson, The Lifeblood of War: Lo-
gistics in Armed Conflicts (London: Brassey’s,
1991), p. 257.
65. Ibid., p. 253.
66. Vego, Joint Operational Warfare, p. VIII-28.
67. Thom Shanker, “Win Wars? Today’s Gener-
als Must Also Politick and Do P.R.,” New
York Times, 13 August 2010.
68. Vego, Joint Operational Warfare, pp. xvii–xviii.
69. U.S. Joint Forces Command, The Joint Oper-
ating Environment 2010 (Suffolk, Va.: 28 Feb-
ruary 2010), p. 72, available at www.jfcom
.mil/.
70. “Collective Intelligence: Number of Women
in Groups Linked to Effectiveness in Solving
Difficult Problems,” Science Daily, 30 Sep-
tember 2010.
71. U.S. Joint Forces Command, Joint Operating
Environment 2010, p. 70.
G R A N G E R 1 4 1
NWC_2011AutumnReview_Granger.ps
\\data1\john.lanzieri.ctr$\msdata\Desktop\NavalWarCollege\NWC_2011AutumnReview\NWC_2011AutumnReview.vp
Tuesday, August 02, 2011 10:44:43 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
147
Naval War College: Full Autumn 2011 Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2011
REVIEW ESSAY
RISING CHINA’S FORGOTTEN FATHER
Charles Horner
Taylor, Jay. The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the Strug-
gle for Modern China. Boston: Harvard Univ. Press, 2011.
736pp. $35
Jay Taylor’s masterful biography of Chiang Kai-shek (1887–1975), first pub-
lished in 2009, is now available in paperback, with a new postscript that assesses
documentation unavailable when Taylor completed his manuscript in 2008.
However, nothing that has appeared since then dilutes Taylor’s original, power-
ful reassessment of Chiang’s appropriate place in twentieth-century history.
Over the decades Chiang Kai-shek had become a textbook example of politi-
cally corrupted writing of biography and history. After the so-called “loss of
China” in 1949, Chiang’s well documented failings were conscripted to camou-
flage the many failings of American policy makers. Later, during the Vietnam
War, the fate of the anti-Communist cause in China as led by Chiang Kai-shek
became a metaphor for those who argued against American involvement. Thus a
large and consequential figure was rendered irrelevant and a statesman of con-
siderable acumen and foresight was unceremoniously dumped into History’s
dustbin.
Still, Chiang’s dominance of China’s politics from
1925 to 1949 did indeed end in his defeat in China’s
civil war and his subsequent flight to the island of Tai-
wan. What more do we need to know than this? Why
accompany Jay Taylor on his long march through
mountains of documentation and read the hefty book
that resulted from it?
Charles Horner is senior fellow at the Hudson Institute
in Washington, D.C., and the author of Rising China
and Its Postmodern Fate. He served in the Department
of State and in the United States Information Agency
during the administrations of President Ronald Reagan
and President George H. W. Bush.
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The appearance of The Generalissimo is for students of modern China an-
other important milestone in an ongoing and thorough reevaluation of the
achievements of “Republican China” (that is, the period between the collapse of
the last dynasty in 1912 and the founding of the People’s Republic of China in
1949). A generation ago we were taught to regard this era as nothing but an exer-
cise in futility, a series of false starts, an opera buffa, albeit with a cast of millions
in misery. It was but an interlude on the way to the People’s Republic, the best
and final form of Modern China, which, presumably, would last forever. Over
the past thirty years, however, as China has been remade and has reopened itself
to the world, many scholars have come to see the years of 1913 through the 1930s
as a fertile seedtime, with advances in politics, commerce, and culture that pre-
figure not only today’s China but also Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan.
Yet Taylor’s magisterial book stands on its own as a well lighted pathway into
China’s modern history, illuminating the connections between China’s own vio-
lent and tumultuous situation and a larger world assaulted by murderous ideol-
ogies. As Taylor explicates Chiang’s complicated view of these things, we see the
eclectic confusion that is the modern Chinese mind, and we are witnesses to
China’s still ongoing struggle to somehow marry its inherited tradition to the
needs of contemporary life. Chiang Kai-shek was, at one and the same time,
deeply Confucian, piously Christian, and thoroughly committed to China’s
modernization. His political creed derived from Sun Yat-sen’s (1866–1925)
“Three Principles,” a racially based Han nationalism; a one-party and elite-
managed constitutionalism; and a vague amalgam of both state socialism and
state capitalism that was meant to avoid any virulent variant of either.
Chiang’s life and times also remind us that China was not, and still is not, iso-
lated from world events. As a military cadet in Japan when China’s final dynasty,
the Qing, was collapsing, Chiang saw in Japan what his mentor Sun Yat-sen had
seen—a model and a potential ally. Frustrated by the West’s dismissal of China’s
claims after World War I and staggered by the seeming collapse of Western civili-
zation in Europe, Sun then led his part of the republican movement into a close
alliance with the new Soviet Union—the “First United Front” with the Commu-
nists. Chiang followed him there, but as Sun’s successor and as a partial unifier of
the country. He then turned on the Communists, but later agreed, under duress,
to a “Second United Front” with them.
Meanwhile, looking for other ways to counter the military pressure from Ja-
pan in the 1930s and 1940s, Chiang skillfully played a very weak diplomatic
hand, maneuvering among the Soviet Union, Britain, and the United States. He
did this not only to build a powerful anti-Japan coalition but also to persuade
the allies to pursue a grand strategy against Japan that would work to his politi-
cal advantage in the postwar era. This is an underappreciated aspect of China’s
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twentieth-century experience; it reminds us of the emphasis that traditional
Chinese statecraft has long placed on appearing strong when it is actually weak.
Chiang’s performance on the world stage was at one with that of his longtime
friend and rival Zhou Enlai, who, in negotiating in the 1970s on behalf of the
China that Mao Zedong (1893–1976) had ruined, nonetheless always managed
to convey the impression that he was speaking for a great power. Finally, as much
as Chiang himself was a master operator within the Chinese political system,
he and his formidable wife Song Meiling (1898–2003)—Madame Chiang
Kai-shek—together were a powerful force for decades within the very different
American political system.
Taylor deftly succeeds in tying all these threads together into a highly readable
and cogently presented story. As he helps the reader to understand, the strands
of the tale cannot be untangled, and so our own understanding of the history of
this maddening era is abetted by watching Chiang himself think it through. In
this, Chiang’s daily diaries (kept 1918–72), which have gradually been made
public, are a great resource. Taylor knows how to properly exploit them by
weighing them against a trove of other contemporaneous documentation.
Taylor’s work is also a major advance in that it pays close attention to what
happened after Chiang repaired to Taiwan and implemented economic and so-
cial reforms there. Through Taylor’s convincing account of those years it be-
comes apparent that the “Rise of Taiwan” prefigures the “Rise of China.” In
China, after the destructive decades of Mao Zedong’s ascendancy, Beijing has
been tracing the design for “Modern China” that Taiwan first drew, and as
Beijing moves out into the world economy, it relies substantially on Taiwan’s
capital and managerial expertise. Chiang Kai-shek’s son, Chiang Ching-kuo
(1910–88), carried out the political reforms that will also be the template for
China’s political modernization. In 1987, he ended his father’s regime of martial
law, and today Taiwan’s competitive multiparty electoral democracy is admired
throughout the Chinese world.
If the Chiang family’s vision of economics and politics is indeed increasingly
influential in China, Chiang Kai-shek’s once-far-fetched project of reestablish-
ing his sway in China now seems less fanciful. Still, Chiang (and his Republic of
China) and Mao (and his People’s Republic of China), no matter their mortal ri-
valry, were as one in their support of a “One China” that includes Taiwan. Today,
Taiwan’s democratic institutions mean that unification requires the assent of
Taiwan’s people. This constrains both those within Chiang’s Kuomintang (Na-
tionalist) Party who still seek unification and China’s Communist Party, which
would like to fashion yet another Communist-Nationalist rapprochement, a
“Third United Front,” that would mimic the previous two. But unlike those two
“fronts,” mere “nationalism” will not now suffice. Just as the economic systems
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of Taiwan and China have begun to converge on Taiwan’s model, the political
systems will also have to converge on Taiwan’s success as a democracy. It is in this
way that Taiwan may yet in the end come to the rescue of the mainland.
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BOOK REVIEWS
NOT JUST A BRITISH POINT OF VIEW
Rodger, N. A. M. Essays in Naval History, from Medieval to Modern. Variorum Collected Studies Series. Sur-
rey, U.K., and Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate, 2009. 346pp. $135.90
N. A. M. Rodger is well known around
the world as Britain’s foremost naval
historian and the author of the three-
volume A Naval History of Britain, cur-
rently in progress. He is an author
whose writing is always a pleasure to
read, and a volume of his collected es-
says is a welcome addition to the litera-
ture. Like other such collections, these
essays were previously published in ei-
ther specialist academic journals, other
volumes, or other languages. They
range in date of original publication
from 1988 to 2004 and provide a range
of themes that expand in detail upon
aspects that Rodger has also simulta-
neously been dealing with in his multi-
volume history in a more summary
manner. Thus it is of particular value to
have these pieces brought together
where they can be easily found, even
though some specialists may have al-
ready read them. However, the highly
worthy object of bringing such essays
together in a single volume has been
largely thwarted by the publisher,
whose insistence on selling the books in
this series at such high prices has made
it impractical for most interested
readers to buy them. The publisher’s
practice of maintaining the original ty-
pography and page numbering is also
disputable. This reviewer certainly pre-
fers the alternative of revised essays,
newly set in a consistent typeface to cre-
ate an even more cohesive and useful
work. To his credit, however, Rodger
has made brief additional comments on
many of the pieces in light of more re-
cent scholarship; also, this volume in-
cludes a general index.
Like the author’s multivolume history,
the seventeen essays collected here all
reflect the laudable view that naval his-
tory is not a backwater of specialist in-
terest but rather a central theme in
general history, both British and global.
The works cover a selection of interest-
ing topics that range over ten centuries
of naval history. While written from a
consciously British point of view, they
are founded in a much broader context.
As the author writes in his preface, “I
do not consider that naval history can
ever be written from a narrowly na-
tional standpoint. The sea links differ-
ent nations, in peace and war, and there
can be no true naval history which is
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not informed by international compari-
sons, and based on the sources from all
relevant countries and languages.” True
to his word, Nicholas Rodger has pro-
duced essays here that fully reflect that
view, the hallmark of the effectiveness
and originality of his work.
Among the several important and broad-
ranging essays are “The New Atlantic:
Naval Warfare in the Sixteenth Cen-
tury”; “Form and Function in European
Navies, 1660–1815”; and “Navies and
the Enlightenment”—broad overviews
of the changing nature of warfare at sea
and the differing types of navies that
characterized those periods. Rodger’s
essays “Cnut’s Geld and the Size of
Danish Ships,” “The Military Revolu-
tion at Sea,” and “The Development of
Broadside Gunnery, 1450–1650” show
consideration of specific general issues.
“Weather, Geography and Naval Power
in the Age of Sail” should be basic read-
ing for everyone approaching the age of
fighting sail for the first time.
Other selections deal with interpreta-
tions of specific aspects of British his-
tory, such as “The Naval Service of the
Cinque Ports,” “Queen Elizabeth and
the Myth of Sea-Power in English His-
tory,” and “Mutiny or Subversion?
Spithead and the Nore.” A number of
such essays neatly summarize the state
of knowledge on topics that deserve
much greater, in-depth research, and
analysis than they have received.
Among these are two essays on naval
medicine in the light of broader medi-
cal development, one on naval chap-
lains, and another on the broad
development of naval education. To
these Rodger has added his own de-
tailed research contribution to a ne-
glected topic—a statistical analysis of
commissioned officers’ careers between
1660 and 1815. Previously published in
an electronic journal, having this article
readily available in print is most wel-
come, despite the absence of some of
the original graphs.
All in all, this book is recommended to
every naval historian. While the price is
sadly far beyond reason for individuals,
librarians should make a point of ac-




Dietl, Wilhelm. Schattenarmeen: Die Geheimdienste
der islamischen Welt (Shadow Armies: The Secret
Services of the Islamic World). St. Pölten: Residenz
Verlag, 2010. 300pp. $31.90
This is a timely book, given the current
revolutions unfolding across the Middle
East and North Africa, where local in-
telligence and security services have
been a major focus of public anger, fear,
and resentment. Across the region, in
regimes of all ideological stripes, the se-
cret police agency (the dreaded mukha-
barat) has long served as a pillar. These
services have a well deserved reputation
for brutality, sometimes even effective-
ness, yet their murky operations have
long remained shrouded in whispered
myth. The fall of the secret police ser-
vices, especially in Egypt, where the per-
vasive mukhabarat had long been the
stoutest defender of the Mubarak re-
gime, has begun to open the door on
what the spies have been up to.
Dietl, who promises to reveal secrets
about what has really been going on,
has the right credentials to do so, know-
ing both the region and the world of es-
pionage; yet he himself is the subject of
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much speculation and controversy. For
years before his cover was blown in
2005, Wilhelm Dietl reported on events
from across the Islamic world for qual-
ity European media outlets. It was then
revealed that he was an operative for
the German Federal Intelligence Service
(the BND), which has long had a strong
presence in the Middle East. Most con-
troversially, Dietl had spied on fellow
journalists for the BND, a revelation
that tarred his reputation and caused a
major political scandal in Germany.
This book (unable to find a publisher in
Germany, it was instead put out by a
small Austrian firm) may be seen as an
effort at redemption.
Certainly the expected spy stories are
here in abundance, presented against
the background of a “new Cold War”
between the West and the Islamic
world. Schattenarmeen begins with a
long and detailed chapter on the nefari-
ous activities of revolutionary Iran’s
clandestine dirty work, going back to
1979. This is a nasty saga that includes
details about assassinations by Tehran’s
spies of dissidents abroad, in a long list
of countries. It is fitting that Dietl de-
votes so many pages to Iran’s intelli-
gence services, since they have been
active in Germany for many years, in-
cluding involvement in high-profile
killings of dissidents.
There are similar but shorter chapters
on bad behavior by Syria and Libya,
both of which have employed their
spies to kill and intimidate enemies
abroad. The chapter on Egypt is unsat-
isfactorily thin, given the importance of
the mukhabarat in the now-fallen re-
gime, and the discussion of Saudi Ara-
bia is equally perfunctory. Particularly
unsatisfying is Dietl’s presentation of
Iraqi activities before 2003; Saddam’s
secret services enjoyed an evil reputa-
tion across the region for repression at
home and dirty work abroad, yet one
finds only a general discussion of the
role of the intelligence and security ser-
vices in Saddam’s complex and sordid
regime. Considering the avalanche of
materials now available on the Iraqi
mukhabarat, thanks in no small part to
U.S. government efforts to declassify
and release thousands of pages of cap-
tured files, this omission is troubling
and perhaps revealing.
Dietl’s presentation of terrorist groups,
with an analysis of secret alliances with
intelligence services across the region,
is an amalgam of assertions and
speculation—little of it new. Asking
important questions about the exact role
of Islamic secret agencies behind such
groups as Hizballah and Hamas (which
too few Western journalists have been
willing to do) is to be encouraged, but
the information offered here lacks spec-
ificity and, above all, sourcing.
Throughout, it is impossible to tell
from where Dietl gets his information.
He talks about “insider sources” yet
provides no footnotes, even to anony-
mous sources. Given the controversial
nature of many of his assertions, this
does not pass journalistic, much less ac-
ademic, muster. The short bibliography
of “recommended literature” is a pedes-
trian collection of secondary sources
(none in local languages), some of du-
bious reliability, that would be known
to any student of the topic.
The omission of any discussion of Alge-
ria is especially curious, since that un-
fortunate country has experienced the
worst jihad-inspired insurgency of any
Islamic state in recent memory. It has
been a bloody conflict, killing some
200,000 Algerians since 1992, and it is
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still in progress. Considering that Alge-
rian intelligence has been exceptionally
successful at fighting terrorists, employ-
ing clandestine methods that are brutal
and nefarious even by regional stan-
dards, the absence of any analysis of Al-
geria cannot be explained.
In the end, Schattenarmeen is really a
collection of spy stories, many of them
of questionable provenance, and lacks
much overarching analysis. The stories
are entertaining and, based on this re-
viewer’s experiences, essentially true;
however, they are not a serious treat-
ment of an important subject. Instead,
Dietl has added to the unfortunate
genre of terrorism books, marred by
unattributed revelations, inadequate
analysis, and overheated rhetoric. The
major role played by Middle Eastern in-
telligence agencies in security matters
and nearly all regional politics is poorly
understood in the West and demands




Mueller, John. Atomic Obsession: Nuclear
Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al Qaeda. Oxford,
U.K.: Oxford Univ. Press, 2011. 319pp. $27.95
John Mueller has written an extensive
body of work on national security is-
sues, work that runs counter to the con-
ventional wisdom. Atomic Obsession, a
broad examination of the limited role
nuclear weapons have played in history,
examines the prospects for a terrorist’s
acquisition and use of a nuclear device.
Mueller argues that the expense of these
nuclear arsenals (perhaps as high as ten
trillion dollars over the course of the
entire Cold War, by one estimate) was
not worth it. He contends that the
memory of World War II, great-power
“contentment,” and fear of conven-
tional escalation were enough to pre-
vent the Cold War from going hot. He
cites historian Adam Ulam as stating
that Stalin “had great respect for the
United States’ vast economic and hence
military potential, quite apart from the
bomb.”
On the specter of proliferation, Mueller
points out that decades of predictions
of an imminent cascade of new mem-
bers in the nuclear club have not been
borne out, that warnings by Herman
Kahn that Japan would “unequivocably”
have an arsenal by 1980 (and similar
predictions concerning a unified Ger-
many) have not come to pass. Mueller
documents what he says is a sixty-year
history of nuclear alarmism, arguing
that this is the light in which we should
view current concern about proliferation.
The most engaging aspect of this im-
portant book is its section on nuclear
terrorism. Mueller, to my mind, demol-
ishes the casually constructed conven-
tional fears on the subject. Even rogue
regimes are highly unlikely to transfer
one of these expensive (and laboriously
acquired) weapons even to a trusted in-
dependent group, because of the poten-
tial for extreme danger to the state. Al-
Qa‘ida, the “chief demon group” in this
regard, is trusted by no one; its “explicit
enemies group includes not only Chris-
tians and Jews, but all Middle Eastern
regimes.”
Mueller documents how remarkably
difficult nuclear weapons are to steal
and use. Not even all weapons designers
are familiar with modern security safe-
guards, such as conventional explosives
within a nuclear weapon that render the
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weapon useless if precise operating pro-
cedures are not followed. Regarding con-
cern over terrorists building their own
bombs, it is very hard to steal fissile ma-
terial, and the work of constructing a
bomb is “difficult, dangerous, and ex-
tremely exacting.” A great deal of com-
plex experimentation, experimentation
beyond the capabilities of substate
groups, would be required.
Mueller points to a raft of alarming but
mistaken predictions about the likeli-
hood of a terrorist group using a nuclear
weapon. For example, John Negroponte,
as UN ambassador (2001–2004), sug-
gested that there was a “high probabil-
ity” that al-Qa‘ida would attempt to use
a nuclear weapon on the United States
within two years—an ominous warning
offered in 2003.
Those concerned by the threat of nu-
clear terrorism against the United States
are likely to find Atomic Obsession a well
argued, engagingly written, thought-




West, Bing. The Wrong War: Grit, Strategy, and
the Way Out of Afghanistan. New York: Random
House, 2011. 336pp. $28
“We have fought the wrong war with
the wrong strategy”—so ends Bing
West’s The Wrong War. West, a former
assistant secretary of defense and Ma-
rine officer with combat experience in
Vietnam, is an award-winning author
whose books have appeared on the New
York Times best-seller list and the Com-
mandant of the Marine Corps’s reading
list. His latest work is an engrossing
compilation of tactical vignettes, cata-
loging changes to the strategic and
operational-level approaches of two
administrations and six theater-level
commanders, over the ten-year history
of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.
West’s concluding view on the key to
exiting Afghanistan, though perhaps an
oversimplification of the challenge, is
nonetheless a valid consideration for a
potentially long-term military commit-
ment in Afghanistan.
The strength of West’s work is in his
vivid descriptions of operations under-
taken by coalition and special opera-
tions forces (SOF) in Kunar and
Helmand Provinces. The author’s credi-
bility and ability to connect with war
fighters provide him intimate access to
small-unit leaders, resulting in narra-
tives of tactical-level successes that ulti-
mately evolved into strategic-level
failures. West also describes the com-
plexities of the regional, tribal, and
national-level political influences in Af-
ghanistan, the latter best illustrated by
operations in Nuristan Province forced
upon the coalition by President Hamid
Karzai. There are also numerous exam-
ples of what West describes as the “cul-
ture of entitlement,” whereby Afghan
leaders gain the benefits of coalition-
provided security and development
projects while seemingly providing—at
best—only neutrality in return. West’s
portrayals of the war fighters’ courage
and heartbreak are well supported by a
number of revealing photographs. His
method of numbering the photos for
specific reference in the text is particu-
larly effective. Aside from some minor
editorial errors, this work is remarkably
detailed yet still easy to follow, despite
the change over time in local leader-
ship, unit rotation, and the periodic
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renaming of forward operating bases
and combat outposts.
The proposed way out of Afghanistan is
offered in rather abrupt fashion in the
final chapter of the book. West’s exam-
ples and repeated references to Vietnam-
era Combined Action Platoons and his
comparisons of them to effective
SOF-led forces in Helmand are indeed
well founded. However, as painstak-
ingly as he describes the regionally
compartmentalized long-term failure of
small units in one region, caution is
warranted in prescribing one district’s
successful approach as a theater-wide
solution. Furthermore, while West
identifies the challenges, his solution
does not address the broader problems
of the narcotics trade, district-level cor-
ruption, and the synchronization of
incentives-based development programs
—all of which must be addressed while
simultaneously balancing an “exit”
strategy with mid to long-term advisory
force structures. Also noticeably absent
is the inclusion of a chapter on the P2K
(Paktia/Paktika/Khowst) region and the
Haqqani network insurgent group.
The Wrong War will undoubtedly be a
popular read among junior leaders and
war fighters, as well as the general read-
ership, and it should be considered for
battalion-level reading lists and prede-
ployment cultural-awareness training.
Nevertheless, and while the lessons of
Kunar and Helmand are certainly rele-
vant and West’s advisory-team struc-
ture is well considered, policy makers
and strategists will find the book lack-
ing sufficient depth in addressing the
broader-based challenges for a long-
term, comprehensive solution.
LT. COL. JEFFREY J. WINTERS, U.S. ARMY
Naval War College
Evans, Thomas W. The Education of Ronald Rea-
gan: The General Electric Years and the Untold
Story of His Conversion to Conservatism. New
York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2006. 302pp. $20
Thomas Evans is the first author to ex-
amine comprehensively Ronald Rea-
gan’s eight years (1954–62) as host of
the television show General Electric The-
ater and then as a traveling spokesman
for General Electric. Evans has deep-
ened our understanding of how a de-
voted “New Dealer” became not only a
champion of Barry Goldwater but then
displaced him as the patron saint of
American conservatism. Evans’s fine
book examines a critical period in Rea-
gan’s life during which his skills as a
public figure blossomed. Reagan was
one of our most ideological presidents,
yet at the same time he considered him-
self a master of the art of negotiation
and frequently compromised with po-
litical opponents in Sacramento and
Washington. As Reagan developed his
negotiating skills as president of the
Screen Actors Guild (1947–52), he saw
the other side of midcentury American
labor strife, from the perspective of
management, during his time with GE.
General Electric was a formidable and
respected union adversary in terms of
countering big labor’s demands; the
company poured considerable resources
into “educating” its workers to reject
union radicalism. GE’s management
was also ahead of its time in communi-
cating directly with its labor force, over
the heads of the union leadership—a
tactic Reagan employed to great effect
in the White House when Congress
stood in his way.
At the same time, Reagan also learned
to “work a room”—meeting GE
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employees and hearing their complaints
about intrusive government and high
taxes. Though he had spent years in the
film industry, this contact with lower-
and middle-class Americans rubbed off
some of the Hollywood veneer and had
the added benefit of teaching him what
worked and what didn’t in trying to ap-
peal to the “common man.” By 1980,
millions of these “common men” would
become known as “Reagan Democrats.”
Yet perhaps most importantly, it was
during his employment with GE that
Reagan robustly embraced a political
ideology of free markets, limited gov-
ernment, and anticommunism. Evans
believes that Reagan’s GE experience
was his “apprenticeship for public life”
and his “postgraduate education in po-
litical science.” The author argues that
GE’s vice president, Lemuel Boulware
(who directed the aforementioned cam-
paign against the union bosses of the
era), was Reagan’s mentor in his con-
servative apprenticeship. By 1964 Ron-
ald Reagan had publicly come out of his
New Deal closet (he voted in 1960 as a
“Democrat for Nixon”), but neither he
nor the company was anxious to publi-
cize the impact of his GE years on his
conversion.
This work has all the flair of a govern-
ment report on agriculture subsidies,
and the author occasionally overstates
the impact of Reagan’s GE experience
(according to Evans, it was when the
seeds for the Iran-Contra scandal and
Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative
were planted). Nonetheless, Thomas
Evans’s book is the best kind of history
and biography, in that it explores a
facet of a statesman’s life that tends to
be overlooked, especially, in this in-
stance, by historians and political




Beevor, Antony. D-Day: The Battle for Normandy.
New York: Viking Penguin, 2009. 591pp. $32.95
The 6 June 1944 Normandy invasion
has received ample research over the
years, with works by such noted histori-
ans as Cornelius Ryan, Stephen E.
Ambrose, and Max Hastings. Known as
Operation OVERLORD, it was by all ac-
counts a pivotal event of the war in Eu-
rope. Hindsight clearly shows that
ending Hitler’s control of Europe re-
quired the Allies to meet the Wehrmacht
in the field in mainland Europe.
So what can another book add to the
canon on Normandy? Antony Beevor’s
meticulously written and researched
D-Day: The Battle for Normandy might
at first blush appear to be simply an-
other treatise on the famed battle. Yet
anyone who believes this to be so with-
out reading it will miss out on sweeping
narrative and credible research.
Beevor minces no words in telling the
story of this grand operation, the epit-
ome of Allied wartime cooperation and
a daunting plan to develop and execute.
There is no shortage of controversies
and points of debate, which Beevor me-
ticulously brings out again and again. A
fellow countryman, General Sir Bernard
Montgomery, his famous ego well doc-
umented, comes in for pointed criti-
cism for decisions and actions he made
throughout the battle. In fact, both Al-
lied and German military leaders face
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Beevor’s scrutiny. The Americans, fix-
ated on securing a port facility for logis-
tical support, learned the hard way that
the entrenched German garrison in
Brest could hold out for a very long
time. Despite a highly sophisticated
air-ground coordination and the com-
mitment of VIII Corps, the Americans
had to pay dearly to pry Brest from res-
olute and determined German defenders
—blood spilled for a port that in the end
was never used.
Beevor is a well known historian of
twentieth-century combat, one who
knows his topic, capably weaves the
broad sweep of the Normandy cam-
paign into a compelling account, and
provides the broader context, bringing
in aspects of the battle that until re-
cently have received short shrift. For ex-
ample, he presents an excellent account
of the battles fought by the Polish 1st
Armored Division. Also, he shows the
critical role of the 20 July assassination
attempt against Hitler in how the Ger-
man leadership responded to the relent-
less Allied onslaught. The subsequent
hunt for conspirators wreaked havoc
with the German military’s ability to
wage a cohesive and effective defense
and helped set up the eventual Allied
breakout and defeat of the Wehrmacht
in France by the end of the summer.
Without a doubt, the battle for France
in 1944 saw some of the most ferocious
and savage fighting to take place in the
European theater. There was the unre-
lenting fight by Montgomery to take
Caen, which was won at great cost—
Allied bombing during Operation
GOODWOOD ultimately reduced the
town to rubble. Seeing Caen as pivotal
to the security of the beachhead, D-Day
planners expected to have it in Allied
hands by the end of 6 June, but it did
not fall until mid-July. Beevor makes
the case that British sluggishness al-
lowed a vast portion of the German
army to escape the Falaise Pocket—
German soldiers who would live to
fight the Allies another day.
A constant thread throughout his book
is the high cost paid by French citizens
for the liberation of their land. Nearly
twenty thousand French civilians died
during the liberation of Normandy, in
addition to the estimated fifteen thou-
sand killed and nineteen thousand in-
jured during the preliminary bombing.
CDR. DAVID L. TESKA, U.S. COAST GUARD RESERVE
San Diego, California
Fukuyama, Francis. The Origins of Political Order:
From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution.
New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 2011. 585pp.
$35
Two decades ago scholars, government
policy makers, and military cold war-
riors struggled to decipher the meaning
of the sudden and drastic change hap-
pening in the Soviet bloc. Francis
Fukuyama now offers a provocative ap-
proach to this puzzle, which has been
widely debated and perhaps misunder-
stood ever since. He cautiously asked in
The End of History and the Last Man
(1992) “whether, at the end of the
twentieth century, it makes sense for us
once again to speak of a coherent and
directional History of mankind that will
eventually lead the greater part of human-
ity to liberal democracy.” Fukuyama
went on to theorize that the fall of
communism represented a great step
forward in mankind’s struggle for
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“recognition” and higher standards of
government legitimacy. Fingers quickly
pointed to continual conflicts in Africa
and the Middle East as proof that such
idealistic notions had little value. Re-
leased in the midst of the Arab Spring,
however, this new book, the first of two
volumes analyzing the origins of politi-
cal order, offers a timely presentation
of Fukuyama’s ideas on political
development.
It is a work of comparative political
philosophy wrapped around a political-
military world history, from prehistory
through the eve of the French and
American Revolutions. As these events
marked the beginning of a rapid in-
crease in the speed of political develop-
ment, Fukuyama pauses here until the
second volume. He begins with a bio-
logical and anthropological premise
that humans naturally form societal
relationships based on kinship. Kinship-
based societal rule has, in turn, pro-
vided a barrier to three key areas of po-
litical development: the state, rule of
law, and accountable government. The
struggle to move from patrimonial sys-
tems of government to modern liberal
democracy is the framework for
Fukuyama’s history. Liberal develop-
ment, as Fukuyama describes it, follows
many different paths in different re-
gions and cultures, not a single, linear
progression.
Readers may be surprised by a nearly
complete absence of Greek and Roman
political history. Instead, the author de-
scribes paradoxes in Chinese, Indian,
and Ottoman development. Each of
these regions experienced bureaucratic
“state building,” with the potential to
escape the bonds of kinship-based rule,
but each ultimately underwent
“political decay,” preventing the transi-
tion to liberal democracy. He contrasts
these with European political develop-
ment, which, while unique, was not
predestined to occur before that of the
rest of the world.
Perhaps the most interesting features of
this work revolve around early achieve-
ments in state building that failed to se-
cure lasting holds on their respective
societies. He describes, for example,
how though the Chinese dynasties of
Qin (221–207 BC) and Han (206 BC to
AD 220) embraced a centralized state,
meritocratic promotion, and an effec-
tive civilian-led military, the rule of law
never emerged and accountability re-
mained subject to dynastic interpreta-
tion. In India, the Brahmans used
religion to create something akin to the
rule of law as well as an impartial stan-
dard of accountability for rulers, but
they were unable to form lasting state
institutions to enforce these trends.
As the American demand for the mili-
tary to add “state building” to its list of
core competencies increases, officers
will find Fukuyama’s observations on
political origins valuable reminders of
the lasting effects of patrimonialism in
current conflict areas. While we ponder
the next phase of political development
from Tunisia to Bahrain to Afghanistan
and hope for the emergence of liberal
democracy, we should heed Fukuyama’s
caution, “Tribalism in its various forms
remains a default form of political orga-
nization, even after a modern state has
been created.” Perhaps this also explains
the lasting problem of interservice ri-
valry as well!
MAJ. MATT VAN HOOK, U.S. AIR FORCE
Air Force Academy
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Kurtzman, Joel. Common Purpose: How Great
Leaders Get Organizations to Achieve the Extraor-
dinary. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2010. 212pp.
$27.95
In his latest book, Joel Kurtzman draws
on his experience as editor, reporter,
and columnist for the New York Times,
editor in chief of the Harvard Business
Review, founder of the magazine Strategy
+ Business, columnist for Fortune and
Chief Executive Magazine, and adviser
to the World Economic Forum (Davos),
the Wharton School’s SEI Center, and
MIT’s Sloan Management Review. He
attempts to capture the essence of what
it takes to be an effective organizational
leader in today’s world, and the term he
uses for this is the title of the book,
Common Purpose.
Kurtzman starts out with the conun-
drum that leaders of organizations face
today: How do you move from tradi-
tional hierarchical organizations to flat-
ter, sensing organizations that are
responsive enough to react quickly and
appropriately to new information,
threats, and opportunities? How do you
encourage prudent risk taking while
empowering people at all levels to make
decisions that benefit the organization
without losing focus on the vision and
mission or squandering time and re-
sources on efforts that do not contrib-
ute to desired long-term goals and
objectives? In other words, how do you
align effort from top to bottom without
traditional bureaucratic approval pro-
cedures that waste time and effort?
Kurtzman cites as extreme negative
examples the FBI just prior to the at-
tacks of September 11 and the Enron
Corporation. In the first example he
demonstrates the danger of not
empowering people at lower levels to
act when they become aware of infor-
mation, and in the second he shows
what can happen when people are em-
powered to act but get carried away
with short-term goals without consider-
ing the effect over the long term.
In later chapters Kurtzman identifies
ingredients of leadership that produce
an atmosphere of shared, common pur-
pose in high-performing organizations.
He points to many examples, leaders
like Gordon Bethune at Continental
Airlines, Steve Wynn at Wynn Resorts,
and Shivan Subramaniam at FM Global
(an insurance company in Rhode Island
that has been in business since 1835).
He discusses the importance of values
that are demonstrated, not just preached,
by the entire leadership team, serving as
examples for everyone in the organiza-
tion. He points out that the best organi-
zations have leaders who acknowledge
and incentivize the flow of new ideas
from all levels of the company, not just
from the top. He speaks about the im-
portance of trust within organizations
and identifies ways in which trust can
be developed and strengthened despite
tough economic times in which massive
layoffs have diminished the loyalty of
employees toward organizations.
Finally, Kurtzman believes in the power
of positive thinking and the importance
of the leader performing the roles of
coach and mentor. Citing the research
of Richard Boyatzis of Case Western
Reserve University, he maintains that
the best leaders create supportive envi-
ronments that are enjoyable to work in,
an effort that pays off in increased re-
tention and even increased willingness
of employees to take prudent risks to
produce better outcomes. Kurtzman
believes that the mutuality of interests
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among employees and the organization
is one of the most important aspects of
achieving a state in which everyone is
working together, with a common pur-
pose. He also provides some useful in-
sight for older leaders working with
an emergent Generations X and Y
workforce.
This is a well written book that offers
some time-tested and proven ideas to
new leaders and serves as a good re-
minder to seasoned leaders, who may
have gotten into bad habits.
ROGER H. DUCEY
Naval War College
Aurelius, Marcus. Translated by C. Scot Hicks
and David V. Hicks. The Emperor’s Handbook: A
New Translation of the Meditations. New York:
Simon & Schuster, 2002. 150pp. $22
Whether or not the first-century Ro-
man emperor Marcus Aurelius ever in-
tended his personal musings to be
shared with anyone, his Meditations has
been translated and published numer-
ous times over the centuries. Writing at
the end of long days campaigning
against Rome’s enemies, Aurelius
sought to capture his personal thoughts
on the best way to approach the many
challenges presented by life, not only as
a military leader and emperor of Rome
but also as a father and a man. His
thoughts are presented within the frame-
work of the Stoic philosophy, one of the
prevailing schools of thought in the first-
century Roman world. The Emperor’s
Handbook is Scot and David Hicks’s
translation of this great philosophical
work. Does it offer anything to the
reader that other translations do not?
The short answer is yes.
For ease of reading alone The Emperor’s
Handbook soars above both previous
and more recent editions of Medita-
tions. The prose is rendered in modern
American English—clearly delivered
and designed to present Marcus
Aurelius to a contemporary audience.
Short sidebar quotes presented every
two or three pages allow skimming
through the book while still capturing
the enduring wisdom it contains; even
the most casual readers can become ac-
quainted with Aurelius’s thoughts in a
very short time simply by reading them.
What they would miss, however, is the
extensive notes that support much of
the text and contribute to the book’s
strength. For those interested in pursu-
ing further study on either the Medita-
tions or the Stoic philosophy of which it
is a part, the translators list plenty of
additional reference material in their
short introduction. There is a short
index.
Scot and David Hicks believe that any-
one can benefit from reading Marcus
Aurelius’s thoughts. Many previous edi-
tions of his Meditations are specifically
geared toward military leaders or to
leaders in business or government.
However, these translators have aimed
their work at a much wider audience.
The back flap of the book states
Aurelius’s wisdom “speaks to the soul
of anyone who has ever exercised au-
thority or faced adversity or believed in
a better day.” That means almost all of
us, and if this book can spark interest in
readers who might not otherwise have
turned toward the Stoic mind-set or
these particular precepts, it can only be
considered a success. The Emperor’s
Handbook is recommended highly for
anyone—whether student of philoso-
phy, person in authority, or someone
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who, as the authors say, believes in a
better day.
The last sidebar, presented on page 144,
asks, “Are my guiding principles
healthy and robust? On this hangs ev-
erything.” The Emperor’s Handbook
delivers possibly the most robust trans-
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IN MY VIEW
ASYMMETRIC WARFARE AT SEA
Sir:
I was pleased to see Thomas Mahnken’s piece on asymmetric warfare and the
battles off Guadalcanal [“Asymmetric Warfare at Sea: The Naval Battles off
Guadalcanal, 1942–1943” in the Winter 2011 issue of the Naval War College Re-
view, pp. 95–121]. Dr. Mahnken makes a number of worthwhile points, and his
conclusions about the importance of integrating technology with tactics and
operational concepts are well founded; these are very important and valuable
lessons.
The article could have been considerably strengthened by more effective use
of primary-source material or more recent secondary sources. Although Dr.
Mahnken’s conclusions are generally sound, the Navy’s preparations for night
combat prior to the battles of Guadalcanal are far more sophisticated than is
generally believed, and the reasons for failure correspondingly more compli-
cated. In order to understand adequately the lessons of Guadalcanal, it is neces-
sary to examine these preparations in more detail.
As Dr. Mahnken points out, the Navy prepared for a campaign in the Pacific
that would culminate in a decisive daylight fleet action. However, the Navy also
recognized the potential of night torpedo attacks and, rather than shying away
from such actions, actively practiced them. The “Night Search and Attack,” an
established tactic of using destroyers to seek out and attack enemy formations at
night with guns and torpedoes, dates back at least to 1921.1 The records associ-
ated with the development of these tactics illustrate that while the main fleet,
and particularly the battle line, was instructed to avoid night action, light forces
were encouraged to seek it out.
Through much of the interwar period, night search-and-attack procedures
were relatively unsophisticated. Destroyers often attacked individually or in
small groups; coordinated action proved to be difficult.2 Continued practice
paid dividends, however, and by 1937 a new set of procedures had begun to
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emerge. Fleet Problem XVIII of that year saw a series of well-coordinated and
successful attacks; the doctrine employed in those exercises was refined and in-
tegrated into a new and more thorough set of doctrinal publications describing
the procedures for night search and attack.3
By the eve of war, the Navy had a set of procedures that rivaled that of the Jap-
anese in terms of complexity and sophistication. New formations had been in-
troduced, the “Vee” and the “Wedge,” for the cooperation of cruisers and
destroyers at night. Both of these formations placed cruisers in the van; their
firepower would be employed to penetrate an enemy screen. The destroyers be-
hind them, arranged in three parallel columns, would charge through the gap
and attack the enemy ships at the center of the formation with gunfire and tor-
pedoes.4 Neither of these formations was linear; like the Japanese, the U.S. Navy
recognized the limitations of long linear columns at night.
Why then were these procedures not employed off Guadalcanal? Admiral
Nimitz asked as much in his comments on the battle of 12–13 November 1942.5
They were part of the existing doctrine, yet none of the task force commanders
off Guadalcanal used them. It is impossible to understand fully the Navy’s fail-
ures without answering this question.
In order to do so, we must first examine the process for developing task force
doctrine in 1942. The Navy had developed sophisticated plans and procedures
for large battles, termed “Major Tactics” in the doctrinal publications of the
time. It left “Minor Tactics” in the hands of individual task force commanders.
They were expected to develop specific tactics for their forces, corresponding to
their capabilities and the likely enemy forces they would encounter.6
This is exactly what happened off Guadalcanal. The linear formation with de-
stroyers attached closely to the van and rear of the cruiser line was the brainchild
of Admiral Scott, who employed it successfully at the battle of Cape Esperance.
Scott departed from existing doctrine primarily because of the risks of friendly
fire.7 Fratricide had been a repeated problem in prewar exercises and had been
narrowly avoided in the battle of Savo Island. Unfortunately, the linear
formation did not succeed in this regard, and it was quickly—and appropriately
—discarded after the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal.8
Absorbing lessons from earlier actions, Admiral Kinkaid developed a plan
prior to the battle of Tassafaronga specifying that his destroyers were to operate
out ahead of the cruisers in a separate formation and use radar to get into torpedo-
firing position.9 It fell to Admiral Wright to execute Kinkaid’s plan, and although
it did not go well, he stuck with the concept of not employing a single column
and sent his van destroyers out ahead.
The approach of relying on task force commanders to develop specific doc-
trines and procedures explains many of the issues encountered in the battles off
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Guadalcanal. In most battles, the ships were thrown into battle without ade-
quate time to develop plans or doctrines. These forces were “scratch teams,”
hastily cobbled together to repulse Japanese advances. They lacked cohesion and
were unable to train together for significant periods of time. The critical failure
was not a lack of sophisticated procedures or doctrine but rather a breakdown of
peacetime organizational structure under the pressures of a two-front war,
which disrupted unit cohesion.10
However, Scott’s departure from existing doctrine also illustrates why the
Navy was able to adapt so quickly to new procedures, like the successful ap-
proaches of Admiral Merrill and Commander Burke. As unit cohesion increased
and greater time was provided for training formations as a unit before battle, the
flexible nature of doctrinal development combined with the initiative of indi-
vidual task force commanders to allow the best procedures to come to the fore.
Similar flexibility led to the rapid introduction and adoption of vastly improved
procedures for the integration of radar into tactical doctrine, in the form of new
gunnery procedures and the CIC.
What Merrill and Burke recognized, and potentially Kinkaid before them,
was that destroyers could use modern radars to approach torpedo-firing posi-
tion and, if they held fire with their guns, devastate enemy formations before
their presence was discovered. The major doctrinal change was waiting to open
fire with guns until the torpedoes had found their mark. This was not practiced
before the war, because in prewar exercises the destroyers’ torpedo targets were
the heavy ships at the center of enemy formations. To get to them, the destroyers
would have to use their guns to penetrate the enemy screen; there was no way for
them to conceal their approach.11 But this assumption did not hold in the
Solomons in 1943, and tactics appropriately changed.
Dr. Mahnken has correctly recognized the flexibility inherent in the Navy’s
doctrinal approach, but it deserves more attention, particularly for the part it
played not only in the victories of 1943 but also in the failures of 1942. The two
are inexorably linked. Without the ability to allow task force commanders to de-
velop their own doctrines, accounting for their forces and individual circum-
stances, the Navy would not have been able to leverage its technological
advantages as quickly as it did. However, this very same flexibility forced on indi-
vidual commanders a reliance that they were unprepared to meet under the
pressures of a global war in late 1942. This factor, more than any other, is to
blame for the failures off Guadalcanal.12
The implications of this are very important and go beyond how best to inte-
grate technology, tactics, and force structure. The solution the Navy introduced
is worth describing. While still encouraging flexibility and individual initiative,
the Pacific Fleet developed in 1943 a more detailed doctrinal manual that
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outlined the best approaches for combat with small units, as well as large ones.
This was Pacific Fleet Tactical Orders and Doctrine U.S. Pacific Fleet, or PAC 10, of
June 1943. It provided a “playbook” that would allow commanders who lacked
the time or ability to develop their own procedures to employ set plans for battle.
This approach was adopted by the entire Navy with the publication of Current
Tactical Orders and Doctrine, U.S. Fleet, USF 10A, in February 1944. With these
documents the wartime Navy discovered a harmonious balance of flexibility
and standardization that allowed success in the Pacific War.13
TRENT HONE
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CAPTAINS OF THE SOUL
Sir:
In his article “Captains of the Soul: Stoic Philosophy and the Western Profession
of Arms in the Twenty-First Century” [Naval War College Review, Winter 2011,
pp. 31–58], Dr. Michael Evans, in what might be regarded as overkill, cites the
Old Testament, the Alcoholics Anonymous “Serenity Prayer,” the TV series Star
Trek, Latin quotes, the poems “Invictus” and “Ulysses,” and other poetry and po-
ets and novels and novelists, Albert Einstein, the pleasure-loving, self-indulgent
Winston Churchill, ancient Greek philosophers, and many other persons and
sources, so numerous it would be tedious to list them by name, on behalf of the
contention that modern Western professional military officers could use Stoic
philosophy to deal with “an asymmetric enemy who abides by a different set of
cultural rules,” i.e., the Muslims in counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Af-
ghanistan. Current behavioral values, Evans claims, place Westerners at a disad-
vantage when fighting followers of Islam, who follow cultural imperatives based
on a strict code of honor.
But Evans, in spite of all his sundry citations, fails to provide even one exam-
ple of how on the field of battle in counterinsurgency warfare, or in trying to win
the hearts and minds of contested populations, the unreformed, unrecon-
structed honor code of Islam (which, for example, to protect family honor re-
quires the male relatives of a woman who has been raped through no fault of her
own to murder her, and which requires that Muslim girls in a burning building
must remain inside and die if they are not properly attired to go outside) places
Muslims at an advantage and Western militaries and Western democracies at a
disadvantage in asymmetric warfare. Evans says an erosion of public honor in
Western term societies has impacted upon “the Western military’s professional
ethics and its institutional notions of duty and sacrifice” [page 33]. But he cites
no example of how this has manifested itself in the actual conduct of counterin-
surgency by Western professional military officers in Iraq and Afghanistan. The
only military problem that Evans describes in his article proposing the adoption
of Stoic philosophy by Western professional military officers is that of neuropsy-
chiatric disorders among 20% of U.S. service members—not just officers—who
have returned from Iraq and Afghanistan. Evans doesn’t disclose what part of
that 20% affected are officers and what percent of all officers are affected.
Evans has not demonstrated how these “invisible wounds of war,” post–
traumatic stress disorders (PTSD), and depression, which are the result of hav-
ing served in Iraq and Afghanistan, have been the actual causes of specific disad-
vantages U.S. forces have experienced during the conduct of operations in those
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two countries. Let’s keep in mind that the “post” in post–traumatic stress disor-
der means “after,” “subsequent,” “later.”
Evans admits that there are “fundamental gaps” regarding the causality of
military mental-health problems. Yet he cites the opinions of an American bri-
gadier general, who is not an expert in psychology, and a military philosopher,
who is also no expert in psychology, that Stoic characteristics could be of value
in combating combat stress—not post–traumatic stress disorder and depres-
sion. These unsubstantiated opinions don’t support Evans’s contention about
the adoption of Stoic philosophy by military officers. He doesn’t even show that
stress in combat is always necessarily dysfunctional and counterproductive.
In closing, I would like to point to an observation by the ancient Athenian or-
ator and statesman Pericles in his funeral oration over the Athenians killed
fighting Sparta in the Peloponnesian War. Although the Spartans may not have
had an intricately developed system of Stoic philosophy, they were certainly stoi-
cal in how they lived. “Unlike the Spartans, we do not harden ourselves with a
stern and harsh discipline beginning in childhood. On the contrary, we live as we
please and take a pleasurable exercise whenever it suits us to do so.” Yet this dif-
ference in lifestyles did not seem to put the Athenians at a disadvantage when
facing the Spartans in battle.
JOSEPH FORBES
I N M Y V I E W 1 6 3
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OF SPECIAL INTEREST
CIVIL WAR MANUSCRIPTS IN THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE’S
NAVAL HISTORICAL COLLECTION
The Civil War began on 12 April 1861, when Confederate troops fired on Fort
Sumter in the harbor of Charleston, South Carolina. This was the start of four
years of warfare on land and at sea. The Naval Historical Collection contains let-
ters, journals, and accounts of Union sailors and soldiers who participated in
battles or were on blockade duty in Southern waters. As this year marks the ses-
quicentennial anniversary of the beginning of the war, these manuscripts de-
serve recognition.
Timothy Murphy, a blacksmith from New Bedford, Massachusetts, joined a
Massachusetts regiment in 1864 and then transferred to the U.S. Navy. His col-
lection consists of letters to his wife written in 1864 and 1865. In them he de-
scribes camp and shipboard life, the battle of Mobile Bay, his concern for his
family and friends back home, and his hope of receiving the bounty offered at
recruitment. He also comments on the many deserters from his unit. John
Seacote’s letters to his father date from 1864 and 1865, when he served in USS
Savannah and USS Chenango as a member of the New Hampshire infantry.
Seacote writes about his duties on board ship, his illnesses, his need for money,
and the prospective bounty. Admiral David Farragut wrote to his wife on 31 July
1864, several days before the battle of Mobile Bay. He confessed that he did not
know when he was going to attack, as he was waiting for troops to arrive, but had
faith in God and the outcome. Earlier, on 1 May 1862, he had sent a letter to Gen-
eral Benjamin F. Butler congratulating him on the capture of the city of New Or-
leans. He hoped that the army would “hold the city without further difficulty.”
Lieutenant Commander Stephen B. Luce was in USS Pontiac on 1 March 1865
when he wrote to Commander George S. Blake regarding the deplorable condi-
tions in the South near the war’s end. Luce found it sad that “families . . . have
been reduced in one day from affluence to begging.”
The Union navy maintained a strong blockade of Southern ports with the in-
tention of preventing supplies from Europe reaching the military and the civil-
ian population. Noteworthy among the Union captains was Commander John
B. Marchand of USS James Adger in the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron
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and stationed off Charleston, South Carolina. He also served in the Western Gulf
Blockading Squadron off Mobile, Alabama, and Galveston, Texas, 1862–64. His
holograph diaries document the weather and the daily tedium of blockade duty.
Despite the best efforts of the ships of the squadron, foreign goods and supplies
got through. But patrolling was not always in vain, as a 1 August 1864 list of
prizes indicates. James Curran was second assistant engineer in USS Unadilla
during the final months of the war. His log records the visit of President Abra-
ham Lincoln to Richmond on 5 April, General Lee’s surrender, Lincoln’s assassi-
nation, and mop-up blockade duty on the Chickahominy River.
While men were in battle at sea or on the rivers of the Confederacy, women
faced their own hardships. Maria McGregor Campbell Smith of Richmond, Vir-
ginia, sought to escape the war in 1864 by traveling north to relatives in
Cooperstown, New York. Her husband, Charles, was assistant surgeon general of
the Confederate armies. Maria left home by wagon with her two children, know-
ing that she faced possible capture when she crossed Yankee lines. After she ar-
rived in the North, she wrote an account of her travels that can be found in the
Roy Campbell Smith Papers.
For information on the Naval Historical Collection and its holdings, contact
the archivist, Dr. Evelyn M. Cherpak, at evelyn.cherpak@usnwc.edu or (401)
841-2435.
CALL FOR CONTRIBUTORS
A three-volume book set, China and International Security: History, Strategy, and
21st Century Policy, is in preparation. Its purpose is to provide in-depth views of
China and its national security environment, including historical (volume 1)
and domestic-cultural (volume 2) contexts as well as contemporary (volume 3)
security issues. The set seeks cogent analyses of China’s security strategies, re-
gionally and internationally, as well as detailed examinations of the Communist
Party of China and the People’s Liberation Army and their roles in China’s na-
tional security, in particular. Academics, researchers, and practitioners (civilian
and military) are all invited to submit original, unpublished one-page proposals
(for chapters of from five to seven thousand words) along with brief biographies
(including full contact information) for consideration. First-draft deadline is 1
January 2012. Contact Donovan C. Chau, PhD, dchau@csusb.edu, Department
of Political Science and MA Program in National Security Studies, California
State University, San Bernardino.
O F S P E C I A L I N T E R E S T 1 6 5
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REFLECTIONS ON READING
Professor John E. Jackson is the Naval War College’s Manager for the
CNO’s Navy Professional Reading Program.
Yesterday, December 7, 1941—a date which will live in infamy—the
United States of America was suddenly and deliberately attacked. . . .
FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT
This December will mark the seventieth anniversary of the attacks on Ameri-can forces at Pearl Harbor and elsewhere on the Hawaiian island of Oahu, at-
tacks that suddenly thrust the United States into the Second World War.
President Roosevelt was correct when he stated that the date would “live in in-
famy”; few dates in American history evoke such memories and such passion.
U.S. veterans of World War II, once numbering over sixteen million men and
women, are dying at a rate of more than a thousand a day and now number only
about 2.5 million. Accordingly, it is becoming more difficult to hear at first hand
about their triumphs and tragedies, but thankfully, many outstanding books
document how the nation was saved by the selfless efforts of what is often called
“the greatest generation.” A number of titles in the Navy Professional Reading
Program discuss World War II in general and the Pacific War in particular.
The New York Times calls Ronald H. Spector’s Eagle against the Sun: The Ameri-
can War with Japan “the best one-volume history of that complex conflict. . . . No
other presents as balanced a view or provides such terse and searching analyses not
only of the great battles but of half-forgotten aspects, such as the impact of blacks
and female participants on the services.” Spector skillfully relates the major events
of the forty-four-month-long war, from the surprise attack that shattered the
quiet of a Sunday morning on a peaceful tropical island to the searing flash of the
atomic bombs that provided the necessary shock to move the Japanese militarists
to surrender. He writes at some length about the contributions of intelligence
analysts and code breakers to many operational successes. He also details the
remarkable achievements of American submarines against enemy shipping—
achievements that came at a tremendous cost in the lives of American
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R E F L E C T I O N S O N R E A D I N G 1 6 7
submariners, nearly 22 percent of whom, he reports, never returned from patrol,
the highest casualty rate of any U.S. service in the war.
James D. Hornfischer’s The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors is an acclaimed
best seller that recounts what has been called one of the most lopsided victories
in the history of naval warfare. The American Library Association notes,
This piece of World War II naval history reads like a particularly good novel. It is an
account of the October 1944 battle off Samar, in which a force of American destroy-
ers and escort carriers drove off a Japanese fleet at least 10 times its strength.
Hornfischer focuses on the men of the escort carrier unit (call sign) Taffy 3, who
fought, flew, and fired to nearly the last shell in a battle that at least one commander
commenced by saying, “Survival cannot be expected.” Readable from beginning to
end, this popular history magnificently brings to life men and times that may seem
almost as remote as Trafalgar to many in the early twenty-first century. Of special in-
terest are its account of the process that turned civilians into sailors, and its carrying
forward of those sailors’ stories to the handful of aging survivors still gathering in
commemoration today.
While emeritus professor George Baer recently retired from the Naval War
College faculty after thirty years of distinguished service, the fruits of his schol-
arship continue to enrich the readers of his award-winning book One Hundred
Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890–1990. He addresses the factors leading
up to Pearl Harbor, the conduct of the war, and the ways in which the lessons of
World War II influenced the U.S. Navy into the last decade of the twentieth cen-
tury. Rutgers University faculty member Edward Rhodes writes,
This is clearly one of the two or three most important works in American naval his-
tory published in the last decade; it has the potential to become a classic in the field.
Well researched and carefully nuanced, it provides a distinctive perspective on the
evolving historical relationship between national interest and national politics on the
one hand and naval power on the other. Not only is this a significant contribution to
scholarship—one that will critically influence how historians and political scientists
think about American naval power—it is an enormously readable work. Baer writes
beautifully, and he has organized his material effectively. The book is fully accessible
to anyone interested in naval history.
Taken individually or as a “literary trifecta,” these books provide enlightening
insights into the state of America’s navy before Pearl Harbor, how the service ex-
panded exponentially to meet the demands of a two-ocean war, and how the
courage and heroism of individual sailors carried the day in the most trying of
circumstances. These are great lessons to recall as we approach the anniversary
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